The politics of democratic governance : the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands by Behagel, J.H.
The politics of democratic 
governance 
The implementation of the Water Framework Directive in 
the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jelle Hendrik Behagel  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis committee 
 
Promoter 
Prof. dr. B.J.M. Arts 
Professor of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy  
Wageningen University 
 
Co-promoter 
Dr. ir. E. Turnhout 
Associate professor, Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group 
Wageningen University 
 
Other members 
Prof. dr. ir. A.P.J. Mol, Wageningen University 
Prof. dr. D. Huitema, VU University, Amsterdam 
Dr. D. Howarth, University of Essex, United Kingdom 
Dr. C. Waterton, Lancaster University, United Kingdom 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of the Wageningen School of Social Science 
 The politics of democratic 
governance 
The implementation of the Water Framework Directive in 
the Netherlands 
 
 
 
Jelle Hendrik Behagel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis 
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor 
at Wageningen University 
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus 
Prof. Dr. M.J. Kropff, 
in the presence of the 
Thesis Committee appointed by the Academic Board 
to be defended in public 
on Monday 10 December 2012 
at 11 a.m. in the Aula.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jelle Hendrik Behagel 
The politics of democratic governance: The implementation of the Water Framework 
Directive in the Netherlands 
233 pages.  
 
PhD thesis, Wageningen University, Wageningen, NL (2012)  
With references, with summaries in English and Dutch 
 
ISBN 978-94-6173-448-8
 Acknowledgements 
The problem with writing acknowledgments is that one always forgets many people who 
have contributed to your personal success. Even so, writing a PhD thesis is a highly 
individual process and intended to be so. It is about becoming an academic researcher in 
your own right and an expert on your own field of study. Notwithstanding this individual 
process, I could not have completed this thesis without the support of too many to mention. 
Therefore, I will name only a few. 
 To start, my PhD research had not been possible without the financial support of The 
Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and their inspirational research 
programme Contested Democracy. Equally, I could not have done without Esther Turnhout 
and Bas Arts, who in addition to being my co-promoter and promoter, saw potential in me 
as a PhD and wrote the research proposal for the project Data or deliberative democracy?, 
within which my PhD took place. They did much more as well: they provided me with the 
inspiration and the criticism needed to helped me grow into the researcher I feel I am today. 
Above all, they have been great colleagues, and I trust will remain so in my career to come. 
 Working at the Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group in Wageningen has been a 
great joy, not only because of all the people I met and got to know over the years, but also 
because of the both safe and challenging environment it offered me. I am grateful for all the 
opportunities that I was given to participate as a full member of the group in organising 
meetings, discussing research, giving lectures, and editing a book together. I wish to name at 
least a few of these colleagues, although I am indebted to many more: Sonja, of course, who 
was not only my co-worker in the research project, but also a co-author, co-thinker, and a 
friend. Jessica I equally cannot leave out as she listened to all my problems, but also shared 
my joys and became a valued friend, in addition to being a great colleague in many matters. I 
was also lucky to work with Barbara as the most overqualified and fun secretary I ever met 
and who you could always have a chat with. Carla of course, who would forgive me all my 
administrative errors with a smile. And there are many more colleagues that I am not 
mentioning here, assistant professors, junior lecturers, PhDs, postdocs, etc., who I am 
grateful to have worked with and who made my PhD the good experience it was. 
 Finally, I would like to say thanks to my family, who always had an unconditional faith in 
me and supported me. I realise this is not a given, and I am grateful for having them. 
Barbara, I met you halfway through my PhD and you did not only make my life more 
meaningful and beautiful, you also inspire me to share that with the world. 
 

 Table of Contents 
The paradox of democratic governance ................................................................................. 1 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 2 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 
The concept of governance ............................................................................................... 6 
The democratic norms of governance ............................................................................... 9 
Debates on democratic governance ................................................................................. 13 
Politicisation and depoliticisation ................................................................................... 16 
EU governance ............................................................................................................... 19 
Research objectives and questions ................................................................................... 21 
A theoretical framework of discourse and practice .............................................................. 25 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 26 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 27 
Critical constructivism .................................................................................................... 27 
The argumentative turn and the practice turn ................................................................. 30 
The concepts of discourse and practice ........................................................................... 32 
Discourse .................................................................................................................... 32 
Practice ....................................................................................................................... 34 
The discursive and the non-discursive ............................................................................. 37 
Ontology and epistemology ............................................................................................ 39 
Combining discourse and practice into an analytical frame ............................................. 42 
Research approach: the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the 
Netherlands ........................................................................................................................ 45 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 46 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 47 
An interpretive research approach ................................................................................... 47 
Democratic norms of research......................................................................................... 49 
Case study research ......................................................................................................... 51 
The case of the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands.. 52 
Data collection and analysis ............................................................................................ 55 
 Outline of the thesis ....................................................................................................... 59 
Democratic legitimacy in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the 
Netherlands: towards participatory and deliberative norms? ............................................... 63 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 64 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 65 
Participation, legitimacy, and democratic norms ............................................................. 66 
Claims, requests and discourse ........................................................................................ 68 
Case description and approach ........................................................................................ 71 
Claims, requests and emergent discourses in the Dutch implementation of the WFD .... 72 
The Aquarein report ................................................................................................... 73 
A claim is made ........................................................................................................... 74 
A new discourse .......................................................................................................... 76 
Sustaining the feasible and affordable discourse ........................................................... 78 
Building a counter-claim ............................................................................................. 80 
The construction of democratic legitimacy in governance processes ................................ 82 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 83 
Annex 1: list of interviewees ............................................................................................ 84 
Political rationalities in the new governance: the case of the implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive in the Netherlands ............................................................................ 85 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 86 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 87 
From functionalist assumptions to political rationalities ................................................. 88 
Rationalities of governance ............................................................................................. 91 
Governmental, instrumental, and deliberative rationalities in the WFD ......................... 93 
The WFD: an example of the new governance ............................................................ 93 
Water quality objectives .............................................................................................. 94 
Public participation ..................................................................................................... 96 
Monitoring and reporting ........................................................................................... 98 
Lower-level authorities .............................................................................................. 101 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 103 
 The performativity of environmental quality standards: convergence and resistance in the 
constitution of water quality ............................................................................................. 105 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 106 
Standards as techniques of governance .......................................................................... 107 
Accounting by standards ............................................................................................... 109 
Performativity: convergence and resistance ................................................................... 111 
The performativity of water quality standards in the WFD ........................................... 113 
Constituting water quality ......................................................................................... 113 
Water quality standards as sites for politics ................................................................ 117 
Unpredictable outcomes............................................................................................ 119 
The performative dimensions of environmental quality standards ................................. 121 
What institutions do: grasping participatory practices in the Water Framework Directive 125 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 126 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 127 
What participatory institutions do ................................................................................ 129 
Fields and logics of practice .......................................................................................... 132 
The practice of participation in the WFD in the Netherlands ....................................... 133 
The design and organisation of public participation in the WFD .............................. 134 
Extending and improving the public sphere? ............................................................. 135 
Changing the logic of the governance network .......................................................... 138 
The economics of participation ................................................................................. 140 
Conclusion: grasping participatory practices ................................................................. 142 
Annex 2: List and dates of interviewees cited in this chapter (all interviews were in Dutch 
and have been translated by the authors) ....................................................................... 145 
What participants do. A practice based approach to public participation in two policy fields
 ......................................................................................................................................... 147 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 148 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 149 
A practice based approach to participation .................................................................... 151 
Methodological choices................................................................................................. 153 
Introducing the case studies .......................................................................................... 154 
 Regional planning case .................................................................................................. 156 
Water Framework Directive case .................................................................................. 159 
A tale of two policy fields: the dynamics of participatory practices ................................ 164 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 165 
Conclusion: The politics of democratic governance .......................................................... 169 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 170 
Introduction ................................................................................................................. 171 
Articulating and performing democratic norms ............................................................ 173 
Dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation ............................................................. 176 
Constitutive power, disciplinary power, and resistance.................................................. 178 
Revisiting the analytical concepts .................................................................................. 180 
The politics of interpretive research .............................................................................. 182 
The politics of democratic governance .......................................................................... 185 
Summary – The politics of democratic governance ........................................................... 187 
Samenvatting – De politieke processen van governance .................................................... 193 
References ........................................................................................................................ 199 
 
 
  
1 
The paradox of democratic governance 
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Abstract 
This chapter introduces the central problem definition of this dissertation and the field of 
study with which it engages. It argues that the literature on democratic governance shows a 
paradox where governance is both presented as an affirmation of, and a challenge to, 
democracy. The chapter disentangles this paradox of democratic governance in three steps: 
(1) The concept of governance is explained by describing three of its key elements – the 
increased involvement of non-state actors, decentralised decision making, and new modes of 
steering by the central state – and the way in which these can serve as analytical categories. 
The democratic norms of governance are then discussed in comparison to those of liberal 
democracies, and the former are shown to be only loosely linked to the preceding governance 
elements. (2) The chapter shows how these governance elements and democratic norms are 
part of normative debates about democratic governance that can be identified as involving 
three dichotomies: representative versus participatory democracy, top-down versus bottom-
up approaches to governance, and instrumental versus deliberative rationality. (3) These 
debates on democratic governance are lifted out of the realm of ethics and placed into the 
realm of the political. This is done by describing these debates in terms of politicisation and 
depoliticisation and as involving contestations over what constitute legitimate political 
actors, arenas, and modes of interaction. The paradox of democratic governance having thus 
been disentangled, some background is given on EU governance and on the subject of the 
case study in this thesis – the EU Water Framework Directive – described as a new mode of 
governance that involves both processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. The chapter 
ends with the formulation and explanation of the problem statement and the research 
questions that inform the remainder of this thesis. 
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 ‘Five principles underpin good governance and the changes proposed in this White Paper: 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is important for 
establishing more democratic governance. They underpin democracy and the rule of law in the 
Member States, but they apply to all levels of government – global, European, national, regional 
and local.’ (European Commission 2001) 
Introduction 
Today, it is widely accepted that the European Union (EU) has evolved towards a system of 
governance (Schout and Jordan 2005). As a result, decisions in the EU are increasingly made 
by supra- and subnational actors, such as the European Commission (EC), regional and local 
governments, transnational interest groups, or local NGOs. This change in the political 
landscape has gone hand in hand with new forms of horizontal, network-based forms of 
decision making where mechanisms of coordination and resource mobilisation now take 
place outside of hierarchical control, and new modes of accountability have been introduced 
(Hajer 2003, Schout and Jordan 2008). These changes in political make-up and new modes 
of steering in the EU have important implications for democracy: how the relation between 
democracy and governance is conceptualised; which democratic norms are invoked in 
debates; and how democracy is performed in practice. 
 In scholarly and political debate, governance and democracy are closely associated, but the 
way in which this association is made depends on perspective. In the perspective that builds 
on the concept of ‘good governance,’ governance is affirmed as a way to strengthen 
democratic decision making. Whereas the concept of good governance is primarily 
normative or prescriptive, a second perspective on governance tends more towards critique. 
This perspective on governance scrutinises normative claims by comparing these claims to 
actual governance practices, or deconstructs certain normative assumptions made by 
proponents of good governance (e.g. Arts et al. 2009, Turnhout and van der Zouwen 2010, 
Arnouts et al. 2012). In these types of analysis, specific modes of governance may actually 
obstruct democracy, as they can lead to top-down, technocratic decision making that takes 
place out of view of the general public. The two perspectives described above present a 
paradox: how can governance be at once an affirmation of, and a challenge to, democracy?  
 A first step in unravelling the paradox is to specify what characteristics of governance can 
be viewed as both affirming and challenging democracy. In itself, governance is a very broad 
concept that can mean any action or manner of governing. However, with the adjective 
‘good’ added to it, it becomes normative. Discourses on good governance include norms of 
participation, efficiency, and accountability, amongst others (Woods 2000). These norms are 
translated into principles of action or ideals that should be pursued, for example when the 
EC White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) promotes participation, 
accountability, and effectiveness. It is this focus on action that creates the paradox. On the 
Chapter 1 
4 
one hand, good governance presents key elements of governance as affirming democratic 
norms, such as the greater inclusion of non-state actors, decentralised decision making, and 
new, horizontal forms of accountability. On the other hand, these same elements are 
criticised for diminishing the political potential of non-state actors, for introducing 
disciplinary power, and for leading to decision-making practices that are unaccountable to 
the general public (e.g. Burnham 2001). 
 A second step in unravelling the paradox of democratic governance is to understand as 
inherently normative the affirmations or challenges that governance presents for democracy. 
Both normative and critical accounts of governance concern themselves either with the 
affirmation of specific democratic norms or with offering a critique of governance practices 
based on such norms. In the context of the EU – which has evolved to a system of 
governance over the last decades –, contestations over what are valid norms for democracy, 
what they mean, and how they are reflected in governance processes are believed to be the 
rule rather than the exception (Wiener 2007). These contestations include struggles between 
representative, deliberative, and participatory norms (e.g. Trenz 2009); questions of what 
democratic participation means (e.g. Warren 2002a); or concerns over whether new forms of 
accountability are actually still democratic (e.g. Papadoupolos 2007). Such contestations are 
played out in and across different domains, including academic debate, policy discourse, and 
local practice. In these domains, they take the shape of debates between representative and 
participatory democracy; top-down and bottom-up approaches; and instrumental and 
deliberative rationalities. 
 The paradox of democratic governance is unravelled in a third step by showing that it is 
about debates over what constitutes a political actor, a political arena, and politics. This 
follows from the understanding that the contestations between different perspectives on 
governance in democratic debates can be read as contestations over what constitutes 
legitimate political action. More specifically, if we understand these debates to be about the 
politicisation and depoliticisation of different spheres, actors, and dynamics of interaction, 
then they can be reconceptualised as contestations over who makes decisions, where, and 
how. Doing so takes democratic debates out of the realm of the ethical and into the realm of 
the political. I therefore approach struggles over democratic norms not as merely entailing 
different perspectives on what constitutes democratic quality, but as occurring and being 
decided in and through fields of power. 
 By bringing the above steps together, this thesis seeks to disentangle the paradox of 
democratic governance by studying the contestations that take place over what are 
considered politically legitimate actors, arenas, and dynamics of interaction. It does so in 
order to bring clarity to debates on democratic governance. These debates are often couched 
in normative assumptions which are not made explicit or lack a firm empirical basis. By 
making explicit the implications of democratic norms for practice and by studying how 
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democratic norms are entwined in fields of power, this thesis aims to elucidate what is 
understood as democratic governance by diverse governance actors. Explicating these norms 
also makes clear why certain governance practises are criticised and why others are not, since 
they are entwined in a field of power. In order to study the paradox of democratic 
governance in terms of power, I adopt a theoretical approach that is able to make sense of 
how democratic norms are constructed in, and performed through, a field of power. This 
perspective builds on a critical constructivist perspective that claims that norms are 
articulated in discourse and performed in practice. Specifically, I combine discourse analysis 
and a practice based approach in a single theoretical framework. 1 
 Discourse analysis is an approach that understands language as shaping the world and the 
actions of actors, as well as being shaped in political processes of contestation (Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005). Importantly, it offers an analytical framework by which to understand how 
norms are articulated and contested, and how they shape practices. By making explicit the 
democratic norms that are articulated in concrete discourses, contestations over what is 
democratic and what is not are explained in terms of competing discourses. As discourses 
reveal how meanings discipline actions, discourse analysis also reveals the entwinement of 
democratic norms with power. In order to understand how and why actors adopt or resist 
certain norms and how they perform these norms in practice, I complement discourse 
analysis with a practice based approach. This approach understands norms as principles for 
action and is able to show how these come into conflict with other principles of action. 
Accordingly, it highlights how democratic norms are not the only principles of action that 
steer governance. In addition, a practice-based approach understands agency as situated 
within the practices in which actors adopt or resist norms (Arts et al. 2013). Analysing how 
these norms perform in practice, why they often perform differently than envisaged, or why 
they do not perform at all, also gives substance to the paradox of democratic governance 
beyond contestations over norms. Thus, an analysis that combines discourse and practice 
reveals the tensions between what are considered democratically legitimate political processes 
in certain policy discourses and what are acceptable political processes in a specific field of 
practice. 
 In order to study the paradox of democratic governance as outlined above, I have chosen 
the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) (European Commission 
2000) in the Netherlands as a case study. I did so for a number of reasons. First, it is an early 
example of EU governance. Second, it integrates a number of principles of good governance, 
such as participation, effectiveness, and accountability. Third, it reflects the changed political 
landscape of the EU and introduces a new mode of steering that builds on more horizontal, 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the concept of discourse is broadly conceived of as a system of meaning, rather than its narrower 
meaning of text, unless stated otherwise. A practice based approach is based on practice theory and should be 
distinguished from simple empiricism or approaches such as grounded theory. For a detailed account of the use 
of discourse in this thesis and the theoretical concept of practice, see chapter 2. 
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network-based modes of decision making. Fourth and finally, it exhibits explicit political 
dynamics such as the competition between discourses and the multiple performances of 
democratic norms in practice. The remainder of this chapter provides relevant background 
to the paradox of democratic governance as sketched above, describes the specific debates in 
which this paradox has been given shape, shows how it can be brought into the realm of 
politics, and details the specific character of EU governance. First, the concept of governance 
is explained by describing its key elements and the ways in which it can be analysed. Second, 
the democratic norms of governance associated with these key elements are identified and 
described. Third, the three dichotomies that encompass the way in which democratic 
governance has been debated in the literature are described. Fourth, these debates are 
situated in the domain of politics, specifically in terms of politicisation and depoliticisation. 
Fifth, the EU as a system of governance is described as well as the concept of ‘new modes of 
governance.’ Sixth and finally, the research questions that inform the remainder of this thesis 
are articulated and explained.  
The concept of governance 
‘In much present-day use, governance refers to: a new process of governing; or a changed condition 
of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.’ (Rhodes 2008:1246) 
Over the last two decades, the concept of governance has gained increasing attention, from 
both scholars and policy practitioners. It has been propagated as a new form of steering by 
the World Bank as good governance (Doornbos 2001) since the early 1990s; it has been used 
to describe the changing polity following the ‘hollowed-out state’ in the UK (Rhodes 1997); 
and it has played a prominent role in debates on the EU, specifically as new modes of 
governance (Héritier 2001). Even though it is now omnipresent, or perhaps precisely 
because of it, no clear definition of governance exists (Pierre and Peters 2000). It functions 
more as a container concept or even as an ‘empty signifier’ (Offe 2009) to allow scholars and 
practitioners to discuss the increasingly important role of non-state actors, the increasing 
complexity and changes in the composition of society as a whole, and the new norms and 
techniques with regard to how society should be governed.  
 Although governance has a wide range of meanings and applications, there are some key 
elements of governance that most scholars who use the concept tend to agree upon (e.g. 
Rhodes 1997, Jessop 1998, Bulkeley and Mol 2003, Bevir 2004, Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2006, Turnhout and van der Zouwen 2010). These key elements are: the 
increased involvement of non-state actors, the decentralisation of decision making, and the 
emergence of new modes of steering by central authorities. These elements are used both 
prescriptively – as ways to achieve good governance – and descriptively – as empirical 
manifestations of a changed political landscape and of the new methods by which societies 
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are governed. Therefore, they can be invoked both as policy instruments to achieve 
democratic norms and as analytical concepts to describe governance.  
 The first key element of governance is the increased role of non-state actors in decision 
making. The involvement of the market, organised civil society, and the public is considered 
a key characteristic of new understandings of how governing takes place or should take place. 
Public services are delivered not only by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, but also by 
market parties, societal groups, experts, and volunteers. In one way, this is a recognition of 
the changed political landscape. Over the last decades, we have seen the proliferation of 
national and international NGOs (Arts 1998), the increased power of global markets, the 
growth of transnational organisations, and the growing reliance on technical expertise 
(Warren 2009) that have ‘overloaded’ the central state in terms of the demands that it faces 
and that have hollowed it out in terms of political legitimacy (Skelcher 2000). As a result, 
actors from the market and civil society as well as experts have become increasingly 
important in decision making. These changes in the political landscape have resulted in the 
formation of governance networks (Torfing 2005), partnerships (Glasbergen and 
Groenenberg 2001, Mert 2009), and other hybrid arrangements. Involving non-state actors 
in decision making is also encouraged by international organisations such as the World 
Bank, by international treaties on participation – for example the Aarhus convention –, and 
by EU and national legislation. The active involvement of non-state actors in decision 
making through processes of participation, in governance networks, or in public–private 
partnerships therefore is not only an empirical phenomenon, but also the result of the 
normative drives of good governance.  
 The second key element of governance is decentralised decision making. Decentralisation 
implies that authoritative decision making has been dispersed from the central state both 
downwards to regional and local units of authority and upwards to transnational 
organisations such as the EU (or WTO, UN, etc.) (Hooghe and Marks 2001). That is to say, 
lower-level governments and transnational organisations have gained increased authority in 
decision making, and decision-making authority has been awarded to semi-governmental or 
non-governmental organisations such as expert networks or standard setting bodies such as 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). As with the previous governance element, processes 
of decentralisation can be explained as resulting from pressures such as globalisation, the 
increasing complexity of society, and the growing reliance on the expertise of central 
governments and their bureaucratic apparatuses; but decentralisation is also encouraged as a 
way to create more effective and democratic governance. Taking decisions as close as possible 
to where those decisions impact is considered to build local democracy (Ribot et al. 2010), 
and local deliberation is often seen as more effective for finding innovative solutions to 
problems (Smismans 2004). Furthermore, decentralisation is said to contribute to the 
transparency and accountability of government because it allows less powerful social groups 
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to gain easier access to decision making (Abers and Keck 2006). Again, as with the 
involvement of non-state actors, both wider empirical phenomena and normative ideals can 
be seen to promote decentralisation processes as a key element of governance. 
 The third key element of governance concerns the new modes of steering by central 
authorities. In the ‘shift from government to governance,’ the state is believed to have moved 
from ‘rowing to steering’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This specific element of governance 
is heavily indebted to new public management (NPM) that seeks to make government more 
efficient by introducing methods from business management to the domain of government 
(Hood 1995). Moreover, it builds on the notion that (central) government should be 
smaller, more concerned with guidance, and less concerned with direct service delivery 
(Skelcher 2000). Consequently, a changed role for the state in governance entails not only 
processes of decentralisation, but also the introduction of business methods such as output 
controls and performance measurement as an alternative form of steering. In addition, peer 
review amongst authorities and by society is believed to promote effectiveness and 
accountability (Dorf and Sabel 1998). These new forms of steering are often described as a 
result of the hegemony of a neoliberal discourse that brings a specific rationality of efficiency 
and managerialism to governance (Rose and Miller 2010). However, they are also promoted 
as democratic forms of steering that lead to greater transparency and accountability (Zeitlin 
2011). Again, both the empirical phenomenon of a changed political landscape and the 
active affirmation of norms that re-articulate the role of state have led to new modes of 
steering as a key element of governance.  
 In order to avoid the conflation of analytical concepts with normative assumptions – in 
which key governance elements are closely linked to specific democratic norms –, some 
scholars in interpretive policy analysis suggest an alternative analytical approach to 
governance. Bevir (2010), for instance, uses a historicist mode of reasoning that understands 
the concept of governance as evoking a more pluralistic pattern of rule that focuses on the 
interactions of the state and civil society. He believes that the concept of governance 
represents a crisis of faith in the central state brought on by theories of politics and public 
sector reforms, and that this crisis of faith makes the image of representative democracy 
implausible. Consequently, the narrative of representative democracy should be replaced by a 
narrative of participatory democracy. Doing so leads to a breaking of the link between state 
functions and governance processes, a break that finds its root in the image of representative 
democracy. Colebatch (2009) takes a different approach, as he views governance more as a 
conceptual development in the analysis of policy than as an empirical phenomenon. He 
argues that key elements of governance discussed today have previously been under-theorised 
and therefore reflect less of a change in empirical phenomena than a change in the practice of 
policy analysis. To avoid the conflation of analytical concepts with empirical phenomena, 
where the idiom of policy analysis comes to represent the practice of governance, he 
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therefore suggests a focus on ‘the shared meanings and contexts within which these actions 
“make sense”’ (Colebatch 2009:64). Such an analysis of governance includes accounts of 
social construction, structured interaction, and authoritative choice. By paying attention to 
processes in which meaning is given through social dynamics, structures, and power 
relations, Colebatch therefore highlights the fundamentally constructed nature of 
governance. 
 Both the insight that we should be critical of the conflation of governance processes with 
the discourse of representative democracy, and the insight that these processes are 
fundamentally a product of social construction, play a crucial role in this thesis. However, I 
do not believe that it is necessary to refrain altogether from using political concepts 
associated with governance discourses or with representative democracy. Since the key 
governance elements as described above are also empirical realities, I believe they provide a 
good entry point to the analysis of governance processes. Equally, the democratic norms 
found in the discourse of representative or liberal democracy play an important role in 
critiques of democratic governance. Rather than doing away with these concepts altogether, 
the following section therefore compares how democratic norms of liberal democracies and 
those of governance relate to each other. It integrates the insight that meaning is given in 
processes of social construction as Colebatch (2009) emphasises, and it uncouples these 
norms from the key governance elements as Bevir (2010) suggests, by describing the multiple 
ways in which democratic norms can be given meaning in governance processes. 
The democratic norms of governance 
‘The very characteristics of today's societies often deemed to make the participatory ideals of 
progressive democracy irrelevant have changed the political landscape in ways that make 
participatory ideals important and even vital.’ (Warren 2002a:698) 
As discussed so far, governance can be understood as providing an answer to a crisis of faith 
in the central state that has changed the political landscape and the mode in which society is 
steered. The democratic norms articulated in governance discourses are therefore different 
than those articulated in discourses of the central state. Indeed, democratic governance is 
often contrasted with the traditional democratic norms that are tied to the central state. In 
western societies, the most dominant form of democracy is that of a liberal democracy 
(Mouffe 2000). Associated with this form of democracy are traditional norms of democratic 
participation, inclusion, and accountability. As already mentioned in the sections above, 
these norms are also associated with governance, but they are articulated differently and have 
a different meaning. Below, I discuss how the three norms of participation, inclusion, and 
accountability are given meaning in the liberal democracy discourse and in the democratic 
governance discourse. Doing so elucidates in more detail how democratic norms are 
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associated with the above-described key governance elements, as well as why they cannot be 
reduced to them.  
 The norm of participation in liberal democracies is given shape most directly by the 
mechanism of voting, but for instance also through petitioning, taking part in public 
hearings, and protesting (Warren 2002a). Contemporary governance stresses alternative 
forms of participation such as stakeholder consultation, participation of non-state actors in 
governance networks, and participatory venues like citizen panels, focus groups, etc. These 
last forms of participation are usually called ‘public participation.’ Participatory democracy 
can be viewed as a response to restrictive notions of citizenship in representative democracy. 
According to participatory democrats, politics in liberal democracies are too strongly 
connected to elitist understandings of competency and expertise and obey what is first and 
foremost a market rationality (Vitale 2006), consequently reducing the political scope of 
citizenship (Leach et al. 2005). Participatory democrats therefore seek to expand democratic 
participation beyond the representative system and to create a substantive rather than a 
formal democracy (Vitale 2006). The norm of participation is consequently ambivalent. For 
liberal democracy scholars, it refers to the direct access of citizens to the representative system 
through a number of specific and institutionalised spaces and modes of engagement (such as 
voting) that are directly connected to the state and to the more indirect ways of influencing 
decision making through opinion formation or protest connected to the public sphere. For 
participatory democrats, participation refers to the extension of political spaces to arenas 
where direct forms of decision making take place beyond and outside the control of the 
central state. Participatory democrats consider the boundary between the state and the public 
sphere to be less absolute and want to create new democratic spaces (Cornwall and Coelho 
2007) and modes of public engagement that include the creation of new publics, such as 
mini-publics (Fung 2003) or sectoral networks. As a result, these two views of participation 
entail different ideas about the legitimate role of state and non-state actors and about what 
constitutes democratic decision making. For liberal democrats, democratically legitimate 
decision making takes place through actors who have been given a political mandate via 
formalised mechanisms of voting and who are responsive to civil society, whereas for 
participatory democrats non-state actors also can make democratically legitimate decisions 
on the basis of their role in society. 
 The norm of inclusion is central to democracy. How this norm is given meaning differs 
between liberal democracy discourses and democratic governance discourses. The idea of 
liberal democracy is that, through representative mechanisms, the whole of society can 
participate in political choices. Representation builds on four key principles (Urbinati and 
Warren 2006). First, it operates from a relationship where representatives stand for, and act 
on behalf of, a constituency. Second, it creates a space where the sovereignty of the people is 
identified in relation to the power of the central state. Third, it ensures a degree of 
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responsiveness of elected representatives to the people that they represent. Finally, the 
principle of ‘one man-one vote’ ensures a degree of political equality. In contrast to 
representation, the democratic governance discourse builds on deliberation as a basis for 
inclusion. It holds that the characteristics of governance can bring about deliberative and 
consensus-oriented modes of decision making and thereby undercut the political deadlocks 
associated with representative modes of decision making. Deliberative democrats take issue 
with voting-centric views of democracy that see democracy as an arena in which fixed 
preferences and interest are aggregated (Chambers 2003). They contrast these views with the 
communicative processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting (Chambers 
2003). Moreover, they believe that these processes take place at a distance from the state, in 
civil society (Dryzek 2001). According to deliberative democrats, arguments and dialogue are 
better mechanisms for responsiveness than the threat of not being re-elected. Therefore, the 
norm of inclusion is believed to be better served by the inclusion of citizens in societal 
debates than by the one-man-one-vote principle. The norms of representation and 
deliberation clearly contrast with one another. Whereas for liberal democrats the consensus-
oriented modes of decision making that characterise deliberative democracy would appear to 
bypass formal mechanism of representation, deliberative democrats believe that these 
processes are at the core of democratic legitimacy. Equally, the aggregation of interests at the 
national level through representative mechanisms and the subsequent instrumental 
pursuance of policy goals by central government would appear to deliberative democrats as 
detracting from the democratic potential of civil society. To liberal democrats however, these 
processes are the cornerstones of legitimate government.  
 Accountability is traditionally connected with the effective delivery of services by 
government. It is often associated with effectiveness, transparency, and with ‘giving account.’ 
Bovens (2007:107) defines accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in 
which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can 
pose questions and pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences.’ This definition 
makes clear that accountability is primarily concerned with the role of actors in political 
arenas and involves the scrutiny of political actors by a specific forum . The relationships of 
the actors to these arenas, as well as the question of which forums are involved in the passing 
of judgment, differ for different forms of accountability. When associated with liberal 
democracy discourses, there are two main forms of accountability: political accountability 
and administrative accountability (Bevir 2010a). Political accountability means that 
politicians are held accountable ex-post to voters who can vote them out of office if they are 
not satisfied with their performance. In addition, these politicians are also held accountable 
to constitutional law and to a judicial system that can revoke their authority. Administrative 
accountability means that civil servants whose task it is to provide neutral expertise are 
answerable within a hierarchical system. The bureaucratic apparatus is so designed that clear 
roles are specified for individuals, making it possible to identify who is responsible for what 
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and have them answer to superiors (Bevir 2010a). Other traditional mechanisms for 
accountability are, for instance, ombudsmen or parliamentary commissions. However, under 
the influence of criticisms about unresponsive politicians and the overloaded state (Skelcher 
2000), confidence in political and administrative accountability has waned. This has led to 
the emergence of NPM and the introduction of accountability mechanisms from the 
business sector to the government, specifically performance management. This type of 
accountability involves output controls and promotes the use of standardised methods for 
evaluation and formal standards of performance and success (Hood 1995, Arts and Goverde 
2006). Bevir (2010a) calls this performance accountability: by making results of policy 
transparent to the public and other branches, levels, or centres of government, accountability 
is sought in competition and peer review, as well as in the involvement of stakeholders 
and/or the general public. Consequently, the hierarchical accountability associated with 
liberal democracies is supplemented or replaced in democratic governance by non-
hierarchical and horizontal forms of peer accountability and participatory accountability 
(Bäckstrand 2008). Peer accountability consists of the mutual evaluations of organisations by 
their counterparts, for instance the same type of lower-level authorities or the mutual 
evaluation of performance of similar governance networks. Participatory accountability 
involves non-state actors in the assessment of the performance of policy. Therefore, peer and 
participatory accountability, which are associated with democratic governance discourses, 
differ from political and administrative accountability, which are associated with liberal 
democracy discourses, because in the latter there is hierarchical accountability from above 
(i.e. elected officials), whereas in the former there is critical scrutiny from below and the side 
(i.e. civil society and peers).  
 To sum up, the discourse on democratic governance shifts the emphasis of the traditional 
democratic norms of participation, inclusion, and accountability to arenas beyond the state 
and to other types of political dynamics. Even so, the democratic norms invoked in practice, 
and their meaning, differ from context to context. A shift from government to governance 
does not necessarily imply that there is also a shift in the democratic norms articulated in 
liberal democracy discourses to those articulated in democratic governance discourses. 
Moreover, whether or not governance is considered an affirmation or a challenge to 
democracy depends not only on the democratic norms performed in everyday practices, but 
also on how these norms are valued from the normative perspective of the researcher or 
policy professional assessing or applying them. Therefore, by describing the multiple 
meanings attributable to democratic norms, more in-depth understanding is provided of 
what actually makes up the paradox of democratic governance. That is to say, whether or not 
governance is conceived to be democratically legitimate is ultimately a political question 
insofar as it depends on the norms performed in practice as well as on the norms articulated 
in scholarly, political, and societal discourse. The next section describes how these norms are 
articulated in debates on democratic governance. 
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Debates on democratic governance 
‘The people of a democratic nation are not only fully entitled to explore the trade-offs between 
system effectiveness and citizen effectiveness, but I believe that commitment to democratic values 
obliges them to do so.’ (Dahl 1994:34) 
The next step in unravelling the paradox of democratic governance, after specifying the key 
elements of governance and the democratic norms associated with these, is to describe how 
debates on democratic governance are given shape in scholarly literature. I identify three 
dichotomies that roughly shape these debates: (1) representative versus participatory 
democracy; (2) top-down versus bottom-up approaches to governance; and (3) instrumental 
versus deliberative rationality. These debates overlap, and the identification of these three 
dichotomies is by no means meant to be exhaustive. For instance, debates overlap when top-
down approaches are associated with instrumental rationalities, or when participatory 
democracy and deliberative democracy are contrasted with representative democracy. All the 
same, these dichotomies give a good and extensive overview of how debates on democratic 
governance are given shape. More importantly, they offer insight into how contestations over 
what constitutes democratic governance can be articulated in discourse. Finally, they show a 
concern with the identification of legitimate actors, places, and modes of political 
interaction, a point to which I return in the next section. 
 The debate between representative and participatory democracy centres on the question of 
who makes policies. In other words, who are legitimate participants in decision making? This 
debate focuses primarily on how one should conceptualise the division between state and 
civil society as well as on how one should conceive of governance networks vis-à-vis the state. 
Unlike voting, which has a very broad range of – be it formal - inclusion (although not 
everyone is allowed to vote), participation is usually restricted to a select group of 
participants. Claims of greater inclusion as a result of public participation mechanisms are 
therefore contested, as not all civil society actors and stakeholders can be included (Smismans 
2008). Public participation is consequently criticised for its elitist characteristics (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001). Moreover, public participation can exclude actors that do not have the 
required knowledge, skill, or resources to participate (Turnhout et al. 2010); this is often the 
case when complex issues are discussed and meetings are held during working hours. In 
addition, civil society can be organised in such a way as to give more voice to powerful 
stakeholders and exclude others. Although civil society is often represented as a homogenous, 
unitary, democratic force, civil society actors may just as easily be undemocratic (Scholte 
2002). Consequently, governance networks that include non-state actors can challenge the 
legitimacy of representative institutions (Klijn and Skelcher 2007), either because they take 
decisions outside the domain of the state and/or out of view of the state, or because they 
influence decision making by the state to an extent that escapes control by elected 
representatives. As a result, meta-governance of governance networks by representative actors 
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or institutions has been suggested (Sørensen and Torfing 2005). The influence of 
representative institutions over participatory processes has equally been subject to critiques. 
Organised participation or ‘invited’ participation (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) has often 
been criticised for being overly instrumental and lacking real political efficacy (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001, Innes and Booher 2003). In these critiques, participatory processes are 
reduced to instruments to achieve goals set by representative mechanisms, such as saving 
time, providing knowledge, and preventing objections and appeals (Woltjer 2002). 
Moreover, as participatory processes are often consensus driven since they usually do not 
involve mechanisms such a majority voting and require unanimity, they also repress power 
dynamics. That is to say, the drive for consensus can repress the playing out of differences 
(Turnhout et al. 2010). The debate between representative and participatory democracy is 
therefore about both who constitute legitimate participants and the role they play in 
decision-making processes. 
 The debate between top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance centres on the 
question of where policies are made. In other words, where is legitimate authority situated? 
This debate is couched in the vocabulary of multi-level governance (MLG) (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001), where ‘top’ refers to central authorities like the EC or a central government, 
and ‘down’ refers to lower-level authorities and/or civil society and the market. Moreover, 
the debate is about the direction of travel of goals, timetables, approaches, measures, etc. 
(Rayner 2010): for example, whether a policy goal is conceived of from the bottom and 
uploaded to higher levels of authorities, or whether it is set at the top and consecutively 
downloaded by lower levels of authority and non-state actors. In this debate, top-down 
approaches are characterised by the setting of regulatory standards by central authorities and 
the subsequent authoritative control of compliance with these standards (Knill and 
Lenschow 2004). Top-down approaches therefore conceive of legitimate authority as 
exercised by the central state (or by supranational organisation like the EU or the UN) and 
favour hierarchical accountability mechanisms. Bottom-up approaches are characterised by 
context-oriented goal-setting, governance by learning, and an emphasis on close cooperation 
between state and non-state actors (Holzinger et al. 2006). In other words, bottom-up 
approaches replace centralised policymaking with a search for innovative solutions to locally 
defined problems by networks of both state and non-state actors. Therefore, bottom-up 
approaches place a strong focus on a broad inclusion of actors and on broad conceptions of 
citizenship (Turnhout et al. 2010). They believe that legitimate policymaking should 
originate in a broad societal field where local-level authorities and non-state actors have 
substantial competences to develop and implement policy and where central policies are 
facilitating rather than steering. The debate between top-down and bottom-up approaches is 
therefore both about where goals are set and about what the political landscape looks like. 
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 The debate between instrumental and deliberative rationality centres on the question of 
how policies are made. That is to say, this debate is about how to account for the processes 
that lead to policy outcomes. Instrumental rationality can be very efficient in problem 
solving: it does so by isolating specific problems, finding cause and effect, establishing goals 
and measures to achieve these goals, and assigning responsibilities. In the modern state, 
instrumental rationality has led to an increased use of scientific expertise and the hierarchical 
organisation of a functionally differentiated bureaucracy (Voß and Kemp 2006). This 
increased institutionalisation of instrumental rationality has brought about two main points 
of critique. First, it imposes the rationality of the state and its bureaucracy on the public 
sphere. According to deliberative democrats, an authentic public sphere is the place where 
rational–critical arguments, rather than the status of actors, are decisive in informing political 
decision making (Calhoun 1993). They therefore criticise decision making based on the 
aggregation of interests, even if these are expressed by civil society, because it does not allow 
for a substantial political discussion of values and policies (Curtin 2003). Second, 
instrumental rationality does not allow for diversity and fails to deal with unintended effects 
of policies. The instrumental rationality of the state is believed to increasingly lead to 
unintended side effects that bring about risks and contestations that make this type of 
rationality untenable (Hendriks and Grin 2007). Deliberative rationality is therefore believed 
to be not only more democratic, but also more effective in dealing with the complexities of 
the changed political field that have led to the shift from government to governance to begin 
with. These ideas about deliberative rationality are also challenged however. The idea that 
local deliberation is likely to lead to effectiveness is believed to be naïve, especially in cases 
where diverging interests do not easily lead to ‘win-win’ situations (Eberlein and Kerwer 
2004). More generally, deliberation is often thought of as a time-consuming process with 
uncertain outcomes and therefore believed to threaten the effectiveness of bureaucratic 
systems (Dahl 1994). In addition, the high ideals of deliberative democracy are often 
believed to be unattainable in practice. Not all actors can live up to the high demands that 
exchanging rational–critical arguments entails (Sanders 1997), and deliberative decision 
making is therefore not always beneficial to the public interest (Papadoupolos and Warin 
2007). In general, the debate between instrumental and deliberative rationality is about what 
constitutes legitimate political interactions (interest aggregation or deliberation) and how 
these should be accounted for (whether in terms of inclusion, effectiveness, or quality of 
argumentation). 
 The above debates on democratic governance show that democratic norms carry 
assumptions not only about what constitutes legitimate political decision making, but also 
about how these norms perform in practice. They do not merely express different preferences 
for the who, where, and how of political decision making, but do so in contrast and in 
reaction to what they imply are not democratically legitimate actors, places, and modes of 
interaction. Consequently, they bring depth to the paradox of democratic governance as they 
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convey not only different ideals on governance but also how these ideals and their 
democratic norms are entwined in a field of power. These debates are political in the sense 
not only that they convey contestations about how to define democratic governance, but also 
that they reflect the power struggles that shape how democratic norms perform in practice.  
Politicisation and depoliticisation 
‘Depoliticisation is the oldest task of politics.’ (Ranciere 1995:19) 
In order to disentangle the paradox of democratic governance, the focus of this chapter so far 
has been on the elements of governance, the norms associated with them, and the debates in 
which these norms are couched. I have done so in order to lift these debates out of the 
ethical context in which they are usually conducted and into the realm of the political. To be 
exact, I argue that the oppositions between ideas on whether governance is democratic or not 
are not simply a matter of value or perspective, but rather involve contestations over what 
constitutes a political actor, a political arena, and politics. Moreover, these contestations in 
the end are not decided by norms, but by power.  
 The concept of the political is usually not defined in political studies. Most scholars 
implicitly use it to describe the tactics used by political parties and/or non-state actors to 
influence steering and decision making. Moreover, the state is where they locate the site 
where policy is formulated and implemented. For the study of politics in liberal democracies, 
this is mostly unproblematic, as according to its democratic norms the state is the prime 
location of legitimate authority. However, for the purpose of this thesis, the above 
conception of politics is problematic, as, in governance, non-state actors are arguably 
legitimate actors as well, authorities are decentralised, and new modes of steering are 
introduced. A more precise definition of the concept of the political is given by Mouffe 
(2005), who describes the political as the construction of antagonisms and the establishment 
of social order through acts of power. In other words, the political consists of contestations 
and decision making in and through power. To say that the political is about contestations 
means that it is about decision making in contingent and undecided terrain (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007). To say that this decision making takes place in and through power is to 
recognise that there are no transcendental, ethical, or universal norms that can ultimately be 
invoked to justify political decisions. Rather, in the realm of the political, decisions are 
understood to be the particular expression of a structure of power relations (Mouffe 2000). 
Although the above conception of the political is derived from post-structuralist authors, its 
basic tenets are widely shared. Politics are commonly associated with giving or withholding 
support, and hence with processes of contestation as well as with the power to decide. 
 Democratic norms govern who can engage in politics, where they can do it, and how. 
However, as democratic norms in governance are open to contestation, they not only govern 
politics, but are also subject to politics. Consequently, one can expect a struggle over who are 
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legitimate actors, what are legitimate arenas of decision making, and what are legitimate 
modes of steering. These struggles can be captured in the vocabulary of politicisation and 
depoliticisation. Politicisation, on the one hand, concerns the opening up of issues to 
political debate. Whereas prior to politicisation issues are the domain of either scientific or 
bureaucratic expertise, they become politicised if they are part of a public debate in which 
political actors rather than (only) experts or bureaucrats will decide on the relevant issue. For 
example, as a result of the BSE crisis, the issue of food safety became politicised and the 
meaning of food safety was renegotiated (Paul 2007). Depoliticisation, on the other hand, 
takes issues out of the public debate and into the domain of scientific or bureaucratic 
expertise when the course of action in a specific issue is no longer contested. For example, 
the issue of acid rain no longer gives rise to the strong political debates that it previously did 
(Hajer 1995), most probably because of successful EU regulation. The vocabulary of 
politicisation and depoliticisation can also be directly applied to the key elements of 
governance. 
 Identification as a democratic actor, a democratic arena, or a democratic mode of steering 
requires all of these to be political first (Warren 2009). Without the possibility of 
contestation and the exercise of choice (and power), most political scholars would agree that 
democracy becomes void of its substance. Consequently, governance is affirmed as 
democratic when it politicises previously depoliticised spheres. Its democratic quality is 
challenged, however, when these spheres become depoliticised. This includes the 
politicisation/depoliticisation of the involvement of non-state actors, of decentralised 
authority, and of the methods by which governments steer. First, the call for a more 
politicised civil society was made by Hannah Arendt (1958) and has inspired participatory 
democrats since the 1960s (Arnstein 1969). Today, it continues to be voiced by participatory 
democrats such as Fung and Wright (2001). Equally, deliberative democrats have called for a 
transformation of the public sphere (Calhoun 1993) where communicative reason with an 
emphasis on diversity and the exchange of arguments should replace instrumental reason. 
That is to say, they seek increased instances of contestations and debates over public issues, 
outside the state’s domain (Dryzek 2001). Second, with decentralisation comes politicisation 
of the bureaucracy (Christiansen 1997). A governance perspective, more than a government 
perspective, recognises the potential democratic value of interactions between bureaucrats, 
citizens, and interest groups for creating political support as well as for voicing dissent (Peters 
2010). Moreover, awarding higher competences to decentralised government authorities 
allows these organisations to play a more political role in the sense that they can contest 
decisions made at other levels of government and that they have greater freedom to choose 
policy goals and measures. Taking decisions as close as possible to where they impact is also 
believed to stimulate deliberation and a greater inclusion of local actors. Third, introducing 
output-oriented steering and replacing hierarchical accountability structures with horizontal 
and participatory forms of accountability entails the politicisation of steering mechanisms. 
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By measuring and reporting the policy performance of lower-level authorities, contests 
between these are stimulated. Moreover, by focusing on outputs rather than inputs, these 
authorities have more freedom to choose in what manner or by what measures they seek to 
achieve these outputs. Furthermore, the increased transparency that is believed to accompany 
these forms of steering creates more room for the participation of non-state actors to contest 
whether authorities are doing all they can to achieve policy goals. 
 Although proponents of good governance affirm the politicising effects of governance, 
governance has also been criticised for having depoliticising effects. Flinders and Buller 
(2006) define depoliticisation as the change of the arena and/or processes of decision 
making. They view it as a strategy adopted by the state to (1) decouple policies from the 
short-term view of electoral policies; (2) reduce the political overload of the state; and (3) 
insulate elected officials from policy failure in difficult and contested policy domains. 
Therefore, the literature on depoliticisation ascribes self-interested and even anti-democratic 
objectives to the state when it promotes a shift to governance. In line with the work of 
Foucault (1994) and governmentality studies (Dean 1999), the extension of political power 
beyond the state is not viewed as contributing to the empowerment of civil society or as a 
stimulus to more local forms of democracy, but rather as the extension of the power of the 
state itself over these domains(Rose and Miller 2010). Critical studies on governance 
therefore view the working of the key elements of governance as the potential stifling of 
opportunities for contestation and the empowerment of civil society rather than promoting 
them. In this perspective, involving non-state actors, decentralising decision making, and 
introducing new forms of steering can be viewed as attempts to discipline non-state actors 
and decentralised authorities into becoming subjects that pursue the goals set by the state. 
Consequently, participation has been criticised as leading to an unjust and illegitimate 
exercise of power by powerful elites (Cooke and Kothari 2001) and as being made 
instrumental to state objectives. The decentralisation of authority has equally been criticised 
as shielding the (central) government from the consequences of unpopular policies and as 
lowering expectations about the effectiveness of policymaking (Burnham 2001). Moreover, 
the performance management techniques that are part of the new modes of steering have 
been viewed as ultimately depoliticising of social life (Guthman 2008) and involving 
attempts by states or markets to colonise the rationalities of other systems (such as ecological 
systems) by replacing them with their own (Robertson 2004). These techniques are 
considered to be neoliberal attempts to replace democratic decision making with a type of 
managerialism focused solely on efficiently completing the tasks set by central government. 
 In view of these dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation, the above-described 
debates on democratic governance can now be understood to concern not only the actors, 
places, and mode of action in which democratic governance takes place, but also the 
struggles over how power is exercised. Specifically, debates on representational versus 
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participatory democracy not only address conflicts between these two versions of democracy, 
but implicitly also discuss the co-optation of one by the other. This leads to questions about 
whether the inclusion of non-state actors in practice leads to their empowerment in terms of 
their ability to contest issues and decide on policies, or whether they are made instrumental 
to the political choices of elected officials. Debates on top-down versus bottom-up 
approaches similarly involve struggles between different levels of governance over who can 
take the initiative to set goals and define issues and over who has power over whom. Finally, 
debates over instrumental versus deliberative rationality concern the question of the role that 
decentralised authorities and non-state actors are expected to play; in other words: whether 
these actors should compete to create more efficient outcomes and find best practices, or 
whether they should contest one another’s beliefs and ideas. Different answers to this 
question involve different notions about how power is exercised and its scope. Consequently, 
situating the paradox of democratic governance in the realm of the political entails the study 
not only of the articulation of democratic norms in political discourse, but also of how these 
norms are performed in practice through the political struggles that seek to translate them 
into principles for action. 
EU governance 
‘Governance within this new polity is sui generis: through a unique set of multi-level, non-
hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of state and non-state actors.’ (Hix 
1998:38–39) 
Before they started studying the EU as a system of governance, scholars discussed the EU 
with a predominant focus on European integration and positioned themselves in debates 
between liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism (Pollack 2005). The core idea of 
neofunctionalism is that of functional spill-over: when decisions are made in one policy field 
on a European scale (for instance on coal and steel), these will lead to pressures to extend the 
authority of the EU to other policy fields. In the theory of neofunctionalism, additional 
pressures from supranational actors such as the EC and subnational interest groups 
strengthen this process, eventually leading to the establishment of a new political polity. 
Neofunctionalists describe this as a process of politicisation where the controversial nature of 
decision making in a policy field increases and leads to a broadening of the actors involved, 
the redefinition of objectives, and ultimately a shift in the political landscape to a new centre 
(Hooghe and Marks 2006). Liberal intergovernmentalism, particularly in the person of 
Moravcsik (1998), contrasts neofunctional accounts with a perspective that considers the 
integration process first and foremost as resulting from member states that aggregate national 
interests and bring these to the negotiation table at an intergovernmental level. According to 
this perspective, the EU political field that results from these negotiations primarily reflects 
the convergence of preferences amongst powerful member states. In this perspective, the 
political domain remains primarily limited to the central nation state.  
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 Following the debates on the drivers and mechanisms of European integration to a 
‘unique’ polity, in the mid-1990s, more attention became directed at what this polity 
actually looks like. To conceive of the EU as a system of governance is a result of the 
‘governance turn’ in EU studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006) that has replaced 
European integration as the primary focus of EU studies. In this governance turn, the key 
elements of governance as identified earlier in this chapter are applied to describe the specific 
nature of the EU. These include the involvement of non-state actors through the 
‘community method,’ where the EC and the parliament rely heavily on interest groups to 
provide information and expertise, and through policy networks (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2006); the decentralisation of decision making in multi-level governance where 
decision-making competences are shared by actors at different levels and are not 
monopolised by state actors (Marks et al. 1996); and a new mode of steering that involves 
the reconceptualisation of the role of the state from ‘deciding from above’ to an activator of 
horizontal networks that form issue- or sector-specific constituencies (Kohler-Koch and 
Rittberger 2006). 
 In addition to the description of EU governance as an empirical phenomenon, there is 
also a normative discourse of EU good governance. This normative discourse is especially 
present in debates on new modes of governance (Héritier 2001, Knill and Lenschow 2004), 
in which the White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) plays a central role. 
New modes of governance are believed to be an answer to continuing challenges to the EU’s 
capacity to govern effectively and democratically (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). The core idea 
of new modes of governance is the abolition of top-down, interventionist, command-and-
control regulation, in favour of bottom-up, context-oriented governance by learning that 
emphasises the close cooperation of state and non-state actors in formulating and 
implementing EU policy (Holzinger et al. 2006). In particular, it contrasts hard regulatory 
targets with soft law and top-down policymaking by the EU with more competences for 
member states, and advocates for a broader inclusion of actors as compared to the 
community method (Héritier 2001). Moreover, it employs mechanisms of learning, 
standardisation of knowledge, iterative processes of monitoring and goal adjustment, and the 
setting of timetables (Héritier 2001). There are different types of new modes of governance 
within the EU, for instance the open method of coordination (OMC), self-regulatory modes 
of governance, and framework regulation (Knill and Lenschow 2004).  
 For the purpose of this dissertation, I focus on framework regulation, conceptualised as 
experimentalist governance. I do so not only because it most explicitly integrates all three key 
elements of governance, but also because it takes specific positions in debates on democratic 
governance. Experimentalist governance builds on the notion of democratic 
experimentalism, which entails the decentralisation of power and the inclusion on non-state 
actors in governing (Dorf and Sabel 1998). Moreover, it features subnational governments 
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that are free to create their own performance standards and choose the means by which to 
meet these standards, where the national government assists in the monitoring of 
performance and the coordination between subnational governments. Furthermore, 
experimentalist governance builds on notions of peer and participatory accountability (Dorf 
and Sabel 1998). These specific characteristics of experimentalist governance are thought to 
result in a direct, deliberative polyarchy: direct, because non-state actors can be involved 
without intermediary representation; deliberative, because decisions are based on arguments 
and the free exchange of information; and a polyarchy because the political accountability of 
governments is supplemented with accountability through peer review amongst different 
authorities (Dorf and Sabel 1998). In the EU, the WFD is a good example of 
experimentalist governance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), as I describe in more detail in chapter 
3.  
 By actively introducing new modes of governance in the EU, and experimentalist 
governance in particular by means of framework directives, the EU can be regarded as 
introducing all key elements of governance to its decision-making processes. Moreover, if we 
follow Sabel and Zeitlin (2008), the manner in which these elements are introduced is likely 
to result in a specific form of good governance: a direct, deliberative polyarchy. This form of 
governance would involve the politicisation of the role of non-state actors, lower-level 
government authorities, and new forms of accountability. However, changing the actors, 
arenas, and modes of political decision making, as the key elements of governance arguably 
do, can also involve processes of depoliticisation. Even though the neofunctionalists have 
successfully predicted the evolution of the EU to a system of governance that includes supra- 
and subnational actors and a shift in political landscape, they have also recognised that the 
process of politicisation can be halted by state politics (Hooghe and Marks 2006). The 
debate between neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism may have been replaced 
by the study of the EU as a system of governance, but the question of whether politics are 
the sole prerogative of the state is not resolved. 
Research objectives and questions 
This introductory chapter set out to gain in-depth insight into the paradox of democratic 
governance, where governance is simultaneously viewed as an affirmation of, and a challenge 
to, democracy. To do so, it has identified three key elements of governance – the increased 
involvement of non-state actors, decentralised decision making, and new modes of steering – 
and the democratic norms associated with them. Moreover, it has described three 
dichotomies by which debates on democratic governance are given shape, and explained how 
these debates in practice can be analysed as processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. In 
particular, the chapter has sought to lift the paradox of democratic governance out of the 
realm of ethics and into the realm of the political. It has done so by describing politics as the 
occurrence of public contestations and the exercise of power. Moreover, the chapter has 
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located these features of the political in a struggle between liberal democracy discourses and 
democratic governance discourses, and in the political struggles that shape the performance 
of democratic norms in practice.  
 Although the paradox of democratic governance can be discussed in many fields of 
governance, I have chosen to focus on EU governance and the WFD in particular. The 
democratic problems of good governance by, for instance, the World Bank have been well 
described, often in a critical fashion that includes attention on power relations and instances 
of depoliticisation (e.g. Nandigama 2013), but this is far less the case for governance in 
Europe. Many studies engage with the democratic quality of governance in the EU (e.g. 
Sørensen and Torfing 2005), but most often do so by applying democratic norms to their 
object of study without taking into account how these norms themselves are subject to 
political processes (e.g. Wälti et al. 2004). Another reason to choose EU governance is the 
strong tradition of liberal democracy in which most EU member states are situated, 
including the case study area of the Netherlands. Such a tradition led me to expect a greater 
likelihood of finding instances in which the democratic norms of governance are contested 
by those of liberal democracy. Of course one can expect the democratic norms of governance 
to be contested in non-western societies as well, as indeed they are (Nandigama 2013). 
However, elucidating how democratic norms perform in practice is different ways is 
facilitated by the choice for case study area that includes a strong tradition of democratic 
practices, as the chapters of this thesis will show. Finally, the choice of EU governance was 
prompted by the fact that governance in the EU is described both as an empirical 
phenomenon and as a normative good. Consequently, it offers a good subject to study the 
paradox of democratic governance. 
 To find out how democratic norms are articulated in political discourse and how they are 
performed in practice, the example of WFD implementation in the Netherlands was chosen 
as a case study in this dissertation. This framework directive represents different normative 
discourses in itself. It can be read as a compromise between different political visions on 
participatory and representative democracy (Kaika 2003), as including aspects of both top-
down and bottom-up approaches to governance, and as combining instrumental and 
deliberative norms (Bouleau 2008). These different normative discourses are therefore 
expected also to be part of the political discourse surrounding the implementation of this 
framework regulation in the Netherlands, and to lead to processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation in practice.  
 In order to bring the paradox of democratic governance out of the realm of ethics and into 
the realm of the political, this dissertation investigates the political processes in which 
democratic norms are articulated in the discourse of policy implementation and how these norms 
are performed in practice. Doing so was expected not only to move past the contradiction 
observed in the paradox, but also, and more importantly, to show how the meaning of 
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democracy in governance processes is itself part of the discourses and practices by which 
governance is given shape. To this purpose, three central research questions have been 
formulated: 
1. How are democratic norms articulated in the political discourse of the implementation of 
the WFD? With the articulation of democratic norms in a political discourse comes 
the analytical question of authoritative choice. In other words, who has the power to 
articulate a political discourse and by what political mechanisms is this achieved? 
Therefore, this research question addresses not only the articulation of norms, but 
also the processes of contestation that give rise to them and the exercise of power that 
fixes them in a discourse. Moreover, it shows whether actual political discourse 
follows the normative assumptions of EU good governance or whether alternative 
norms are dominant.  
2. How are the democratic norms that are articulated in political discourse performed in 
practice? This question aims to bring out the political struggles that seek to translate 
democratic norms into principles of action. Doing so is expected to elucidate how 
power is exercised as a force that can either be disciplinary or constitute resistance. In 
addition, as democratic norms are translated into principles of action, this research 
question investigates whether these come into conflict with other principles of action 
that state and non-state actors follow and how they are constructed in fields of 
power. 
3. How does the introduction of governance affect the politicisation and/or depoliticisation of 
non-state actors, lower-level authorities, and new modes of steering? Answering this 
question is expected to reveal a nuanced and differentiated picture about the extent 
to which democratic governance actually takes place beyond the state. That is to say, 
it should show how the interaction between actors, between arenas of decision 
making, and within new modes of steering is structured in and through power. 
Moreover, as politicisation and depoliticisation are not likely to take place in the 
sense of either/or, but rather on a continuous scale, the image that this question aims 
to draw out can serve as a buffer to both overly optimist views of democratic 
governance and overly pessimistic views of ‘tyranny’ by the state. 
The above questions are designed to provide in-depth insight into the paradox of governance 
by addressing the key elements of governance, by situating democratic norms in political 
discourse and practice, and by engaging with debates on democratic governance as entwined 
with power. To answer the research questions, this thesis employs a critical constructivist 
perspective to guide the theoretical framework. This analytical framework builds on the 
concepts of discourse and practice and is explained in detail in chapter 2. Subsequently, 
chapter 3 describes the interpretive research approach chosen, the case study of WFD 
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implementation in the Netherlands, and data collection and analysis. It ends by introducing 
the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
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Abstract 
This chapter describes the theoretical framework applied in this dissertation and the specific 
approaches that have guided the analysis of the case studies. The basis for this theoretical 
framework is a critical constructivist perspective on social reality that is conceived of as best 
suited to address the paradox of democratic governance as described in chapter 1. The 
critical component of the perspective allows the researcher to scrutinise the contingent 
nature of power and therefore to study democratic discourses and practices as accidental 
rather than inevitable. The choice of constructivism is inspired by the understanding of 
governance as produced and contested in discourse and practice, and the interest of this 
thesis in situating the articulations and performances of democratic norms in a single field of 
explanation. Discourse and practice are presented as cornerstone concepts to give body to a 
critical constructivist perspective and are first discussed in terms of their roles in the 
argumentative turn and the practice turn in the social sciences. Next, Foucauldian and post-
structuralist approaches to discourse are drawn upon to flesh out the concept of discourse, its 
analytical application, and its specific applicability to this dissertation. The same is done for 
the concept of practice. After both concepts are discussed in detail, the distinction between 
the discursive and the non-discursive is discussed and affirmed. In order to integrate the 
concepts of discourse and practice in a single theoretical framework, they are described as 
sharing basic ontological and epistemological assumptions because they understand the social 
as a field that exhibits logic and conceive of meaning as socially constructed and material. 
The overarching concepts of discourse and practice inform an analytical framework that 
builds on the analytical concepts of: (1) the articulation of social demands; (2) logic of 
practice; (3) political rationalities; (4) performativity; and (5) situated agency, in order to 
show how democratic governance is constitutive of, and constituted by, the 
interdependencies between the discursive and the non-discursive realm.  
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 ‘Whereas discourses for Laclau and Mouffe are structured totalities of meaningful entities, 
practice—if I understand them right—is movement and change. Discourse, in other words, is 
being, while practice is the becoming from which discourses result and to which they eventually 
succumb.’ (Schatzki 2001) 
Introduction 
This thesis combines a discourse-theoretical with a practice based approach. In this chapter, I 
first describe the critical constructivist perspective in which both of these approaches can be 
situated. After doing so, I then link this perspective to two developments that have shaped it 
in the field of political and policy sciences: the argumentative turn and the practice turn. 
Following this historical account, I describe discourse theory and practice theory in a more 
systematic matter, identifying for each what is most characteristic of them, how they 
conceive of the construction of social reality, and how they criticise power. Then, I discuss 
how discourse and practice relate to each other by engaging with a discussion on the 
difference between discursive and non-discursive practices and making a choice to uphold 
this distinction. Next, I describe the common ontological and epistemological assumptions 
that both discourse theory and practice theory build upon in order to place them in a single 
theoretical framework. I end by identifying five analytical concepts used in this thesis to 
study the paradox of democratic governance: 1) the articulation of social demands; (2) logic 
of practice; (3) political rationalities; (4) performativity; and (5) situated agency, arguing that 
each concept offers a unique perspective on the fields of power in which the discursive and 
non-discursive practices of democratic governance are constituted. 
Critical constructivism 
As already stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis uses a critical constructivist 
perspective to study the paradox of democratic governance. This perspective consists of two 
equally important components: a critical stance towards the object of study and the 
perception that this object of study is socially constructed. The choice of such a perspective 
for the study of democratic governance is by no means self-evident. Although it has been 
argued that democratic norms should be conceived of as socially constructed and thereby 
open to contestation in the study of democratic governance (Wiener 2007), democratic 
norms also continue to be invoked on a universalistic basis (e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione 
2003). Equally, although critical studies on democratic governance are widespread (e.g. 
Swyngedouw 2006), the democratic norms associated with democratic governance are just as 
often uncritically invoked in order to pass judgement on empirical instances of governance 
(e.g. Parkins 2006). Before specifically describing the theoretical and analytical framework of 
this thesis, I therefore first describe what precisely a critical constructivist perspective entails 
and argue why it is appropriate for the study of the paradox of democratic governance. 
Chapter 2 
28 
 A critical attitude is defined by Foucault as ‘the art of not being governed so much’ 
(Foucault 1997:45). Although this is a rather broad conception of critique, he specifies it to 
entail three distinct points. The first point of a critical attitude is to create a different 
function for some received wisdom or knowledge, for instance questioning the meaning of 
the Scriptures, and thereby the rules that are based on them. The second point that Foucault 
makes is that critique can be employed by basing it on universal norms that are brought to 
bear on a specific type of rule, for example when torture practices are critiqued from the 
perspective of human rights. The third point is not to accept truth on the basis of authority, 
but only on the basis of valid reasoning. Therefore, a critical stance or a critical perspective 
implies a challenge to the basis upon which decision making takes place. Moreover, such 
challenges are directed at centres of power, which in modern societies are usually represented 
by the central state (although other centres of power, such as the World Bank, are equally 
subject to critical enquiry). This critical stance has been shaped in the social sciences in 
different ways that more or less relate to the three points that Foucault specifies. One way in 
which criticism in social science is given shape is as ‘speaking truth to power.’ This mode of 
criticism is associated with the work of Weber (1949), where the researcher attempts to give 
‘value-free’ accounts of political practices in order to exclude political bias from knowledge 
production and dissemination (Glynos and Howarth 2007). A second mode of criticism, the 
school of Critical Theory – commonly associated with the work of Adorno and Horkheimer 
and of Habermas – believes that giving value-free accounts is not possible as these accounts 
continue to reproduce the social worlds and practices that are linked to historical modes of 
domination. It holds that knowledge is never value-free, but is integrally connected to the 
solving of problems situated within structures of power. Critical theorists therefore oppose 
an instrumental view of knowledge with dialectic and reflective reasoning that exposes 
contradictions in social orders and proposes alternatives (Glynos and Howarth 2007). 
Habermas specifically opposes the instrumental reason of the state with a universalistic 
conception of communicative reason in order to justify a type or form of rule (Habermas 
1996). Both of the above modes of critique build on a notion of opposing power with truth 
or universal norms. In contrast, a third mode of critique is more concerned with the 
historical and contingent roots on which power and knowledge systems are based. 
Commonly associated with constructivist lines of thought, it emphasises the contingency, 
structural incompleteness, and fundamental openness of all social systems. Moreover, it 
conceives of power as pervasive (Weldes 1998), being reproduced not just in centres of 
power such as the state but also in policies, local practices, education, and so forth. It 
operates by problematising the ‘naturalness’ or self-evidence in which dominant rules and 
norms in society present themselves (O’Malley et al. 1997) by tracing the historical and 
contingent roots that have led to the institutionalisation of these rules and norms to begin 
with. Critique, viewed thus, consists not so much of opposing certain rules and norms with 
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other rules and norms that are more valid, true, or universal, but rather of showing how 
these norms are the contingent expressions of power structures. 
 Constructivism, in line with the above-described third mode of critique, holds that social 
orders and/or social relations are historically contingent and constituted within relations of 
power. That is to say, the social cannot be explained from causal mechanisms, natural facts 
about categories of the state, institutions, the will of the public, or a universal rationality 
(Bevir 2010a). In particular, constructivists take issue with notions of objectivism, empirical 
realism, objective truth, and essentialism (Schwandt 1998). To be exact, constructivists hold 
that the world is not made up of objective facts that are to be uncovered by research (Latour 
and Woolgar 1979); that the empirical reality that we study is not value-free (Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985); that there is no single truth out there that is independent of perspective 
(Collins 1993); and that there are no essences of objects and subjects that exist independent 
of the construction of meaning, but that these are the result of strategic processes that Gieryn 
(1995) calls boundary work. This implies ‘not only that we make the social world by acting 
on certain beliefs and meanings, but also that we make the beliefs and meanings on which 
we act’ (Bevir 2010a:60). Accordingly, the distinction between facts and values cannot be 
upheld. Empirical facts as we study them are value-laden: they always depend on underlying 
assumptions and meanings (Fischer 1998). This does not mean that there is no such thing as 
an objective world outside of the social construction of meaning. Rather, it is to say that the 
way in which we experience and view the world is always mediated by the meanings that we 
attach to it and the discourses in which we describe it. Constructivism thereby distances itself 
from positivist and neopositivist approaches to the study of social reality. Such approaches 
either base themselves on the assumption that individuals and institutions are driven by 
interests or core beliefs that are independent of the values they hold, or they seek to make 
generalisations based on empirical evidence alone. What is problematic in these approaches is 
that they separate empirical phenomena from the norms and beliefs that create these 
phenomena. Moreover, they treat these norms and beliefs as though they could be 
permanently fixed to a system, an institution, a group, or an individual actor, rather than 
conceiving of them as historically contingent. A constructivist perspective therefore moves 
from systematic to historical modes of explanation and considers identities and interests as 
not just give rising to political processes, but also as being constituted by these processes. 
 To recap, a critical constructivist perspective does two things. First, it challenges the 
naturalness and self-evident nature of dominant structures of power by emphasising the 
contingency and structural incompleteness of these structures. This implies that things could 
have been otherwise and that a system of power can never fully account for social reality. 
Second, it conceives of the empirical reality of the social (and the natural for that matter) as 
inseparable from the way in which we interpret it. Specifically, practices are imbued with the 
norms, values, and beliefs that we hold about the world and are also shaped by these. 
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Applying such a perspective to the study of democratic governance therefore means that I do 
not consider one perspective on democracy better than another insofar as they present 
themselves as systematic and closed accounts of the democratic ordering of society, whether 
that is the tradition of liberal democracy or the contemporary discourse on good governance. 
Instead, it leads me to adopt the critical stance understood as ‘not being governed so much’ 
(Foucault 1997). This stance entails the affirmation of principles of openness, 
empowerment, diversity, and inclusion. Not by accident, these are principles that many 
democrats hold in high regard. Applying a critical constructivist perspective to democratic 
governance also means that I understand democratic norms to be historically contingent 
rather than universal and to be constitutive of practices of governance as well as being 
constituted by those practices. This allows me to take normative debates out of the realm of 
ethics and to place them into the realm of politics, as the first chapter of this thesis already 
indicates. In the words of Jacques Lacan: ‘there is no other of the other’; there is no ultimate 
authority or meta-discourse that can explain why a system of power is like it is and not 
otherwise (Zizek 1997). It can only be traced back to its historically contingent roots. In the 
political sciences and the policy sciences, a critical constructivist perspective has been given 
shape by two key movements: the argumentative turn and the practice turn. 
The argumentative turn and the practice turn 
Although discourse and practice are different categories, they can be situated in similar 
traditions of social science. The argumentative turn in policy analysis operates from the 
assumption that language does not simply mirror the world but profoundly shapes our view 
of it (Fischer and Forester 1993). As a result, language becomes central to questions of truth 
and power. Rather than merely studying institutions or networks of actors, the 
argumentative turn pays attention to the central role that arguments and language play in 
establishing authority, creating legitimacy, and assessing accountability. Moreover, the 
argumentative turn reconceptualises the function of political and policy sciences from 
settling debates to actually stimulating them. Rather than looking to predict political change 
or to find efficient solutions to societal problems, the role of the social scientist according to 
the argumentative turn should be to further democratic policymaking by stimulating 
deliberation and uncovering the power structures behind the everyday discourses of 
policymaking. That is to say, the argumentative turn understands the policy sciences to have 
an impact on public issues and consequently understands theories of democratic governance 
to impact on governance practices (Bevir 2010a). 
 The argumentative turn in policy analysis has led to a proliferation of the use of the 
analytical concept of discourse in studies as diverse as environmental politics (e.g. Hajer 
2005), European institutions (e.g. Schmith and Radaelli 2004), or food safety (Paul 2007). 
Particularly, it has prompted authors to recognise discourse as a substantial factor in 
explaining policy change (Arts and Buizer 2009), policy problems (Feindt and Oels 2005), 
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social movements (Benford and Snow 1998), and the political modes of engagement 
between state and society (Griggs and Howarth 2008). Moreover, this focus on discourse has 
revealed how social practices cannot be reduced either to the institutions of the state or to 
the interests of social groups and citizens, but rather are constituted by the discourses that 
shape these institutions and interests. This insight allows a focus on political processes 
beyond the state, but also beyond the play of interests with which the concept of politics is 
often associated. Even so, discursive approaches have also been criticised for being overly 
focused on social structures and power systems and for not giving adequate attention to the 
agencies that shape social phenomena and to the activities in which the social is performed. 
It is here that the practice turn comes in.  
 Discursive approaches to politics and policy are part of a critical school of thought that is 
often subsumed under what is called ‘interpretive policy analysis.’ This school of thought is 
critical of those mainstream approaches to policy analysis that build on forms of 
institutionalism and rational choice approaches (Arts et al. 2013). The practice turn follows 
such critiques but draws on the concept of practice rather than discourse to flesh it out 
(Schatzki et al. 2001). Practice scholars do not focus primarily on systems of meaning, but 
first and foremost conceive of the social as being made up out of human activity. In the 
words of Schatzki: 
In social theory, consequently, practice approaches promulgate a distinct social 
ontology: the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices centrally 
organised around shared practical understandings. This conception contrasts with 
accounts that privilege individuals, (inter)actions, language, signifying systems, the 
life world, institutions/roles, structures, or systems in defining the social. (Schatzki 
2001:12) 
Practice scholars thereby share the democratic impulse of scholars that use discursive 
approaches and share their critique of mainstream approaches to politics and policy because 
they want to free our understanding of the social from the grasp of overarching social 
systems and structures. Both approaches do so by questioning the categories of individual 
actors or institutions as formative of social reality. However, contrary to discursive 
approaches, the practice turn explicitly opposes the idea that explicit rules or norms can 
directly govern social activity. Rather, practice scholars hold that social activity is shaped by 
tacit or implicit rules that exist in a field of practice. Even so, I believe that discourse theory 
and practice theory have more in common than just a critical tradition and that they share 
basic ontological and epistemological assumptions. Before I describe these, I first discuss each 
concept separately. 
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The concepts of discourse and practice 
Before discussing how the concepts of discourse and practice can complement each other, I 
discuss them separately in terms of how they conceive of the construction of social reality 
and how they contribute to a critical perspective. I do so by describing first how discourse 
conceives of the process of the social construction of reality as articulation, criticises power in 
terms of hegemony and contingency, and sees power as exercised through rationalities and 
techniques. Second, I discuss how the concept of practice conceives of the social as an 
ensemble of doings and sayings that is captured in logics of practice and is the basis for situated 
agency, and criticises power as performative.  
Discourse 
Discourse analysis comprises a range of approaches that can be placed on a scale from a 
narrow to a wide application of discourse, ranging from discourse as text, communication, 
frame, and social practice (Arts and Buizer 2009). These last two approaches in particular, 
discourse as frame and discourse as social practice, have been applied in the political and 
policy sciences. Discourse understood as social practice is strongly associated with the work 
of Foucault and of Laclau and Mouffe (1984) and conceives of discourse as constitutive of 
society, not only by constructing meaning, but also by constructing the objects and subjects 
in it. It does so because it conceives of knowledge and power as being intimately related or 
entwined. This thesis uses the approach that understands discourse to be constitutive of 
social practice. It does not, however, equate the one with the other. 
 Articulation, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985), is any practice that establishes a 
relation between elements such that their relation is changed as a result of that articulatory 
practice. The structured totality that follows from this practice they call a discourse. An 
element, in this terminology, can be any signifier (i.e. symbol, word, name), which only 
receives meaning after being articulated in a discourse. In discourse theory, identity and 
meaning are constituted in a singular movement, as both are always relational and therefore 
only constituted in articulation. However, this articulation does not entail a complete 
fixation of the meaning or identity of the signifier. If such were the case, articulation (and 
therefore changing the relation of one element to another) would not have been possible. 
Laclau and Mouffe therefore conceive of a ‘discursive exterior’ that deforms discourse and 
prevents it from being a fully closed system of meaning. Because for Laclau and Mouffe 
discourse constitutes social practice, what follows from this understanding of discourse as 
articulation is that they view the social as fundamentally open. In other words, the 
articulation of a discourse is always non-necessary or contingent: it could have been 
articulated otherwise. Articulation is therefore a key concept in discourse theory: it explains 
the practices or processes in which the meaning of social reality is shaped. Processes of 
articulation can follow different logics: either political or social (Glynos and Howarth 
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2007).2 When articulatory practice follows a political logic, the meaning of elements is 
unfixed, and previously heterogeneous elements become equated to one another in a process 
that challenges and (if successful) replaces a hegemonic discourse. A social logic of 
articulatory practice entails the articulation of singular elements without changing the fixed 
positions of the elements that are part of a discourse. Political logics can therefore be 
understood as involving contestations and politicisation, whereas social logics are more 
understood in terms of rule-following and depoliticisation. An element that plays a key role 
in processes of articulation is social demand (Laclau 2005). A social demand, according to 
Laclau (2005), can be articulated either in a political logic as a claim or in a social logic as a 
request. These two concepts represent different styles of political engagement between the 
state and civil society and consequently give insight into processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation. Institutions and actors receive their identity in this articulatory practice, as 
do democratic norms. Discourse theory thus conceptualises social structures as practices that 
result from the creation or affirmation of meaning and are characterised by an inherent lack 
of stability (Glynos and Howarth 2007). It should be noted that the process of articulation is 
not just a mental activity: it shapes the material elements of society in processes that involve 
contestations and the exercise of power. 
 The lack of stability of social systems implies that they need to be sustained by power and 
equally can be changed by power. That is, the radical contingency of discourse offers a basis 
for the critique of power and at the same time creates the possibility of resistance. Discourse 
theory conceptualises power as hegemony. Hegemony implies two things: first, a single 
signifier comes to represent a whole discourse. Therefore, the social elements with which this 
signifier is most closely articulated will be given preference over others. Second, hegemony 
denotes a dominant power structure that presents itself as natural and self-evident. Studying 
discourse as hegemonic therefore means being able to criticise power in two modes. First, it 
can show how a certain articulation of discourse around a central signifier (such as the state) 
favours some social actors, norms, or interactions over others. Doing so can reveal power 
inequalities, processes of exclusion, or for instance the lack of empowerment of certain 
domains of society. It thus shows how power is pervasive. Second, hegemony refers to the 
dominance of one discourse over others. For example, the discourse of neoliberalism in 
modern government can be said to be dominant over previous discourses of the state as a 
deliverer of services. This conception of hegemony allows the criticism of power by opposing 
it with competing discourses. Both modes of criticism draw on the contingency that 
accompanies any articulation of discourse. Each of them conceives of power relations not as 
natural or self-evident, but as the result of a historical act of articulation that fixes meaning 
                                                 
2 Glynos and Howarth (2007) also identify a third type of logic in addition to the political and social logics that 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) identify: fantasmatic logics. They do so to add a critical layer to discourse theory to 
account for change and continuity. As in the theoretical framework of this thesis the concept of practice fulfils 
this function, fantasmatic logics are not discussed. 
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in a way that is not universal. Claims to authority, legitimacy, or accountability thus can all 
be contested on the basis of showing that other modes of articulating meaning are possible as 
well. 
 Discourse theorists not only criticise power for being contingent, but also employ the 
concept of political rationalities to describe how power is disciplinary and thereby constitutes 
reality. These types of criticism are often couched in the idiom of governmentality (Foucault 
1994, Dean 1999). Governmentality studies examine how power is exercised through 
rationalities and techniques of government. Rose and Miller (2010) define the analytical 
category of political rationalities as ‘the changing discursive fields within which the exercise 
of power is conceptualised … notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, 
and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose and Miller 2010:273). 
Rationalities describe the inherent logic of actions and decision making and connect drivers 
for action to actors. They provide the logic of action that is embedded in political discourse 
(Glynos and Howarth 2009). The study of rationalities therefore fleshes out how articulatory 
practices operate in social logics of rule-following. They show how such practices consist of 
characteristic forms of seeing and perceiving, distinctive way of thinking and questioning, 
and specific ways of acting and intervening by relying on specific methods and techniques 
(Dean 1999:23). Specifically, governmental rationalities that expand the domination of the 
state over society through these modes of thinking and techniques are criticised for 
disciplining subjects (such as bureaucrats and citizens, but also elected officials) into specific 
modes of behaviour. Rationalities can also be seen to be in competition with one another in 
a more direct way than discourses are: whereas discourses struggle over the fixation of 
meaning of entire social systems, rationalities are more concerned with articulating the 
meaning of singular and targeted elements. This practice of re-articulation can therefore be 
contested by drawing on alternative rationalities. Using this concept for analysis means that 
rationalities for different levels of governance and different governance actors may differ. 
Consequently, the study of governmentality directs attention to the singular or local 
practices within a larger social system.  
Practice 
Practice theory operates from the basic assumption that phenomena such as knowledge, 
meaning, activity, power, and social institutions are aspects or components of the field of 
practices (Schatzki 2001). Practice can be defined as ‘an ensemble of doings, sayings and 
things in a specific field of activity’ (Arts et al. 2013). In contrast to discourse, practice 
conceives of social reality first and foremost as constituted by activity. Moreover, it focuses 
on the implicit understandings of actors in the practices in which they are situated to help 
explain what guides their behaviour. Rather than just being focused on ‘mere’ doings, 
practice theory understands practices as complex ensembles of actions, sayings, objects, 
understandings, rules, and so forth. What is specific to practice theory is that it does not 
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explain practices as an aggregation of these separate elements of practice, but rather as the 
entwinements of all these elements in the field of practice. Social order is therefore not 
structured by these elements separately, but by the field of practice itself.  
 Practice theory holds two key implications about how we understand the social to be 
constructed. First, practice theory does not conceive of institutions, formal rules, or norms as 
ordering the social, but views these as one of many elements that are part of a practice. These 
concepts thereby lose their primacy in explaining human action. Second, practice implies 
that the social is not singular, as hegemonic discourses imply (and impose), but rather 
multiple. A plethora of practices imply also a multitude of ways in which the social not only 
can be, but is ordered. It is specifically this multiplicity that allows me to conceptualise 
practices not just as complementary to discourse, but as the sites where contestations and 
hence politicisation become real. Rather than being based on rule-following, practices are 
viewed as exhibiting patterns and regularities that lead to certain logics of practice and that 
in turn can be described as principles for action (Bourdieu 1990). Moreover, practice 
theorists do not locate agency in autonomous individuals as for instance rational choice 
theorists would do. Rather, they view agency as always being situated in practice (Bevir 
2005). 
 According to Bourdieu (1977), a logic of practice describes the limited number of 
principles that organise the doings and sayings of actors. A logic of practice therefore gives 
practice its singularity that tends ‘to guarantee the “correctness” of practices and their 
constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit norms’ (Bourdieu 
1990:54). Moreover, the logic of practice concept stresses that logics that inform behaviour 
do not have to be consistent, but that conflicting principles of action may exist side-by-side 
(Costa 2006). Finally, the logic of practice concept gives primacy to practice over formal 
rules or institutions, detracting from the optimistic faith in the possibility of designing the 
‘right’ institutions for governance. The logic of practice concept therefore offers an analytical 
tool to study actions as governed by patterns and principles that are local to a specific 
practice. This does not mean that actors do not make choices when faced with dilemmas or 
that they do not have the ability to contest dominant power structures. It means that these 
choices and abilities always draw on the field of practice in which an actor is situated. The 
concept of situated agency moves away from rationalist accounts of agency that situate the 
basis of actors’ decisions in fixed economic rationality and interests (Bevir and Rhodes 
2006). Instead, situated agency places the basis for agency in the field of practice. Actors 
need to interpret the social fabric in which they are situated while they pursue their goals, 
and these interpretations may differ for each situation. As the quote at the beginning of this 
chapter suggests, practice is the origin from which contestations arise, but also where they 
eventually fail.  
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 The relationship between practice and power can best be described in terms of 
performativity. This concept has been used to describe how power disciplines practices 
(Butler 2000). According to practice theory, doings, sayings, and things are not only features 
of the field of practice, but also recursively (re)produce the fields in which they are 
embedded (Arts et al. 2013). Performativity as a concept describes not only the disciplining 
effects of power on subjects, but also how knowledge effectively constitutes reality (Callon 
1998, Law 2009). According to Law and Urry (2004), the world that is performed through 
processes of knowledge production is a highly selective one that ignores, undervalues, and 
marginalises those aspects that are left out. Performativity also implies that a social system, in 
order to exist, must be performed over and over again. As each repeated performance takes 
place in a different historical and local context, performances can lead to unexpected results. 
For example, according to Butler (1997), a saying is redoubled in the moment of speech: 
‘there is what is said and there is a kind of saying that the “bodily instrument” performs’ 
(Butler 1997:11). These sayings are not identical, and the concept of performativity 
therefore opens up diversity and change. Moreover, by deliberately performing elements of 
the social structure in a specific way, performativity can describe how practices can be used 
creatively to resist power (Tucker 1998). According to Barnes (2001), to engage in a practice 
is to exercise power. The analytical concept of performativity shows why this is the case. It 
conceives of how systems of knowledge, but also the more random doings, saying, and things 
in a field of practice, actively produce reality. Therefore, performativity highlights both how 
knowledge is entwined with power and how power is resisted in the specificity and repetition 
of practice that escape full understanding. 
 Discourse and practice, as can be concluded from the above, differ in how they identify 
what receives primacy in the understanding of the social. For discourse, it is systems of 
meanings that are fixed and unfixed in political logics and that constitute identities, whereas 
for practice it is the field of practices in which patterns of action and understanding take 
shape and according to which actors and institutions assume their roles. Whereas discourse 
theory views the social as being constructed in articulatory practices of meaning 
construction, practice theory considers the social as historic patterns of activity that cannot 
be reduced to institutional, discursive, or rational principles, but which have their own 
socially embedded logics. Moreover, whereas discourse equates power primarily with 
hegemony and disciplining, practice considers power to be relational and expressed in 
activities. Discursive and practice approaches therefore appear to locate the primacy of the 
understanding of the social in different domains. I believe, however, that this does not need 
to be the case. In order to argue why discursive and practice approaches share similar 
understandings of the social, I first argue why I think they do not present competing 
accounts of the social, but only highlight different features. 
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The discursive and the non-discursive 
Foucault, in The archaeology of knowledge (1972), distinguishes between discursive and non-
discursive practices. The distinction leads to the question of what the limits of discourse are. 
Foucault never gives a precise definition of non-discursive practices in The archaeology of 
knowledge (1972), but he does associate them a number of times with institutions, political 
events, social relations, economic processes, or simply calls them practices (Foucault 
1972:74,162,164). These are said to form the elements or objects about which discourse can 
speak, or to serve as general elements for the formation of discourses upon which they are 
articulated (Foucault 1972:157,162). In other words, discourse ‘is articulated on practices 
that are external to it, and which are not themselves of a discursive order’ (Foucault 
1972:164). The discursive relations between these non-discursive elements constitute 
discourse as a (discursive) practice itself, because these relations (or articulations) act as the 
limits of what can be said within a discourse as well as determine the group of relations that 
discourse must establish to speak of a specific object (Foucault 1972:46). Put more simply, 
or in line with the above discussion on constructivism: discourse is both constitutive of, and 
constituted by, social relations. 
 Discourse theory as developed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) considers this distinction 
between discursive and non-discursive practices problematic. They hold that especially the 
relation between the discursive and non-discursive realms is unclear because of the many 
interdependencies that Foucault describes but never develops in full (Howarth 2000). 
Instead, they affirm that every object is constituted as an object of discourse as no object 
appears outside of discourse (Laclau and Mouffe 1984:107). They argue that objects can 
only be discussed in terms of discourse and that they can only be conceived of as discursive 
articulations. They do not hold that such objects do not exist outside of discourse, but rather 
that for these to appear as objects they need to be articulated in a discourse. They argue for 
the indissoluble totality of discourse in which both language and action are interconnected 
by giving the example of language games as described in Wittgenstein’s (1983) Philosophical 
investigations, where in a building process if actor A calls for a ‘block,’, ‘pillar,’ or ‘slab’ it 
entails the action of actor B bringing them to actor A. Therefore, what constitutes the 
identity with a linguistic element is not the idea of a block or a pillar, but the block and 
pillar themselves (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:108). However, in order to conceive of the social 
as fundamentally open, Laclau and Mouffe need to invoke the previously mentioned 
discursive exterior that deforms discourse and prevents it from being fully closed, and that 
they themselves never explain in full. Moreover, in order to speak of change, they invoke the 
concept of ‘dislocation’ that ‘breaks open’ the fixation of meaning in a discourse. Therefore, 
Laclau and Mouffe replace the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive 
with a distinction between the discursive and the extra-discursive. How dislocation occurs, or 
whence is originates, is never made clear. In my opinion this is problematic, as the extra-
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discursive is something that can only be spoken about in the negative or in terms of ‘quasi-
transcendentalism’ (e.g. Butler et al. 2000). 
 The debate on the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive so far seems 
mostly theoretical, but it does have implications for undertaking the kind of critical 
constructivist analysis proposed in this thesis. Whether the openness of the social is the result 
of an extra-discursive exterior or results from the multiplicity and heterogeneity inherent in 
non-discursive practices entails different ideas about where change originates and how power 
is resisted. If this openness is only found in a system of discourse itself, change can only take 
place in this system, and power can only be exercised from the positions that this discourse 
has fixed. Although elements become ‘unfixed’ in political logics and can create new relations 
of power that fix them in alternative ways, the explanation of the unfixing process is never 
insightful. Alternatively, practice theory locates this openness in the logics of practice that do 
not determine but only guide human behaviour, leaving room for creativity and 
improvisation by situated agencies. Moreover, its conception of performativity also shows 
how the discursive and the non-discursive are co-produced in practice, but nevertheless 
cannot be equated to each other. The difference that arises opens up possibilities for 
contestations and resistance. Although the concepts of dislocation and contingency can do 
the same, I believe that practice is a more insightful way of describing how these processes 
take place because it views the social not only as fundamentally open, but also as 
fundamentally multiple and heterogeneous.  
 Foucault found it important to oppose accounts of power ‘from above’ with resistance. 
For him, resistance is a productive form of power, originating primarily from the self, that 
seeks to resists the norms and morals that act upon it. He does not draw on other norms or 
morals to offer such resistance, but focuses primarily on the material body (Pickett 1996). 
Discourse theory considers this a problem as it does not allow for a conceptualisation of how 
systems of power are formed and dissolved (Howarth 2000). By considering the entire field 
of the social as articulated in discourse and by focusing on practices of articulation, discourse 
theorists are able to describe how systems of power are challenged and effectively overturned 
by using concepts such as hegemony and contingency. However, what both Foucauldian and 
post-structuralist approaches to discourse seem to lack is the ability to describe social 
processes of contestation and local struggles over power that do not lead to a full shift in a 
system of power. For the study of the multiple dimensions and domains in which democratic 
governance takes place, this is problematic. I therefore contend that the concept of practice 
as developed by practice theorists is a better candidate to explain the fundamental openness 
of the social and to locate where change originates. This understanding is in line with 
Foucault’s original distinction between discursive and non-discursive elements. It implies a 
contextual theory of meaning, as is the case in the example of Wittgenstein’s language game 
above, in which meaning is derived not only from different discursive elements, but also 
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from relations of discursive with non-discursive elements (Bevir 2010b). Moreover, drawing 
on the analytical concepts of articulation, rationalities, logics of practice, performativity, and 
situated agency can clarify the many interdependencies between the discursive and the non-
discursive that Foucault neglected to develop. To do so, however, it is necessary to show that 
discursive and practice approaches have an understanding of the social that can be made to 
correspond with each other. For this, I draw on the shared ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of the two approaches. 
Ontology and epistemology 
To claim that discourse theory and practice theory share ontological and epistemological 
assumptions is not to say that they are identical. It does mean that they can be made 
commensurable and integrated in a single analytical framework. Both discourse and practice 
theory conceive of the social primarily as a field of relations and positions, and not as a 
collection of individual elements, and as being ordered by contingent logics, rather than by 
universal laws or formal rule. Moreover, they emphasise that knowledge is socially 
constructed and share a focus on materiality. I discuss these assumptions for discourse theory 
and practice theory together since I want to show how discourse and practice do not present 
incommensurable views on the understanding and study of the social, but rather represent 
complementary approaches to the social.  
 The ‘field’ is a basic ontological concept for both discourse and practice theorists. The 
concept of the field signifies that the fabric of the social cannot be reduced to singular 
instances of institutions or actors. Instead, the social should primarily be thought of as what 
gives identity and meaning to objects and subjects without fully fixing these identities and 
meanings (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Therefore, all phenomena such as knowledge, actors, 
power, norms, and institutions take place in, and are part of, the field that is the ‘total nexus 
of interconnected human practices’ (Schatzki 2001 et al.:11). The field signifies a primacy of 
the conditions under which social phenomena are constituted over the operations of these 
phenomena themselves. The concept of the field also reduces the autonomy of actors to 
influence social processes and decentres their capacity for agency, but also reduces the scope 
of powerful structures to do the same. The field of discursivity, in the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe (1984), signifies the fundamental incompleteness of any social structure and 
therefore the contingency of any historically formed structure of power. ‘It determines at the 
same time the necessarily discursive character of any object as well as the impossibility of any 
given discourse to implement a final suture’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:111). The field is 
thereby constitutive of social practice. More importantly for the purpose of this thesis, it 
presupposes that every social object (or norm) can always be interpreted or articulated 
differently as a result of the openness of the social. Practice theory conceives of the social as a 
field of practices. It conceptualises the field as a system of positions and relationships among 
positions (Costa 2006). Thus, order is understood as a feature of the field, rather than as a 
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result of agreements, negotiations, or other interactions (Schatzki 2001).The field thereby 
reduces the scope and ordering of power of discourse (Schatzki 2001). Overall, both 
discourse and practice theory employ the concept of the field as the domain in which the 
social is constituted. They hold that this constitution of the social is never complete as 
identities and positions cannot be fully fixed by means of discourse, agreements, norms, or 
otherwise. Equally, they employ the concept of the field in order to argue that the social is 
always already there, in the sense that objects and subjects necessarily are part of a system of 
positions that fixes identities and positions. 
 As a result of understanding social reality as the contingent articulation or fixation of 
identities in a system of positions, as both discourse theory and practice theory do, these 
theoretical approaches place a strong focus on logics as ordering principles. A logic of a 
practice, discursive or not, ‘comprises the rules or grammar of a practice’, as well as ‘the 
conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable’ (Glynos and Howarth 
2007:136). The first aspect of a logic hints at the ordering principles that it represents. For 
instance, the logic of neoclassical economics presupposes principles of supply and demand 
that determine price allocation (Hoogstra-Kleijn 2013). However, these principles also make 
markets vulnerable to price fixing and/or artificially keeping supply low in order to keep 
prices high. So, the second aspect of a logic is that it is open to contestation and does not 
represent a universal order or reason: a logic may change if it no longer functions in a way 
that successfully orders a practice. In discourse theory, two main types of logics are 
identified: social and political. Social logics comprise the rules by which a society is ordered, 
whereas political logics comprise a contestation to that order. Both types of logics, however, 
describe how the positions and relationships in a social field are ordered, either in processes 
of stability or in processes of change. In practice theory, a logic does not imply that a practice 
conforms to a number of rules, but rather that ‘practice has a logic which is not that of the 
logician’ (Bourdieu 1977:109). That is to say, instead of providing a complete ordering of a 
field, a logic of practice reflects only a limited number of principles that organise the activity 
in that field (Bourdieu 1977). These principles provide a common sense of how interactions 
take place (Blackmore 2010), but do not completely fix it to formalised standards or rules. 
Following principles of economy, ‘no more logic is mobilised than is required by the needs 
of practice’ (Bourdieu 1977:110); this implies that, if the needs of a practice change, so will 
its logic. The concept of logics in both approaches therefore expresses the ordering that takes 
place in the fields of the social as contingent upon historical and local conditions. The order 
that logics express is never complete: it may be contested in political processes as it never 
fully captures all demands or needs of a social practice. Consequently, a logic cannot be said 
to be universal, but only represents a historical moment of order. 
 As ontological assumptions inform us about how the social is ordered, epistemological 
assumptions deal with how that order receives meaning. A basic shared epistemological 
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assumption of both discourse theory and practice theory is that the world does not present 
itself in a way that can be neutrally represented by the observer. That is to say, social objects 
only acquire meaning in the articulation of discourse or ‘in action.’ Meaning in both 
approaches is therefore nonrepresentational and viewed as constructed in practice (Thrift and 
Dewsbury 2000). Discourse theory conceives of this construction of meaning as first and 
foremost a relational activity, where signifiers or discursive elements only acquire meaning in 
relation to each other. That is to say, for instance, the concepts of state, civil society, and the 
market only become meaningful when they are articulated in discourse, for instance the 
discourse on liberal democracy. Suppose that these concepts are articulated in a different 
discourse, for instance that of socialism: then each of the concepts will acquire a different 
meaning as the relations between these concepts change. In practice theory, meaning is not 
only discursively constructed through reflection (Bourdieu 1977), but primarily an 
identification of the actions in a practice (Schatzki et al. 2001). It emphasises the flow of 
practice ‘as caught up with and committed to the creation of affect, as contextual, and as 
inevitably technologised through language and objects’ (Thrift and Dewsbury 2000:415). 
Like discourse though, meaning is seen as constituted in the relations and patterns of the 
field. Thus, in both discourse theory and practice theory, meaning is tied to the organisation 
of the field.  
 Finally, discourse and practice theorists share the epistemological assumption that the 
social is material.3 That is to say, there is no sharp separation between the social world and 
the natural world; rather, these are co-produced. This point is supported by Jasanoff 
(2004:2) when she says: ‘the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.’ Discourses do 
not simply represent a mental phenomenon, but actively articulate how we view the world. 
Equally, meanings can be altered, but only in relation to real objects (even though these only 
acquire meaning in discourse). As a consequence, meaning cannot be unified in the mental 
consciousness of a singular subject, but can only appear within the relations between diverse 
subject positions (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:109). Practice theory conceives of practices as 
embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity. Moreover, it highlights the 
interactions of the human and the non-human world that make up the field of practice 
(Corradi et al. 2008). Therefore, studying meaning is also a way to grasp action, as meanings 
have a constitutive relationship to actions (Bevir and Rhodes 2006). In other words, thinking 
and materiality are considered as two sides of the same coin (Thrift 2003). Consequently, 
meaning is not only constituted by the relations and patterns of the field, but is itself also 
constitutive of these relations and patterns. This entwinement of language and action in 
materiality breaks down strict barriers between epistemology and ontology. As meaning (or 
knowledge) constitutes action, it also affects the patterns and relations within the field.  
                                                 
3 It also holds that the natural is material, but, with the exception of very subjectivist approaches, this is not 
really a contested view on the natural. Viewing the social as material, however, is not self-evident. 
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Combining discourse and practice into an analytical frame 
Both discourse-theoretical and practice based approaches explain social and political 
processes by describing how the interdependencies between discursive and non-discursive 
elements shape the social. These interdependencies are analysed by a process of ‘cutting out 
and turning over’ (De Certeau 1984:62-63). Discourses and practices are cut out from an 
undefined field to present ordered wholes. These cuts are made intelligible by means of the 
analytical concepts of articulation and logic of practice. The concept of articulation shows how 
specific links are created between different discursive and non-discursive elements (for 
example democratic norms and social demands). These links constitute a discourse that can 
become hegemonic through political logics and that excludes or marginalises other social 
elements. Thus, it cuts out order from the field by articulating heterogeneous elements 
together in a specific and contingent way. The logic of practice is able to organise the field by 
means of a few generative principles according to the economy of the logic of practice. On 
the one hand, this means that a logic can remain implicit and does not have to be 
discursively articulated; on the other hand, it means that the constitution of practice cuts out 
unnecessary or superfluous patterns and relations with regard to the ‘needs of practice.’ The 
concepts of articulation and logic of practice thus describe the cutting out of concrete 
discourses and practices from the field. They present positions on different ends of a 
spectrum, as articulation describes the constitution of discourse in political action, whereas 
logic of practice understands the ordering of the field as a result of how activity unfolds over 
time in specific local conditions. Both concepts therefore provide insight into the way power 
is constitutive of social reality by processes of exclusion and marginalisation: from the explicit 
articulation of discourse to the implicit logic of practice, power is exercised in and through 
the cutting out of the superfluous, the other, or the remainder of the field.  
 In the process of turning over, in which the unity of the social that results from the 
cutting out is inverted to show its inner differences, discourse-theoretical and practice-based 
approaches show how power is not only constitutive, but can also be disciplinary or 
resistance. This turning over of the discourses and practices that have been cut out of the 
field is accomplished by the analytical concepts of rationalities, performativity, and situated 
agency. These concepts illuminate the mechanisms by which ordering is sustained and 
resisted. They shift attention from the boundaries that give discourses and practices their 
unity to the processes in which they produce and reproduce order. The concept of 
rationalities educes characteristic forms of seeing and perceiving, distinctive way of thinking 
and questioning, and specific ways of acting and intervening. It illuminates how the 
discursive relations between discursive and non-discursive elements are given shape and 
thereby discipline practices within a discourse. Thus, the concept shows how discourses can 
discipline the way in which practices take shape. Similarly, the concept of performativity 
describes how through processes of knowledge production – but also by the repetitions of 
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doings and sayings – a field is disciplined into an ordered practice that produces a specific 
reality. However, the concepts of rationalities and performativity also show how discourses 
can be resisted. In line with the distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive, 
the gap that exists between these spheres opens up the possibility of agency and resistance. 
This agency can be analysed by drawing on multiple rationalities, on the unexpected and 
creative ways in which knowledge is performed, and on the situated agency that actors can 
exert when they actively interpret the field in which they are situated, while drawing on the 
available discursive and non-discursive elements to make choices when faced with dilemmas. 
The theoretical openness of the field, or the inability of discourse/knowledge to articulate all 
elements within a field, are thus used to explain how discourse and consequently power can 
be resisted and how change occurs.  
 Each of the five analytical concepts described above presents a specific focus on how the 
relations between discursive and non-discursive elements are constitutive of, and constituted 
by, the social: articulation is concerned with how social demands are central to the creation 
of new hegemonic discourses; logics of practice study actions as governed by principles and 
patterns that are specific to a practice; rationalities describe how political discourse is 
connected to drivers for action; performativity describes how knowledge actively produces 
reality as disciplinary power, but also how practices lead to resistance; and situated agency 
understands the actions – including opposition – of actors from the practice in which they 
are situated. These concepts show how the constitution of the unity of the social leads to 
exclusion and marginalisation, how power disciplines reality into specific shapes, and how 
this disciplinary power is countered by resistance. These three modes of power – constitutive, 
disciplinary, and resistance – are highlighted by the concepts of articulation and 
performativity. The concept of articulation shows how democratic norms are discursively 
linked to other discursive and non-discursive elements in a process of cutting out, whereas 
the concept of performativity shows how democratic norms can act disciplinary or are 
resisted in the process of turning over.  
 Having three perspectives on how power is exercised is important for the study of how the 
introduction of governance affects processes of politicisation and depoliticisation on multiple 
levels. The analysis of power as constitutive shows how politicisation in terms of the 
empowerment of some domains involves the depoliticisation of other domains in the 
processes of cutting out. The analysis of power as disciplinary educes processes of 
depoliticisation when practices are disciplined within a discourse. The analysis of power as 
resistance highlights how such processes of depoliticisation are never completed because 
alternative realities are produced in multiple, creative, and unexpected ways. As these 
processes involve either the opening up or the closing off of junctures of contestation and 
empowerment, they can be convincingly analysed by a theoretical approach that views these 
processes as interlinked with the articulation and performance of democratic norms. The five 
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analytical concepts introduced in this chapter are fleshed out in more detail by applying 
them to the case study of the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive in the 
Netherlands introduced in the following chapter, and they are reflected upon in the 
concluding chapter. 
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Abstract 
This chapter discusses the research approach chosen to study the paradox of democratic 
governance. It introduces an interpretive research approach and links this to the theoretical 
framework of discourse and practice. Next, it explains and defends the choice of a single case 
study and provides some background information on the choice of WFD implementation in 
the Netherlands as a subject for research. The chapter concludes by discussing the 
methodological choices for data collection and analysis that were made and by presenting an 
outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
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‘All epistemic orders are imposed, and the epistemological construal is just another one of those 
orders. It has no claim to ultimate correctness, not because it has been shown inadequate by an 
exploration of the conditions of intentionality, but because all such claims are bogus. They mistake 
an act of power for a revelation of truth.’ (Taylor 1995:16) 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research approach chosen for this thesis. It comprises the choice of 
an interpretive research approach, a single case study, and qualitative data collection and 
analysis. These choices are not accidental. As the previous chapter on the theoretical 
framework has already explained, adopting a critical constructivist perspective on a field of 
study has implications for how to approach and order reality. The perspective has inspired a 
theoretical framework that combines discourse and practice through a set of analytical 
concepts and that is specifically designed to address the research questions posed in the 
thesis. In the following, I specify the methodological approach used to access my field of 
study and disentangle the paradox of democratic governance. Specifically, I set out to explain 
why I employed an interpretive research approach to study democratic governance and how 
such an approach aligns with the ontological and epistemological assumptions of discourse 
and practice. Moreover, it addresses the interconnectedness of epistemology and ontology as 
discussed in chapter 2, premised on the assumption that the social is material, but also on the 
understanding that critique entails a normative stance of ‘not being governed so much.’ 
 The chapter is ordered as follows. First, it introduces an interpretive research approach as 
a specific form of democratic activity that is linked to the norms of democratic governance. 
Next, the choice of a single case study approach is discussed, and the case study on the 
implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) in the Netherlands is argued for. 
This is followed by a short description of the WFD in terms of the governance elements that 
it introduces, the democratic norms associated with it, and the democratic debates in which 
it can be placed. After this description, an account is given of how data were collected and 
analysed by means of qualitative techniques. The chapter ends with an outline of the 
remainder of this thesis and briefly introduces the different case study chapters and the 
concluding chapter. 
An interpretive research approach 
This thesis uses an interpretive research approach. What distinguishes this approach from 
other approaches is that it privileges meanings as ways to grasp actions and that it considers 
meaning to be contextual (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, Bevir 2010b). That is to say, it holds that 
meanings are constitutive of actions and that therefore actions and practices can be explained 
by the meanings that actors attribute to them. This builds on the understanding that facts 
and values cannot be separated in practice (Fischer 1998) and that actions are never 
completely devoid of meaning. These meanings can be explicitly articulated in discourse, but 
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equally can be viewed as the patterns and principles of a field of practice according to which 
actions are ordered. To say that meaning is contextual is to say that it is also part of a broader 
field of meaning to which specific meanings refer. Adopting an interpretive approach implies 
that meaning cannot be studied in separation, but must always be located in a broader field. 
As actions in an interpretive approach are viewed as the expressions of meanings, interpretive 
approaches go beyond mainstream approaches in policy analysis that employ normative 
accounts of democracy. Therefore, interpretive approaches also engage with the less rational 
– but equally real and relevant – ways in which meaning is given, for instance as sentiments 
and informal values. These are part and parcel of governance processes along with the more 
rational and formal ways in which such processes are given meaning (Yanow 2007). 
 An interpretive approach also has a distinct critical component. It holds that actors can 
interpret situations and actions in many ways. It emphasises the contingency of political 
norms and practices as these can never be fully fixed in the field of meaning in which these 
are positioned (Bevir and Rhodes 2006) and considers these norms and practices therefore to 
be open to contestation. Moreover, taking an interpretive approach means resisting positivist 
research approaches that have increasingly become mainstreamed (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
2002). This resistance goes beyond a mere dispute about preferences for methods. 
Epistemological and ontological assumptions mutually implicate one another since what is 
perceived as a researchable reality will affect the research approach that is chosen and vice 
versa. In other words, methodological choices touch upon basic commitments and 
assumptions about the kind of world in which we find ourselves and to which we wish to 
contribute. From this perspective, focusing on methods such as cost-benefit analyses, 
decision trees, attitudinal and other survey research that reproduce positivist understandings 
of validity, reliability, and hypothesis testing will also reproduce instrumental goals set by the 
state (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002, Yanow 2007). Instead, interpretive research is 
concerned with how it derives its appropriateness from the nature of the field under study. It 
implies that method and worldview are linked and that these links need to be highlighted 
over and beyond the valuation of certain techniques over others (Morgan and Smircich 
1980). This implies that interpretive research is about philosophy (Bevir 2010a): it is about 
opposing social explanations that present the social as a closed system of causal links and 
fixed identities by stressing the openness of the field and the contingency of social processes. 
 As interpretive approaches view the social as constructed in the intertwinement of action 
and meaning and recognise the impossibility of separating what we take the world to be and 
how we set out to investigate it, they also hold that research is not about accessing reality but 
about actively engaging it. Just like the actors that are studied, researchers are agents who 
cope with things (Taylor 1995). The meaning that the researcher articulates on objects and 
the objects he or she chooses to articulate are grounded in the way he or she deals with those 
things conceptually and methodologically. Thus, although a distinction can be upheld 
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between the meaning of an object and the object itself (or the discursive and the non-
discursive), no such distinction between meaning and object is possible when we deal with 
processes of articulation and performativity. In other words, as soon as meaning is 
understood as fundamentally entwined with action, the researcher has to acknowledge that 
he or she him/herself is positioned in a specific field that exhibits logics in which he or she is 
taking part. How the researcher depicts these processes cannot be fully separated from these 
processes themselves: 'the notion that our understanding of the world is grounded in our 
dealings with it is equivalent to the thesis that this understanding is not ultimately based on 
representations at all, in the sense of depictions that are separately identifiable from what 
they are of’ (Taylor 1995:12). Denying that reality consists of separate identifiable elements 
that have essential characteristics also undermines a methodological fundamentalism that 
builds on specific techniques in order to satisfy the ‘criteriology’ of objectivity, validity, and 
reliability in positivist approaches (Seale 1999). It also challenges too strong a focus on more 
constructivist-inspired criteria such as authenticity, credibility, and transferability (Lincoln 
and Guba 1985). As objects or elements only receive meaning in the field and are 
constitutive of and constituted by action, all foundational claims about the truth or 
credibility of such methods become untenable. Much like the introduction of specific 
governance elements does not necessarily lead to more democracy (chapter 1), 
methodological techniques cannot be made solely to account for the value and quality of 
research. Conceiving of a research approach as philosophical therefore locates the value and 
quality of research primarily in the logic of the arguments that it makes (Bevir 2010a): 
whether that logic can explain the pattern that the researcher distinguishes in the field, and 
whether it leads to an account of the social that is open, multiple, and heterogeneous.  
Democratic norms of research 
The position of the researcher in relation to the field he or she studies and the actors that are 
part of it becomes a matter of concern once a research approach is adopted that situates the 
researcher in this same field. It opens up questions about the ways in which the researcher 
both shapes and is shaped by the actors and practices that he or she encounters (Yanow 
2007). Adopting an interpretive research approach therefore concerns not only access to and 
collection of data, but much more the engagement with a field in which the researcher enters 
into various relations with actors, norms, principles, and so on. An interpretive approach is 
‘in many respects, a much more "democratic" undertaking than traditional policy analytic 
practices, which, in resting on the technical-rational expertise of practitioners, deny not only 
agency but also local knowledge of their own circumstances to those for whom policies are 
being designed’ (Yanow 2007:112). By opposing methodological fundamentalism, which 
involves large, randomised samples and experimental design, the regulatory and disciplinary 
processes that result from the worldviews that these methods imply are countered by 
interpretive research approaches that build on principles of openness, multiplicity, and 
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heterogeneity (Lincoln and Canella 2004). To consider the social as essentially an open-
ended process in which meaning can be contested and newly created is to challenge the 
methodological closure that is associated with these conservative methods (Morgan and 
Smircich 1980). 
 Methodological closure, by implicating social closure, can favour certain articulations of 
democratic norms over other. For example, conceiving of the behaviour of actors as 
determined by a mechanism of rational choice that seeks to maximise economic interests will 
favour a more restricted notion of citizenship that is more in line with representative notions 
of democracy. Alternatively, if one considers meaning and action to be mutually constitutive, 
an active type of citizenship in which positions are shaped in deliberative processes is more 
likely to be given preference. As I conceive of an interpretive approach as philosophical, this 
entails using methodological techniques not only to describe, but also to affirm that the 
social is fundamentally open, multiple, and heterogeneous. If these features of the social are 
seen as related to methodological principles, they thereby perform in specific ways the 
democratic norms of inclusion, participation, and accountability discussed in chapter 1. For 
example, the multiple and complex meanings and actions that are considered to be inherent 
in social reality lead interpretive researchers to prefer bottom-up studies (Bevir and Rhodes 
2006). Such studies view meaning as constituted not only in top-down political discourse 
but also in the bottom-up practices of local rationalities and situated agencies (Bevir 2010a). 
In another example, interviewing is employed not only to gather the opinions of subjects and 
to identify how they personally position themselves in a field, but also to question 
interviewees in a mode that calls on them to reflect on and/or justify their actions or beliefs 
(Curato 2012). Such an approach to interviewing therefore enacts norms of deliberation 
rather than representation. In addition to deliberation, or dialogue, interpretive research also 
entails the active articulation of norms such as inclusion and accountability. For example, in 
interpretive research, the norm of inclusion does not necessarily refer to the 
representativeness of samples but to ensuring that all relevant voices are heard (Howe 2003). 
Similarly, the accountability of the researcher is achieved not only by publishing peer-
reviewed articles or volumes, but also by engaging in dialogues with the actors situated in the 
field of research to link the logic of the researcher’s arguments with those of these actors.  
 An interpretive research approach is therefore specifically suited to answer the research 
questions outlined in the first chapter: (1) how democratic norms are articulated in 
discourse; (2) how these norms are performed in practice; and (3) how the introduction of 
governance affects processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. To start with the first 
research question: active engagement with the field in terms of questioning, dialogue, and 
probing for the justification of actions and beliefs educes the articulatory practice in which 
democratic norms become part of a political discourse. This is done in a way that fleshes out 
how specific actions are entwined with democratic norms and how these are situated in the 
 Research approach 
51 
wider field. In addition, the logics of articulation that are found are argued for in terms of 
action and meaning. For example, they link practices of lobbying to norms of interest 
representation, situate these in the broader field of social demands, and argue how these 
together form a political logic. In relation to the second research question, the fundamental 
entwinement of meaning and action acts as a basis for enquiry into how norms perform in 
practice. Moreover, the principles of multiplicity and heterogeneity inform a search for 
multiple practices and performances by heterogeneous actors. For example, it is not only 
governmental authorities or experts that are viewed as actors who perform democratic norms; 
participants, users, and decentralised authorities are viewed as equally performing democratic 
norms and therefore shaping the meaning of these norms. Finally, in relation to research 
question 3, processes of politicisation and depoliticisation are highlighted specifically by 
analysing processes of participation not only in terms of the material inclusion of actors, but 
also in terms of whether their voices are heard. Moreover, an interpretive approach actively 
seeks out processes of contestation and power by situating actors in different fields of 
meaning and by showing how these actors always have the agency to contest political norms 
because meanings and actions in the field are never fixed. The examples given here are not 
exhaustive: they merely show how an interpretive research approach aligns with the research 
questions of this thesis; how an interpretive worldview that stresses openness, multiplicity, 
and heterogeneity relates to the democratic norms of participation, inclusion, and 
accountability; and how this allows me to answer the research questions.  
Case study research 
In the political sciences, the use of case study research is widespread. Case study research is 
often associated with qualitative methods of data collection. These methods usually include 
interviewing, document analysis, and participant observation. However, the predominantly 
qualitative focus of a case study does not make it part of an interpretive approach per se. 
According to Thomas (2011), every case study must comprise two elements: (1) a practical 
historical unity that is the subject of the case study and (2) an analytical or theoretical frame 
that is the object of the case study. He explains: 
Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. 
The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena 
that provides an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is conducted 
and which the case illuminates and explicates. (Thomas 2011:513) 
Although Thomas argues for the importance of an analytical distinction between the subject 
and object of the case study, both are intimately connected in interpretive research. 
Interpretive researchers treat a case study ‘as part of a broader methodology that emphasises 
human meaning and reflexivity. These scholars more often engage in single-site research 
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aimed at detailing the lived experiences of persons in that setting’ (Yanow et al. 2008:2). As 
meaning and action are entwined, the phenomena with which the case study is concerned 
are not so much explained or illuminated by a theory that is tested, nor are these phenomena 
expected to lead to induction from an observed pattern to generalisation. Rather, the case 
study is expected to result in exemplary or critical knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2006). Thomas 
(2010) also argues for this understanding of the case study when he emphasises that we 
should distinguish between theory and phronesis and that a case study is supposed to yield 
the latter: the infusion of practical knowledge with theoretical judgement.  
 As I understand case study research primarily as concerned with studying ‘meaning in 
action’ and as a search for exemplary and critical knowledge, I treat it as a methodological 
principle rather than as a technique (Yanow et al. 2008). This also explains the choice of a 
single case study. Multiple case studies are often concerned with achieving comparability and 
a degree of control that single case studies cannot offer (Lijphart 1971). Conceiving of the 
purpose of case study research as exemplary and critical does not preclude the use of multiple 
case studies, but it does give primacy to analyses that connect practical knowledge with 
theoretical judgment over the comparability of different regions, domain, or time periods. 
Whether to choose a single or multiple case studies is therefore primarily a question of 
research strategy (Yin 1994). As the analytical object and the empirical subject field of the 
case study are mutually implicative, both the empirical delineation of a case study and the 
analytical object of which it is exemplary or critical are to a substantial extent decided on and 
identified during research.  
 As outlined above, I have treated case study research as a methodological principle. This 
entails my viewing the analytical distinction between subject and object only as a starting 
point of research and not as a fixed delineation of what the empirical subject of the case 
study should be; it also means that I allowed for adjustment of the analytical object of the 
case study during research. These starting points entailed the research questions in chapter 1 
as an object of the case study, and the governance elements of the WFD and its 
implementation timeline in the Netherlands as a subject. This subject of WFD 
implementation in the Netherlands was chosen because: it is an early example of EU 
governance; it includes the key governance elements of the increased inclusion of non-state 
actors, decentralisation, and a new mode of steering by the central state; it is normatively 
presented as an example of democratic governance; and it is expected to expose contestations 
between different democratic norms. Each point is discussed below.  
The case of the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the 
Netherlands  
The WFD came into force in December 2000. It obliges all EU member states to adopt a 
river basin approach in the management of their waters and to report on progress by sending 
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regular reports to the European Commission (EC), the most important of which are the 
River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). The WFD is considered as the third wave in 
European water legislation (Aubin and Varone 2002): it is designed to replace a number of 
older directives on water, e.g. on surface water (1975), discharges of dangerous substances 
(1976), and groundwater (1980); and it integrates elements of more recent directives, e.g. on 
waste water (1992), nitrates (1992), and integrated pollution and prevention control (1996). 
These directives are grouped by Aubin and Varone (2002) in two waves. The first wave of 
water directives was designed to protect consumers’ health and introduced quality norms and 
reporting requirements. The second wave took a more command-and-control approach, 
setting emission limits, and including measures specifically aimed at sources of pollution. 
The WFD represents a third wave, combining elements from the first two waves and adding 
an integrative perspective. That is to say, the WFD combines the elements of quality norms 
and output control with those of specific programmes of measures.  
 The WFD includes each of the three key elements of governance identified in chapter 1: 
the increased role of non-state actors in decision making; decentralisation; and new modes of 
steering by central authorities. It does so by setting a number of requirements. First, 
according to the WFD, the active participation of interested parties is to be encouraged in 
the WFD implementation, in particular in the production, review, and updating of the 
RBMPs. In practice, this entails the organisation of processes of public participation in 
which non-state actors such as stakeholders and NGOs can take part in the WFD decision-
making processes. In addition, key WFD documents have to be made available for 
comments from the public. Second, the institution of river basin management entails 
processes of decentralisation to lower-level authorities. The WFD allows these lower-level 
authorities to formulate goals that are specific for the waters that they manage and gives 
them the competence to select measures to achieve these goals by themselves. Third, the 
WFD introduces a mode of steering that does not follow a command-and control style, but 
rather seeks to actively enrol lower-level authorities to set goals and design measures. It does 
so by using mechanisms for accountability that include monitoring and reporting 
techniques, which in turn serve as information for peer review and scrutiny by the public. 
The WFD therefore seeks to steer not so much through political or hierarchical 
accountability as through processes of transparency and peer review. Together, these WFD 
governance elements can be summed up as follows: 
• Active involvement of interested parties and information for, and consultation with, 
the (general) public. 
• National and local authorities set water quality goals according to a systematics 
outlined by annexes to the WFD (i.e. achieving ‘good status’ by 2015) and design 
programmes of measures (that provide the basis for the RBMPs). 
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• Regular reporting on implementation milestones, setting up a monitoring network, 
and publishing of RBMPs, which are periodically revised (every six years). 
 It is believed that the WFD does more than just include governance elements; it is also 
expected to bring about good governance in terms of participation, effectiveness, and 
accountability (European Commission 2012, Holzwarth 2002). This belief is based on the 
following elements: First, participation is believed to be guaranteed by Article 14 that of the 
directive that requires information and consultation of the public and the active involvement 
of interested parties. Moreover, the institution of river basin management is believed to be a 
more efficient way to deal with water issues as it follows the borders of the natural flow of 
waters. Furthermore, the WFD is thought to institute new modes of accountability through 
monitoring and reporting and the periodic revision of the RBMPs, which is expected to lead 
to peer review amongst different authorities as well as public scrutiny. These elements of the 
WFD have specifically been described as an example of ‘experimentalist governance.’ 
According to the logic of experimentalist governance, the WFD is designed to systematically 
provoke doubt about its own assumptions and practices (Zeitlin 2011). Consequently, it is 
expected to lead to a ‘direct deliberative polyarchy.’ The idea of a direct deliberative 
polyarchy embodies a number of ideas that are given shape in the debates on democratic 
governance as described in chapter 1. First, the participation of non-state actors and the 
greater competencies delegated to lower-level authorities can be expected to lead to the 
articulation and performance of participatory rather than representative norms of democracy. 
As many of the decisions in WFD implementation are not directly made by representative 
institutions, more direct forms of democracy can emerge. Moreover, the decentralisation of 
authority by the WFD that allows lower-level authorities to set goals and to select measures 
also conforms more to a more bottom-up than to a top-down approach to steering. 
Furthermore, the use of steering methods that build on processes of peer review and 
transparency can also be thought to lead to a more deliberative way of policymaking than the 
instrumental methods of command-and-control. 
 The normative account of the WFD as good governance or as a direct deliberative 
polyarchy was expected to be contested in practice, both by myself as a researcher and by the 
governance actors in the field. There are a number of reasons why the Netherlands serves as a 
good empirical subject for these contestations to take shape. These have to do with the 
political landscape in the Netherlands, its history as a liberal democracy, the specific modes 
of interaction between civil society and the state that are characteristic of the Netherlands, 
and the fact that WFD implementation became a serious issue in state politics at the end of 
2003. First, there is a history of involvement of non-state actors in water management that 
does not date back only to the 1970s, when environmental NGOs became active against 
water pollution, but goes even further back in history with the establishment of water boards 
by villages and water users as early as 1255. These water boards in the Netherlands have 
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always had a democratic status, as they have elected boards and the power to raise taxes. In a 
sense, the Netherlands therefore already had decentralised water policy before the WFD 
came into force, and the institution of framework goals and river basin management is 
therefore not necessarily a move towards bottom-up decision making. Moreover, the 
Netherlands has a strong history of liberal democracy, which can be said to have existed since 
1848. This history has established the democratic norms of liberal democracy firmly in 
Dutch society in terms of voter participation, interest representation, and bureaucracy. 
Therefore, the tradition of liberal democracy was expected to pose a challenge to the 
democratic norms of governance. Finally, non-state actors have traditionally had, and 
continue to have, a prominent role in decision making in the Netherlands through lobbying 
and consultative processes; this has led to the establishment of professional organisations that 
engage with state actors in more or less institutionalised ways. These specific characteristics 
of water policy in the Netherlands led me to expect contestations to arise over the democratic 
norms of governance, and the specific performance of these, as they were intertwined with 
the governance elements of the WFD. Indeed, this occurred, as the remaining chapters of 
this thesis describe.  
Data collection and analysis 
As I conceive case study research to be a methodological principle rather than a technique, 
the case study was refined and further delimited in the processes of data collection and data 
analysis. Thus, the research practice had a degree of relative autonomy from the abstract 
considerations that provided the starting points of the case study. Methodological decisions 
were made along the way and based on some of the principles outlined above, rather than 
strictly following a range of specific techniques (Seale 1999). Such principles, as already 
mentioned, included openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity, and were applied to the 
subject and object of study, as well as to their mutual entwinement. An important, one could 
say overarching, principle was that I took a qualitative approach to the case study, both in 
terms of data collection and in terms of data analysis.  
 According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003:267) ‘the particular value of qualitative research lies 
in its ability to explore issues in depth and from the perspectives of different participants.’ 
For the purpose of this thesis, both of these are important characteristics of qualitative 
research. In order to grasp the social field in which discourses are articulated and practices are 
performed, an in-depth view that sees social elements not in isolation but positioned beside, 
and in relation to, other social elements is vital. Moreover, an in-depth view is important to 
expose the different logics that are at play in discourse and practice by uncovering patterns 
and regularities. Such could not have been accomplished if the different actions of actors, the 
multiple roles of institutions, or the variety of ways in which norms were articulated had 
been researched in isolation. An in-depth perspective therefore is sensitive to the openness of 
the social. Similarly, the importance of ascertaining the perspectives of different participants 
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addresses the principles of multiplicity. Different participants occupy different positions in 
the social field and therefore establish different relations. This can help for example to 
ascertain whether actors share discourses and practices, or whether they give different 
meanings to similar norms by articulating and performing them differently. Finally, 
qualitative research is sensitive to the principle of heterogeneity: as different types of actors 
are approached in different manners, by asking questions that are specific not only to the 
researcher’s theoretical interests but also to the interests and goals of these different actors, 
differences are respected and heterogeneity remains in the foreground. 
 The data collection for this study consisted of semi-structured, recorded, and transcribed 
interviews, document search, and group meetings where notes were taken. Interviewees were 
selected on the basis of the prominence of their participation in WFD implementation and 
their role as representatives of organised groups in civil society, authorities, or expertise. This 
prominence was assessed by indication of participation in key events, structural participation 
in formalised networks, authority for decision making, impact of statements on the public 
discourse, authorship of key documents, and by snowball sampling. While the interviewees 
were being selected, additional care was taken to include heterogeneous voices by selecting 
interviewees from different domains of society and with different views on the WFD. 
Moreover, selection was sensitive to include both those affected by decisions and those that 
made decisions. During the interviews, general guidelines about qualitative interviewing were 
used to create thick accounts and to prompt the interviewees to reflect on their own actions 
and beliefs in detail (e.g. Patton 1980, Warren 2002b). For example, interviewees were asked 
to give their own historical account of WFD implementation, in which key events and 
documents were called to memory by the interviewer. Furthermore, the interviewees were 
prompted to give a judgment on why they acted in a certain way and not another, and why 
they believed other actors in the case study acted in the way they did. In the conversations, I 
usually started by asking an interviewee to give an account of his or her career and daily 
activities and stimulated him or her to talk about the activities and events that meant most to 
him or her. Educing emotional involvement and/or social engagement allowed me to 
uncover where struggles and contestations took place and how these did or did not lead to 
new actions and meanings. Document selection was based on the roles these documents 
fulfilled in the articulation of discourses and how they reflected certain practices. As I gave 
primacy to interviewing in data collection, these roles were assessed by the importance 
interviewees attached to these documents and how often they were mentioned. In addition, 
documents that played a visible role in the public sphere were selected. Selected documents 
included policy reports, advisory notes, parliamentary proceedings, evaluation reports, 
technical reports, political pamphlets, web content, draft reports, RBMPs; in other words, all 
those written materials that played a role in the discourses and practices of WFD 
implementation. Group meetings were held with government officials, experts, and civil 
servants in order to informally discuss the implementation of the WFD, but also to discuss 
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issues and dilemmas that concerned both policy professionals and academics and to test 
preliminary results. These group meetings were sometimes organised to discuss a specific 
topic, such as the role of expertise in the WFD, whereas at other times they were more open 
with regard to the agenda. In these settings, the mutual engagement between the researcher 
and his or her subject came to its clearest expression. This engagement resulted for example 
in a volume of collected essays that included views on the WFD, both of actors in the field 
and of academic peers (van der Arend et al. 2010). 
 Data were collected in three phases that took place intermittently between 2007 and 
2011. In the first phase, the focus of data collection was primarily on the political discourses 
that articulated democratic norms on a national level. In this phase, twelve interviews were 
conducted that focused on both higher and lower-level government officials and on non-
state actors operating at a national level. In addition, the author of an influential advisory 
report was interviewed. As already mentioned, document selection was based on the role of 
these documents in articulating political discourse. Furthermore, around five group 
meetings, in which both high-ranking government officials and fellow academics 
participated, were held to discuss the WFD implementation in terms of what it meant to 
different actors in society. The second phase of data collection focused primarily on processes 
of participation organised by the decentralised authorities of water boards and river basin 
committees. Here, sixteen interviews were conducted, eight by myself and eight by my 
colleague and co-author of two chapters, Sonja van der Arend. The selection of interviewees 
was coordinated between us, and the transcribed interviews were shared. The interviews were 
supplemented with documents relevant to the issues described by the interviewees and which 
they sometimes suggested themselves. The third phase of data collection focused on the use of 
framework goals and their role in democratic governance. Ten interviews were conducted 
with leading experts who created these goals for the Netherlands as well as with persons who 
used this expertise by formulating local goals and by carrying out processes of monitoring 
and reporting. In addition to interview data, numerous reports and drafts used to create and 
employ these framework goals were analysed. Some of these reports were sent to me directly 
by the interviewees, others were publicly available. Finally, two group meetings were held 
with six or seven (depending on the meeting) experts in order to reflect on the function of 
these framework goals in the broader practice of governance. Together, the case study is 
based upon 38 semi-structured interviews with an average duration of one and a half hours, a 
great variety of public and (semi-)private documentation, and seven group meetings. 
 I analysed the collected data by coding for a number of categories. These categories 
included the key governance elements, democratic norms, contestations, resistance, 
hegemonic discourse, principles of action, and so on. These categories could not be fully 
detached from data collection, as data collection was already structured according to several 
norms of interpretive research that resonate with the democratic norms described in chapter 
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1. Moreover, data collection was to a certain degree structured according to the WFD 
governance elements, for instance when the second phase focused on public participation. 
Even so, in the coding process I did not seek to reproduce such categories uncritically. 
Instead, I analysed the data in three phases. In the first phase, I searched for events in which 
contestations had taken place, junctures at which power was exercised, or examples of where 
a clear lack of contestation existed, even though events or decisions had some type of 
negative impact. These events were identified by searching for regular patterns that could be 
identified across various accounts (Talja 1999): repeated descriptions of events, similar 
arguments, common explanations, and so on. This phase was expected to expose 
contestations where meanings were fluid and could be re-articulated or performed in 
alternative ways as well as instances where meanings were fixed according to a specific logic. 
In the second phase, I used one of the five analytical concepts (articulation, logic of practice, 
rationalities, performativity, situated agency) to educe how the introduction of one or 
multiple key elements of governance (i.e. involvement of non-state actors, decentralisation, 
new mode of steering) acted as sites where processes of politicisation or depoliticisation took 
place. For example, I used the concept of performativity in chapter 5 to educe how water 
quality objectives were performed both in ways that were disciplinary and in ways that 
resisted this disciplinary force. To do so, I therefore situated the occurrence of contestations 
or lack thereof from the first phase in the context of the governance in which they took 
place. In the third phase, I set out to find the interdependencies between these governance 
elements and democratic norms. This involved an analysis of what justifications were given 
for engaging or not in contestations, and analysing that justification as a specific link 
between discursive and non-discursive elements that involved a search beyond governance 
elements and norms, depending on the analytical concept applied. For example, when I used 
the concept of articulation, I found the discursive elements of broad policy concepts (i.e. 
feasibility, level playing field, etc.) in addition to democratic norms; and non-discursive 
elements of social demands and institutions in addition to the governance elements of the 
involvement of non-state actors and the introduction of a new mode of steering. The three 
phases did not progress in a linear order, but were iterative. For instance, when I wanted to 
identify how a political discourse was articulated, I went back and forth between searching 
for the contestations that gave rise to this discourse, the processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation that it involved, and the democratic norms as well as other elements that it 
articulated. This iterative process continued until I found that I could clearly link these three 
phases in a way that was intelligible not only to myself, but also to the actors in the field. 
Therefore, a hermeneutical circle was followed by engaging in a back-and-forth between 
multiple and heterogeneous parts of norms, demands, practices, and so on. This process 
stopped when a convincing and empirically grounded logic of arguments could be 
constructed without the need for full closure (Kincheloe and Mclaren 2011).  
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Outline of the thesis 
The preceding chapters in this thesis have discussed the problem outline, objective, and 
research questions (chapter 1); the theoretical and analytical framing of the research (chapter 
2); and the research approach used (chapter 3). This section presents an outline of the 
subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis (chapters 4–8) as well as the concluding chapter 
(chapter 9). The empirical chapters each take one the five analytical concepts as key to 
explaining how democratic norms were articulated or performed in WFD implementation in 
the Netherlands, and how this affected processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. The 
chapters are all either published as journal articles or submitted to a peer-reviewed journal, 
with the exception of chapter 7, which is published as a book chapter in a peer-reviewed 
edited volume. The chapters are organised to present a continuum from discourse to 
practice. I chose to order the chapters from discourse to practice in order to elucidate how 
the political is not limited to ‘grand’ political discourses, but can be found in processes all the 
way to the day-to-day decisions by local actors in the field. Moreover, starting with discourse 
makes sense in light of the important role of political discourse in ordering the field of WFD 
implementation in the Netherlands.  
 Chapter 4 describes how democratic legitimacy was constructed in the political discourse 
of WFD implementation in the Netherlands through an articulation of representative norms 
that led to a depoliticisation of civil society. It seeks to address the first research question and 
builds on the first phase of data collection. It uses the analytical concept of articulation in 
order to show how political struggles over the meaning of democratic norms were ultimately 
decided by firmly established power structures and led to the marginalisation of 
environmental demands in water governance. It also shows how the politicisation of WFD 
implementation was actively limited to the level of the state and parliament and how this 
involved the depoliticisation of key elements of governance. It concludes with the 
observation that initial hopes about the WFD instituting participatory and deliberative 
norms were ultimately dashed, because representative politics affirmed themselves over 
attempts by EU law-making to institute a new form of governance.  
 Using the analytical concept of rationalities, chapter 5 describes how processes of 
disciplining and resistance are shaped in every element of the WFD. It primarily addresses 
the third research question as it seeks to create a nuanced image of how processes of 
politicisation and depoliticisation took place at multiple scales and sites. The chapter builds 
on all three phases of data collection. It applies the analytical concept of rationalities to 
describe how these processes are not linked to a single actor, such as the state, or to a single 
rationality, for instance deliberation, but that multiple rationalities operate in each of the key 
elements of governance. It concludes that democratic norms are differently performed in 
practice every time, depending on the positions and relations in which governance actors 
find themselves.  
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 Chapter 6 shows that EU law-making can have both depoliticising and politicising effects. 
It describes how the WFD water quality standards operate as a disciplinary force as well as 
act as sites of resistance. It addresses the second research question and builds on the third 
phase of data collection. By applying the analytical concept of performativity, it shows that 
water standards can be performed as a neoliberal tool for accountability. They are not value-
free and can be conceived of as a technique of power. For example, they impose ecological 
values set at EU level that are not necessarily shared by the Dutch state or some local actors. 
It is also shown, however, that in a number of practices, water quality standards perform as 
sites of political action and unpredictability. The chapter concludes that the WFD water 
quality standards have performed in ways that do not follow horizontal modes of 
accountability, as described in the governance literature, but rather build on mechanisms of 
accountability associated with the liberal democratic state. 
 Chapter 7 shows how non-state actors’ existing logics of practice were not convincingly 
changed by the introduction of participatory institutions in the WFD. It addresses the 
second and the third research question and builds on the second phase of data collection. By 
applying the analytical concept of logic of practice, it shows how the performance of 
democratic norms, such as empowerment and deliberation, can be both strengthened and 
resisted by the logics of practice that are characteristic of the field in which non-state actors 
are situated. As the design of participatory processes failed to take into account existing fields 
of practice, its impact on participants’ logic of practice was low. The chapter concludes that, 
although the spaces created by participatory institutions were conducive to higher modes of 
interaction in the WFD governance network, to a large extent they also depoliticised the 
public sphere. 
 Chapter 8 describes how the organisation of public participation builds on a deliberative 
ethos and a managerialist pathos that omits the role of power in participatory processes and 
the goals that non-state actors pursue. Like chapter 7, it addresses the second and the third 
research question and builds on the second phase of data collection. However, it also builds 
on a case study carried out by the first author (van der Arend) that was not part of the 
research for this dissertation. The first author and I contributed equally to this chapter. By 
applying the concept of situated agency, the chapter counters ideas that hold that the top-
down organisation of participation is either desirable or possible. It shows how the neglect of 
the role of power in participation and the poor coverage of participants’ activities have led to 
promoting instrumental and managerial approaches to democratic governance. However, it 
also shows how participants draw on a repertoire of methods, strategies, and habits to 
exercise power and engage in contestations outside formal governance architectures. The 
chapter concludes that the balance of power between government and society takes root in 
much larger historical and institutional contexts than is recognised in the governance 
discourse.  
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 Finally, chapter 9 concludes the thesis by discussing its findings and by addressing the 
research questions and problem outline that informed the research. Specifically, it reflects on 
the entwinement of democratic norms and governance practices and on the processes of 
politicisation and depoliticisation that emerged through that entwinement. It concludes that 
the introduction of governance elements in WFD implementation in the Netherlands led to 
the articulation and performance of democratic norms in various ways. Accordingly, a 
nuanced image of the discourses and practices of democratic governance is painted. On the 
basis of this reflection, the chapter proceeds by discussing how democratic norms are subject 
to different processes of power: the power to constitute reality; the power to discipline 
subjects into specific rationalities, behaviours, and shapes; and the power to resist and do 
things otherwise. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the analytical concepts of articulation, 
logic of practice, rationalities, performativity, and situated agency are useful to highlight how 
the interdependencies between norms and governance elements are not isolated but part of 
larger discourses and practices. In addition, it reflects on the value of an interpretive 
approach, as this approach conceives of the social as open, multiple, and heterogenic. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by bringing the concepts of openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity 
to bear on the paradox of democratic governance.  
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Abstract 
The European Union increasingly shapes environmental policy in its member states. By 
including public participation requirements in environmental directives, the European 
Commission aims to open up the policymaking process and move from an administrative to 
a more participatory approach. Participation is considered to contribute to democratic 
governance, but has been associated with democratic problems as well, as the bases of 
democratic legitimacy do not automatically change when a participatory approach is 
implemented. This article uses a discourse-theoretical approach to analyse how participation 
in the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands took shape and 
what the implications were for the construction of democratic legitimacy. Our findings show 
how market and agricultural groups succeeded in dominating the debate by articulating a 
hegemonic discourse that marginalised environmental demands. Environmental groups did 
not succeed in turning the debate around, as the participatory and deliberative norms that 
they ascribed to were not taken up. The case study demonstrates that although the 
administrative policymaking process was opened up, political dynamics limited the scope for 
participation. The article concludes by reflecting on the potential of EU governance to 
promote democratic legitimacy and fulfil participatory and deliberative norms. 
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Introduction 
European Union (EU) environmental directives are becoming increasingly important in 
shaping environmental policy in its member states (Beunen et al. 2009). The Birds and 
Habitats directives are considered prime examples, but directives such as the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) are equally significant. As this latter directive was drafted in 
the late 1990s, it was influenced by what is called the ‘participatory turn’ in the EU 
(Saurugger 2009). This participatory turn emerged in the middle of the 1990s and has 
culminated in the White Paper on Governance (European Commission 2001) (Saurugger 
2009). In it, the European Commission (EC) considers the inclusion of civil society in policy 
formulation and implementation as a key principle for good governance (European 
Commission 2001). This article will follow the White Paper’s definition of ‘organised civil 
society’ that includes both economic interest groups and public interest groups (European 
Commission 2001 :40). The participatory turn is reflected in participation requirements, of 
which the WFD gives a good example. Article 14 of the WFD states that Member states 
shall: 
[…] encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation 
of this Directive. (European Commission 2000) 
 The inclusion of civil society (or all interested parties) is commonly viewed as an antidote 
to the lack of legitimacy (Scholte 2002) that is currently associated with the changing role of 
the state in national and EU governance (Skelcher 2000). According to the EC, participation 
is important ‘for establishing more democratic governance’ (European Commission 2001). 
Thus, the EU aims to actively open up the policymaking process and move from an 
administrative to a more participatory approach. Such a participatory approach is supposed 
to yield benefits such as increased support for decisions, more informed and effective 
policies, and more effective enforcement. However, the benefits of participation are not 
undisputed. Numerous studies document how participatory processes have failed to meet 
their objectives, have generated unanticipated outcomes, and are characterised by unequal 
power relations (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Turnhout et al. 2010). In addition, organising 
participatory processes alone does not guarantee democratic legitimacy (Turnhout and van 
der Zouwen 2010). These observations point to the importance of analysing participation as 
it is put into practice, including all the power relations and politics that characterise this 
practice. Accordingly, the aim of this article is to understand how a specific participatory process 
was shaped by power relations and how this affected the construction of democratic legitimacy. In 
addition, the article seeks to demonstrate the theoretical value of a Laclau-inspired approach 
to discourse for the analysis of processes of legitimacy construction.  
 Our analysis is based on material from the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands. In this case, the implementation process shifted from a mere administrative 
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issue to a highly political one, in which participation became politicised. The article first 
discusses several critiques of public participation and relates these to the democratic norms 
that can be drawn upon to construct democratic legitimacy. The section that follows 
discusses different modes of engagement between civil society and authorities, by using a 
discourse approach that is inspired by Laclau (2005). It shows how the articulation of 
demands can create a discourse that in turn affects how democratic legitimacy is constructed. 
The article then goes on to describe the case study, which shows how two competing 
discourses on the implementation of the WFD (‘feasible and affordable’ versus ‘ambitious’) 
are linked to different ways in which legitimacy is constructed.. The article concludes by 
discussing the implications of our findings in light of the participatory turn in the EU.  
Participation, legitimacy, and democratic norms 
Although participation is increasingly called for in academic and policy debates, processes of 
public participation have received criticism. One major strain of criticism is addressed at the 
limited extent in which participation is put into practice. For instance, Schout and Jordan 
(2008) address how the limited administrative capacities of actors can limit their 
participation in governance networks. Others discuss the degree of willingness found in 
authorities to take up a governance approach (Moss 2004), only minimally implementing 
participation because it is required by law (Innes and Booher 2003). Some also question the 
general level of participation of ‘new’ governance when compared to ‘older’ styles of 
governance (Smismans 2008). A second strain of criticism discusses issues of accountability. 
The elite characteristics of governance network actors and their subsequent failure to 
empower civil society have frequently been criticised (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Turnhout et 
al. 2010). If participation within a policy area is limited to those organisations and 
individuals that are immediately concerned (e.g. ‘those affected’), it can diminish 
accountability to a more general public (Peters 2004). In a similar vein, Scholte (2002) 
discusses how civil society itself is not necessarily democratic and that its involvement can 
reproduce or skew power relations.  
 The above criticisms of participation build on the norms of participation and deliberation, 
norms that receive growing attention. Since the early debate in the 1960s (Arnstein 1969), 
participatory democracy has addressed the need to implement direct forms of democracy and 
the importance of including non-state actors and structures (Vitale 2006). From the late 
1970s onwards, deliberative democracy has become a widely accepted ideal, especially when 
dealing with environmental issues (Dryzek 2005). Since the beginning of the 1990s, policy 
innovations that promote participation and deliberation have become institutionalised in 
multilateral, national, and local contexts (Bäckstrand et al. 2010). Accordingly, participation 
and deliberation are now considered important norms by which to legitimise the processes 
and outcomes of decision-making processes (e.g. Fung 2003, Papadopoulos and Warin 
2007, Parkins and Mitchell 2005). 
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 The term legitimacy is often used in the literature on democratic and political theory, but 
rarely defined (Parkinson 2003). One strain of scholarship associates legitimacy first and 
foremost with the process of acceptance or consent (e.g. Häikiö 2007, Saward 2000), which 
is seen to depend on political participation, interest representation, and effective government 
(Schmidt 2004). A second strain of scholarship – on deliberative democracy – puts more 
emphasis on justification and accountability, locating legitimacy in free and unconstrained 
deliberation and in the resonance of collective decisions with public opinion (Dryzek 2001) 
As such, the norms of participation and deliberation address two main aspects of political 
legitimacy, which concerns authority relationships in governance (i.e. who has the right to 
govern): (1) acceptance or consent, and (2) justification of a shared rule by a community 
(Bernstein 2011). In addition, these norms include the more stringent democratic legitimacy 
demands of participation, representation, transparency, deliberation, and engagement with 
civil society. (Bernstein 2011). 
 Recognising that these different democratic norms can all contribute to legitimacy is all 
the more relevant in context of state withdrawal, where legitimacy is constructed ‘in and 
through specific processes of governance’ (Connelly 2011:2). The reconfiguration of the 
roles of government and civil society in governance implies that legitimacy can ‘no longer be 
understood in terms of the authorisation and democratic accountability of elected 
governments’ (Wallington et al. 2008:11). Nonetheless, a shift towards more participatory 
and deliberative norms in the construction of legitimacy is not self-evident. As Häikiö 
(2007) shows, the bases of legitimacy do not necessarily change when a participatory 
approach is implemented. A shift from formal consultation to more active participation does 
not easily materialise in practice, nor does the well-established democratic norm of 
representation automatically give way to the norm of deliberation. Rather, both the 
democratic norms of formal consultation and interest representation, as the democratic 
norms of participation and deliberation, can be drawn upon in the construction of 
democratic legitimacy in governance processes. 
 We draw on Liebert and Trenz (2009) and Kohler-Koch and Quittkat (2009) to relate the 
construction of democratic legitimacy to the roles and input of civil society in decision 
making. We do so by connecting these roles and inputs to the democratic norms of formal 
consultation and active participation, and to interest representation and deliberation, 
respectively. According to Liebert and Trenz (2009), participation can range from an 
auxiliary to a constitutive role of civil society in decision making. The input in decision 
making in participation can range from interest representation to deliberation (Kohler-Koch 
and Quittkat 2009). Figure one combines the two in a two-by-two matrix.  
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Figure 1: Democratic legitimacy: The horizontal axis represents the role of civil society, ranging from auxiliary 
to constitutive. The vertical axis represents the input of civil society, ranging from interest representation to 
deliberation 
 Understanding the democratic value of participatory approaches requires a close look at 
how – and what kind of – legitimacy is constructed. In the far upper left corner, legitimacy is 
predominantly based on the process of acceptance, whereas in the far right lower corner 
legitimacy is principally understood by grounds of justification. Specific critiques of 
participation are positioned in the matrix of Figure 1: in combination with interest 
representation, an auxiliary role for civil society is usually associated with a limited scope for 
participation, whereas a constitutive role may reproduce or skew power relations. If a 
deliberative input is present, an auxiliary role may still lead to the failure to empower civil 
society, and a constitutive role can be associated with a diminished accountability to a 
general public. As such, the matrix shows how democratic legitimacy does not only depend 
on who has the right to govern, but also according to what democratic norms governance 
takes place. This article uses the matrix and the associated concepts to analyse and typify the 
participatory practices and discourses identified in the case study. The next section explains 
the discourse theoretical approach used to generate the analysis. 
Claims, requests and discourse 
For our analysis, we combine a discourse-theoretical perspective (Howarth 2000, Laclau and 
Mouffe 1984) with the concept of claim-making (Laclau 2005). This specific type of 
discourse-theoretical approach has gained ground in governance studies more recently (e.g. 
Paul 2009, van den Brink 2009). The approach fits the current study because of the 
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following aspects. First, it recognises legitimacy as constructed in processes of governance 
rather than pre-given (Hendriks and Grin 2007). Second, it fits with the politicised character 
of the case study. Unlike most governance studies that view governance predominantly as a 
procedure (Turnhout 2010, Turnhout and van der Zouwen 2010) or a managerial issue (van 
der Arend and Behagel 2011), a discourse approach considers processes of governance to be 
characterised by discursive dynamics that have the ability to shift power balances or create 
political conflict (Hajer 1995). Discourse structures policy options and enables and 
constrains the role and input of civil society in policy formulation. Third, by distinguishing 
between claim and request, the specific Laclau-inspired discourse approach that is used here 
directs special attention to modes of engagement between civil society and authorities. As 
such, the approach contributes to our understanding of power within governance and links 
this to dynamics of engagement between civil society and governmental authorities. 
 In this article, we understand discourse as a relational totality of meaning resulting from 
the articulation of social demands.4 The concept of social demand allows us to describe how 
a group (or coalition) is constituted (Laclau 2005). Moreover, by using the social demand as 
a unit for analysis, we avoid ascribing democratic norms to a specific group in an essentialist 
manner by situating the construction of democratic legitimacy in articulatory processes. In 
addition, social demands can both be understood to be articulated by civil society and 
directed towards governmental authorities, and to be articulated by governmental authorities 
into a specific policy in response. This ambiguity in meaning makes the social demand 
specifically suited to analyse the different roles that civil society can take up when engaging 
with government. 
 According to Laclau (2005), social demands can be either articulated as singular requests or 
articulated together as a claim. A social demand that is articulated as a request does not call 
into question the decision-making power of the authority it to which it directs itself. That is 
to say, a request does not attempt to change the institutional order at which a demand is 
directed. Moreover, a request is posed in a dialectical manner: it is styled as an intellectual 
exchange of ideas which are believed to be well-defined and not influenced by power 
relations. Furthermore, a request is passive: it trusts in the current institutional order for 
satisfaction and does not enter into action itself. Finally, a request does not represent a larger 
set of demands or some other unarticulated civil grievance. Consequently, it will be 
articulated within an institutionalised discourse in which meanings are relatively stable. 
These points - taken together - mean that demands that are articulated as requests do not 
create a chasm or frontier within society (Laclau 2005). Social demands that are articulated 
together as a claim, do create a frontier within society: when multiple social demands are not 
satisfied, they can become linked together in a chain of demands. A claim differs from 
                                                 
4 For a more intricate and comprehensive account of the status of discourse in Discourse Theory, see Laclau 
and Mouffe (1984: 105-114). 
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requests in that it calls the current institutional order into question and in that it may 
advocate taking action elsewhere. In addition, a claim is put in an active and forceful way as 
opposed to a request. Furthermore, a claim will be open to include many different demands, 
which have the commonality of being unfulfilled by the institutional order. Finally, an 
identity that unifies the claim is created in the articulation of multiple demands in reference 
to one of them: one demand will act to signify the complete chain of demands that become 
articulated within the claim, thus becoming the ‘hegemonic’ signifier. This signifier is 
hegemonic because it structures the articulation of the entire claim. For a demand to attain 
this function of hegemonic signifier, rhetoric is used: literary devices such an analogy, 
metonymy, and metaphor are used to displace the meaning of terms or to aggregate these 
(Laclau 2005 :109). When successful, a claim gives rise to a new discourse.  
 When we shift our attention from the specificity of social demands to the logics of 
engagement between civil society and authorities, we distinguish between social and political 
logics (Glynos and Howarth 2007). We encounter social logics when there is relative stability 
in relations of power. This stability is identified by having a specific place or structure in 
which each single social demand can be addressed. It is reflected in the hegemony of a 
certain discourse in which social demands are expressed and dealt with. Political logics occur 
when there is a significant instability in relations of power. This instability is identified by a 
lack of place or structure in which multiple social demands can be addressed. As a result, the 
dominant discourse might be challenged by a new discourse (resulting from a claim) If a new 
discourse is successful , it will become hegemonic. In turn, this will result in a new or 
changed institutional order that is able to address the demands that were previously 
frustrated; it will specifically address the single demand that structures the hegemonic 
discourse in the articulation of a claim. Table 1 schematically presents the qualities of a 
request and a claim, and summarizes our analytical framework. 
Request Claim 
Single demand Multiple demands 
Passive Active 
Respects institutional order Call institutional order into question 
Part of a social logic Part of a political logic 
Table 1: Schematic presentation of the qualities of a request and a claim 
 The conceptual framework developed here allows for the resituating of democratic norms 
out of the domain of normative theory and into the domain of power and politics. Using the 
typology of democratic norms, and the associated roles and input of civil society, the analysis 
will show how democratic norms are articulated with social demands in a discourse. 
Consequently, the analysis of how a discourse is articulated will also show how democratic 
legitimacy is constructed.  
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Case description and approach 
The article uses the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands as a case study. The 
WFD is an EU framework directive that aims at cleaner (fresh) waters by setting ecological 
and chemical goals for surface and ground water. As it is a framework directive, EU member 
states retain the freedom to choose measures to attain these goals and identify the water 
bodies to which these goals apply. Nevertheless, the WFD requires member states to inform 
and consult the public and to encourage the involvement of ‘all interested parties’ in its 
implementation. The EC offers two reasons for requiring public participation in the WFD: 
(1) balancing the interests of various groups, and (2) enforcing implementation, through 
consultation or, if necessary, legal action (European Commission 2009). In the Netherlands, 
this requirement has led to the modification of a national consultancy body on water and sea 
issues, the establishment of regional sounding boards, and the organisation of local 
workshops. These participatory processes were almost exclusively attended by organised civil 
society. As we will show in the next section, the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands was accompanied by a distinct politicisation process during which civil society 
was involved in the articulation of claims and requests and the construction of democratic 
legitimacy. As such, the case study fits the objective of the article.  
 Our material focuses on the time period 2003-2008, a period which entailed a number of 
key events which are considered as exemplary (Flyvbjerg 2006) of the construction of 
democratic norms within a participatory governance process. We adopted a qualitative 
approach to data collection. According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003 :267) ‘the particular value 
of qualitative research lies in its ability to explore issues in depth and from the perspectives of 
different participants’. In order to satisfy our research objective, exploring different in depth 
perspectives has proved crucial to understanding the complex interactions of power and 
democratic legitimacy. These interactions are found in the different perspectives of desired 
input and role of civil society that interviewees sketched and the different discourses in 
which they situated themselves.  
 The data consists of documents (from written media, policy notes, public reports, and 
advisory reports) and transcribed interviews (Appendix 1). Document selection was based on 
the roles these documents fulfilled in the articulation of social demands into a discourse. 
These roles entail: influencing public opinion, setting out policy lines, engendering political 
debate, and legitimising or criticising policy choices. Interviewees were selected based on the 
prominence of their participation in the implementation of the WFD and their role as 
representative of organised groups in civil society. This prominence was assessed by 
indication of participation in key events, structural participation in formalised networks, 
impact of statements on the public discourse, and by snowball sampling. Twelve key semi-
structured interviews were held. During the interviews, interviewees were asked to give their 
own historical account of the implementation of the WFD, in which key events and 
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documents were brought to mind by the interviewer. Furthermore, the interviewees were 
asked to give their opinion on the input and role of civil society in the implementation 
process. In addition to key interviews, a number of unstructured interviews took place 
during workshops, informal gatherings, and conferences, in which key events were identified 
and preliminary findings were tested. We analysed our data by searching for the articulation 
of social demands within discourses. To identify discourses, we searched for the qualities of a 
request and a claim and paid special attention to the articulation of democratic norms in 
terms of the role and the input of civil society. The results that are discussed below follow 
the chronological order of events in the process of implementing the WFD in the 
Netherlands. 
Claims, requests and emergent discourses in the Dutch implementation 
of the WFD 
From the time of its publication in the year 2000, the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands had received little public attention. This early period was characterised by an 
interviewee as follows: 
No one in the Netherlands has even heard of the WFD, except for those who are 
busy with implementing it. (I1) 
Indeed, no public participation event to speak of had taken place. This early period may be 
characterised as mainly administrative and government centred, which is illustrated by the 
systematic pursuit of the objectives that were set out by the WFD that followed a pre-
established timeframe. As the quality of waters in the Netherlands was believed to be good 
by most officials, the effect of the WFD was thought to be mainly on administrative and 
technical capacities and limited to the water sector alone: 
Originally the Netherlands thought: well, this directive, oh well, it could imply 
something for Southern Europe. Hey, in the Netherlands we are already very good at 
water management … that was around the period when the directive first took effect. 
But I believe we have changed that view relatively fast, like: Oh, what have we gotten 
ourselves into?(I2)  
These assumptions of limited effects and impacts changed dramatically at the end of 2003, 
when a scenario-study on the implications of the WFD on agriculture, nature, fishery, and 
recreation, named ‘Aquarein’ (van der Bolt et al. 2003) was published.  
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The Aquarein report 
The Aquarein report was commissioned by the ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality5 (LNV) after a major Dutch research institute named ‘Alterra’ had pointed out the 
possible implications of the WFD. Alterra, although an independent institute, is historically 
linked to LNV, and the report covers the impact of the WFD on sectors that are the domain 
of LNV, which include agriculture, nature, recreation, and fishery. These sectors are 
different from those handled by the competent authority for the implementation of the 
WFD in the Netherlands – the ministry of Traffic, Public Works and Water Management 
(V&W)6 which is concerned with infrastructure and water management. As such, Aquarein 
introduced new demands of the agricultural, fishing, nature, and recreational sectors, which 
V&W had thus far not addressed. Because these demands lacked an institutional structure in 
which they could be satisfied, they were in danger of becoming frustrated.  
 The Aquarein report in itself did not call the institutional order of water policy into 
question, the demands it articulated were styled as an intellectual exchange. The report 
included an expert-based ‘quick-scan’ based on the impacts of the WFD on the sectors of 
agriculture, nature, recreation, and fishery. For these sectors, it presented four scenarios 
based on a number of parameters, one of which was the level of ‘ambition’ ranging from the 
achievement of ‘good ecological status’ for all waters in 2015 as the lowest and ‘very good 
ecological status’.as the highest. The scenarios all painted a devastating picture for the 
agricultural sector. Even the scenario based on the lowest level of ambition predicted that 
70% of agricultural land in the Netherlands would have to be taken out of production in 
order to meet the WFD’s water quality goals (van der Bolt et al. 2003). The high impact on 
the agricultural sector that these scenarios predicted made the general message of the 
Aquarein report more than just an intellectual exchange of ideas. Indeed, according to one of 
the contributors to the report, Aquarein was intended to stir up political discussion on the 
implementation of the WFD:  
 [Making political choices], that was the message. Our message wasn’t that 
agriculture would disappear from the Netherlands; that was just a coincidental result 
of the methods we used.(I1) 
The national coordinator of the WFD, who at the time of the publication of the report 
worked at LNV, was even clearer on the strategic purpose of the report: 
…one of the options is to use advice, a study, something that can be thrown in from 
outside … [Placing the WFD on the political agenda] was necessary, if you are 
already busy for years, … , if it is kept far too bureaucratic, kept out of sight for too 
long, understand? (I3) 
                                                 
5 In Dutch: Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit (LNV) 
6 In Dutch: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (V&W) 
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In other words, the Aquarein report also aimed at putting new demands on the political 
agenda. So far, this agenda-setting had been carried out mostly by a LNV and Alterra, but 
when Aquarein was presented at a broadly set up conference, organised civil society became 
involved as well.  
A claim is made 
On the 28th November of 2003, LNV organised a conference to present the Aquarein study 
and to discuss the impact of the WFD on its policy domains. The conference was attended 
by almost all of the actors from government and civil society that were involved in water 
policy, including representatives from three different ministries, interest groups from 
agriculture, fishery, recreation, commerce and industry, and environmental NGOs. The 
presentation of the Aquarein study stirred up discussion, especially amongst members of civil 
society groups, who were explicitly asked to give their perspective on the WFD. At the 
conference, some representatives of civil society gave presentations, and all took part in 
workshops in which they commented on specific themes of the WFD, such as nature and 
agriculture. During these events, demands were articulated. For example, the foundation for 
Nature and Environment (SNM)7 wanted more protected areas and more waters to be 
designated as ‘natural’, rather than ‘artificial’ or ‘heavily modified’, and the organisation for 
recreational fishing wanted a healthy and diversified fish population that is also accessible. 
The organisation for agriculture and horticulture in the Netherlands (LTO)8 made their 
demands more forcefully:  
LTO wants to see the international competitiveness of the Dutch agri- and 
horticulture reinforced. …[This] is also the basis of the Note on Spatial Planning9 
and thereby also gives shape to the framework of the Agenda Vital Rural Area10. This 
means that we ask the minister of LNV how he reconciles the results of [Aquarein] 
with the reinforcement of our international competitiveness. (Expertisecentrum LNV 
2004) 
The LTO is a firmly institutionalised and historically influential interest group in the Dutch 
policy scene with strong ties to major political parties and access to policy makers. As such, 
their demand carried weight. 
 As the following comments illustrate, the conference also included a first attempt to 
articulate these diverging social demands around a demand that all societal groups had in 
common, namely public participation:  
                                                 
7 In Dutch: Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
8 In Dutch: Land en Tuinbouw Organisatie 
9 In Dutch: Nota Ruimte 
10 In Dutch: Agenda Vitaal Platteland 
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Do not handle the Water Framework Directive as a technical drill, but as a 
democratic process’ … ‘LTO wants to be regionally and nationally involved with the 
formulation of policy on water quality. Public participation! (Expertisecentrum LNV 
2004) 
Nevertheless, the demand for public participation did not lead to a claim. The different 
demands, which included competitive agriculture, recreational fishing, nature conservation, 
and public participation, were still made in the form of separate requests. Moreover, these 
requests were directed at the appropriate authority that dealt with these demands, for 
instance to the minister of LNV when it concerned agriculture or the protection of nature 
areas. A claim was articulated only after the demand of competitive agriculture within the 
WFD context had been linked to demands that had arisen out of frustration with the 
implementation of earlier EU environmental directives. These frustrations concerned fears 
that the EU environmental directives were ‘locking down’ the Netherlands, meaning that 
new economic developments would be delayed or stopped by legal procedures initiated by 
environmental groups. In the Netherlands, EU environmental standards on air quality had 
led in many instances to the delay or even abandonment of big development projects. The 
resulting frustration had led to demands by industry and entrepreneurs for fewer (legal) 
obstacles to spatial developments. As a spokesperson for the drinking water companies put it:  
Besides [the lobby for agriculture], the dossier on air quality has resulted in a lot of 
problems … Politically, this meant: ‘never again’ … That’s why I think [the 
government] is more sensitive to demands by VNO-NCW 11  and the 
agriculturists.(I4) 
VNO-NCW represents the interests of industry and employers and is one of the most 
powerful interest groups in the Netherlands, next to LTO. To illustrate, their president was 
elected the most influential Dutchman of 2010 by a leading newspaper (Dekker and van 
Raaij 2010). Just as LTO, VNO-NCW has strong ties to major political parties and access to 
policy makers. VNO-NCW had a clear position about how the Netherlands should deal 
with environmental directives: 
We did everything to prevent the possibility for the environmental movement to 
start legal procedures. … VNO-NCW has no interest in the environmental 
movements to start legal procedures with the province, with the State Counsel. That 
only creates difficulties. (I5) 
 By linking their demand for competitive agriculture to the frustration with EU 
environmental directives in general, LTO was able to articulate a claim. This claim explicitly 
                                                 
11 VNO-NCW is the confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers..VNO-NCW is the full legal name 
of this confederation. 
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challenged the institutional order of water policy and placed itself outside that order. LTO 
demanded change: 
It should be clear that if these are the consequences for Dutch agriculture, leaving no 
future for agriculture, then a discussion on the vision on the WFD is of little use. … 
The manner in which elected officials are dealing with the development and 
implementation of European Directives should be made subject to discussion … the 
implementation of the WFD has been, up until this moment, an affair of civil 
servants and scientists that are concerned with water quality. The situation should 
not be that ecologists are responsible for the implementation of the WFD. 
(Expertisecentrum LNV 2004) 
LTO accused civil servants and scientists of having a predominantly environmental focus. 
Moreover, LTO criticised the junior minister of V&W for not opening up the debate on the 
implementation of the WFD (Expertisecentrum LNV 2004 :32). The different demands 
that were frustrated by EU environmental directives were now articulated together by 
excluding environmental demands. According to one of LTOs spokespersons, the most 
important issue in the implementation of the WFD was to make sure that: ‘the existing 
agricultural functions […] don’t have to give way to water quality’ (I6). LTO’s demand for 
change was picked up by regional and national media. The heading of one national 
newspaper read: ‘Eco-norm EU finishes agriculture’ (Schreuder 2003), the heading of 
another stated: ‘rules drive farmers out of the country’ (Algemeen Dagblad (2003, December 
1) cited in Expertisecentrum LNV 2004 :43). As a result, action was taken. A majority of 
Members of Parliament joined the claim of LTO by demanding that the junior minister of 
V&W should draw up a strategic plan that would protect the Dutch agricultural sector from 
the effects of the WFD. They backed up this demand by refusing to transpose the WFD in 
national legislation. Now, what had been imagined to be an administrative step within a 
timeframe for implementation had become a political moment. This moment resulted in a 
social divide in the field of water policy with two competing discourses on the 
implementation of the WFD. 
A new discourse 
As a result of LTO’s claim and the media attention and political pressure it generated, the 
junior minister of V&W drafted a strategic note named ‘Pragmatic Implementation of the 
WFD in the Netherlands’ (Verkeer and Waterstaat 2004), which started a new phase in the 
implementation process. First, the call for public participation that was made during the 
conference described above was honoured. This meant that civil society groups, departments 
outside of V&W, water boards, provinces, and municipalities got involved in the drafting of 
the note, and sounding boards were set up for regional public participation. Second, the 
WFD was no longer thought of as a merely administrative process, as the note required 
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V&W to draft annual notes reporting the progress of the implementation of the WFD in 
terms of feasibility and expected costs to the national parliament. In other words, the WFD 
was placed on the political agenda.  
 During the preparation of the strategic note, groups from civil society were invited to 
comment on which themes of the WFD should be identified as either feasible, feasible with 
extra effort, or not very feasible. Many themes were identified as ‘feasible with extra effort’, 
including the achievement of ecological goals and measures that would involve spatial 
planning. The only themes that were identified as ‘feasible’ were public participation, 
effective water pricing, and ‘new’ pollutants. Although ‘feasible with extra effort’ appears to 
be a rational phrasing of whether something can be accomplished, it had a significant 
rhetorical function of displacement that some parties had overlooked. When the note on 
pragmatic implementation spoke of extra effort, it was referring to innovative techniques, 
not money: ‘The task seems feasible with extra effort, on top of existing policy, … The 
application of innovative techniques will be necessary to accomplish this’ (Verkeer & 
Waterstaat 2004). As a result of this interpretation, all measures that would require extra 
financial effort were considered to be not very feasible. In this way, the note on ‘pragmatic 
implementation’ was very effective in shaping a new discourse. It did this by fixing the 
meaning of what it meant to implement the WFD in a ‘feasible and affordable’ manner, that 
is, by articulating what would be considered as ‘feasible’, which excluded all measures that 
would require extra financial input, and by appealing to cost-effectiveness: 
The Netherlands takes as a starting point a pragmatic implementation of the WFD 
and nothing more. This note chooses a course of action that keeps the consequences 
and the costs as restricted as possible and optimises the benefits.(Verkeer & 
Waterstaat 2004) 
In practice, this meant that very little consequences or costs would be acceptable. Similarly, 
something was considered ‘feasible’ only when goals could be achieved based on existing 
policy measures, that is to say, measures that were already anticipated upon independently of 
the WFD.  
 The way that the strategic note fixed the meaning of the terms ‘feasible’ and ‘affordable’ 
can be interpreted as an articulation of the social demands that made up the initial claim – 
the insurance that agriculture, industry, and entrepreneurs would not meet any obstacles for 
new or existing developments – into a new discourse. To establish itself and to signify the 
frustrations of the social demands that gave rise to it, this new discourse articulated itself in 
opposition to another discourse. This was done by portraying the WFD as a piece of 
legislation that was forced upon the Netherlands by the EU and imposed difficult 
obligations. These obligations could be escaped through strategies of pragmatic 
implementation. The excerpt from the strategic note below offers some examples:  
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In the River Basin Management Plans, the Netherlands will identify goals that are 
feasible, if necessary with phasing until 2027. 
 The Netherlands will, where possible, identify water bodies as ‘artificial’ or ‘heavily 
modified’. 
The WFD offers, within restrictions, options to phase goals when the achieving of a 
good status in 2015 leads to unreasonable demands. The Netherlands will have to 
use the options to phase goals frequently. (Verkeer & Waterstaat 2004) 
These strategies taken from the strategic implementation note show that LTO’s claim had 
been institutionalised and had become hegemonic. The lowering of ambitions was 
articulated as a national interest of pragmatics and cost-effectiveness, yet the private interests 
of agri- and horticulture were central: ‘An extra load on top of the Nitrates Directive would 
lead to disproportionate costs for the [agricultural] sector’ (Verkeer & Waterstaat 2004). 
This equation of feasibility and affordability with the interest of the agricultural sector would 
remain dominant. Subsequent governmental notes (Verkeer & Waterstaat 2005, 2006) 
continued to stress that implementation would be ‘feasible and affordable’ and during 
subsequent events of public participation the same discourse was applied by authorities in 
the selection of water quality measures. 
Sustaining the feasible and affordable discourse 
Although the hegemonic discourse of ‘feasible and affordable’ adequately addressed social 
demands by groups from civil society such as LTO and VNO-NCW, some concerns 
remained. To keep up pressure on authorities to maintain the strategic course that was set 
out by the strategic implementation note, they held on to their ‘outsider’ role. Moreover, 
they relied on interest representation to satisfy their demands, as they were accustomed to 
do. For instance, they sent a letter to all the ministries involved in the implementation of the 
WFD in which they expressed the following concern: 
[The WFD] is very ambitious in its aims and will demand great efforts of the 
Netherlands in the fields of environment, spatial planning, and agriculture. The 
boards of VNO-NCW and LTO-Netherlands are seriously concerned about the 
economic consequences of the European Water Framework Directive. Great concern 
exists about the manner of implementation employed by the government. (VNO-
NCW and LTO 2004, November 23) 
In addition, LTO and VNO-NCW also took part in formal participatory venues – such as 
the quadrennial national consultative body consisting of civil society groups and authorities 
(Consultative Committee Water and North Sea12 (OWN)), regional sounding boards, and 
                                                 
12 In Dutch: Overlegorgaan Water en Noordzeeaangelegenheden (OWN) 
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local workshops. These actors believed that an auxiliary role for civil society was appropriate 
for these venues. As one interviewee participating on behalf of LTO put it: 
In essence I believe [the sounding boards were] useful and especially informative for 
societal parties. That is to say that there was ample opportunity to develop your own 
perspective and make it heard. There was less room for advice. (I6) 
Agricultural parties were used to having their demands addressed by regional and national 
authorities. Those parties that feared the threat of environmental legislation for spatial 
developments – such as VNO-NCW – also focused primarily on the national level as that is 
where laws are made. In this context, an auxiliary role to decision making which is limited to 
consultation made sense  
 The discourse of ‘feasible and affordable’ that had resulted from the claim made by LTO 
dominated the participatory processes that were organised. The two main parties that 
supported this discourse were lobbying organisations; they had extensive experience with 
representing their interests and were not – and this is especially true for VNO-NCW - very 
interested in deliberation. As the following quote by one participant illustrates, the input of 
these organisations focused predominantly on stakes or interests and did not involve 
deliberation: 
The moment we didn’t have support from LTO [for the discussion of goals on water 
quality], we gave up on them… LTO puts its stakes on what is possible for them as 
agriculture and it ends there. (I7) 
Most organisers of participatory venues also understood the input of civil society to be 
interest representation and its role as auxiliary. Accordingly, they organised participatory 
venues in which comments could be offered and interests could be balanced. According to 
one of them: 
…there are differences between those who have to [implement the WFD] and pay 
for it and interest groups that just keep on asking. And then you do not get a 
constructive dialogue. (I8) 
Indeed, decision making remained the domain of authorities and deliberation was hard to 
find. In 2006, the pragmatic coalition still used the same rhetoric that aggregated frustrations 
of the past with possible implications of the WFD for the future. They kept warning that the 
WFD could result in the ‘locking down’ of the Netherlands. For instance LTO voiced its 
concern that ‘…trouble will arise in fragile areas. New WFD measures could ‘lock down’ 
these areas for farmers.’ (WaterForum Online 2006a). VNO-NCW also continued to lobby 
against stringent WFD legislation, pointing out that the Dutch economy should not be 
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locked down and stressing that: ‘.. By having Dutch law refer to [the possibility for 
exceptions in the WFD], companies can move and expand’ (WaterForum Online 2006b).  
Building a counter-claim 
The new discourse excluded and frustrated environmental demands. Environmental groups 
in civil society, such as Natuurmonumenten13 and SNM became increasingly discontent 
with how the implementation of the WFD took shape in the Netherlands. This discontent 
concerned not only the low ambitions that the government set for the implementation of the 
WFD in terms of allocated resources and goal commitment, but also the expectations that 
government had of civil society in terms of the role it could play and the input it could 
deliver. More specifically, the environmental movement wanted to provide a deliberative 
input that went beyond interest representation and they had the ambition to play a 
constitutive role, not just an auxiliary one. Out of discontent with the hegemonic discourse 
of ‘feasible and affordable’, environmental groups tried to build a counter-claim which 
highlighted the environmental aspects of the WFD. The counter-claim was supported by a 
coalition that called itself ‘benefits of clean water’. This coalition articulated a discourse of 
‘ambition’, for instance by means of a pamphlet (Coalitie Baten Schoon Water 2006) that 
described the benefits of clean water. The pamphlet appeals to the official text of the WFD, 
which states: 
Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must 
be protected, defended and treated as such.(European Commission 2000, preamble 
1) 
The coalition was initiated by the environmental lobbying group SNM and included a broad 
spectrum of civil society actors including not only environmental groups, but also 
recreational groups and drinking water companies. The coalition wanted to change the 
hegemonic discourse of ‘feasible and affordable’ and emphasised the benefits that would 
result from an ambitious implementation of the WFD: 
Direct use value: agriculture, fishery, industry, recreation, and private citizens could 
profit from clean water. Even better, it could help some sectors grow. (Coalitie Baten 
Schoon Water 2006) 
In doing so, the ‘benefits clean water’ coalition attempted to shift discussions away from the 
mainly negative focus on costs. Within the discourse of ‘ambition’, the terms ‘feasibility’ and 
‘affordability’ included not only economic but also environmental demands. However, the 
coalition was not very strong as illustrated by decreasing involvement of the recreational 
sector and the drinking water companies in the coalition. Also, the coalition was not 
                                                 
13 Natuurmonumenten is an organization that owns and manages a large number a nature areas in the 
Netherlands 
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successful in building its counter-claim and could not change the hegemonic discourse. This 
became apparent in participatory venues, as the quote from a representative of 
Natuurmonumenten below illustrates: 
Very soon in those discussion groups (organised by water boards), when financial 
objections, or mainly the objections of the agricultural sector came into view, Pavlov-
reactions occurred in those workshops, like: ‘this is significant damage or 
disproportionably expensive’, that’s not an obligation of the WFD. … . In the end, 
the notion of ‘disproportional costs’ was no longer used, it was just ‘feasible and 
affordable’. It was just very hard to verify: is that correct? [ Our staff] let themselves 
be influenced by the societal discourse. (I9) 
 In spite of their inability to change the discourse, environmental groups continued to seek 
ways in which to make their arguments heard. For instance, they identified the complex 
administrative process of implementation as an impediment to constructive dialogue: 
It is not about how the Netherlands took on the administrative route, it is about 
interaction, involving civil society in the planning. … The entire administrative route 
is so complex that one does not have time for actors from civil society, it is just too 
difficult to have a real dialogue. I am still searching for possibilities for constructive 
deliberation in the future. (I10) 
The deliberative norm of a joint search for a common good based on the open exchange of 
ideas and perspectives is reflected in many of the arguments and strategies of the coalition 
‘benefits clean water’. They looked for ways in which all parties would benefit from a more 
ambitious implementation of the WFD, they searched for ‘best practices’, and they wanted 
rational discussions on which measures to take.  
 In addition to their attempt to bring in more ambition to the implementation of the 
WFD by means of deliberation, environmental groups also tried to obtain a constitutive role 
for civil society in the policy process. They asked the junior minister to create a help-desk 
that would actively support the involvement of civil society groups and organise additional 
national meetings for specific target groups (OWN 2008). This would help to increase the 
possibilities for civil society involvement in the decision-making process: 
Look, if you attend these sounding boards … I can go and state my opinion, but I 
am still on the outside, I am not really a decision-maker … more attention should be 
given to the carry-over to the societal arena. Special meetings for civil society actors 
where national and regional are sitting side-by-side. Some kind of target group 
meetings... (I10) 
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In a letter (Verkeer & Waterstaat 2008, June 16) to OWN, the junior minister rejected the 
request for more participation. Instead, she redirected it to the regional authorities and 
promised to improve existing information channels. In doing so, her primary focus remained 
on providing information, rather than on stimulating active participation.  
The construction of democratic legitimacy in governance processes 
In the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands, we have seen a move away from an 
administrative approach to policymaking. Our findings demonstrate how civil society groups 
became involved in the implementation process and how some of them articulated a 
discourse that became leading in determining policy choices. The hegemonic ‘feasible and 
affordable’ discourse included demands frustrated by EU environmental directives while 
excluding environmental concerns. The implementation of the WFD became dominated by 
a pragmatic strategy aimed at avoiding costs and protecting the interests of agriculture and 
business. Although we have seen that all actors involved were in favour of participation, the 
interpretations of what this participation should entail differed. VNO-NCW and LTO 
opted for an auxiliary role of civil society based on interest representation. In contrast, 
environmental organisations had the ambition to play a constitutive role and provide 
deliberative input. Our findings also show how the environmental movement was unable to 
break down the hegemony of the feasible and affordable discourse and instead became, at 
least partly, co-opted by it. Subsequently, its participatory and deliberative ambitions were 
not fulfilled.  
 We trace the failure of environmental organisations to build a counter-claim and to break 
the hegemony of the discourse of ‘feasible and affordable’ to the mode of engagement that 
they for which they opted. By choosing a deliberative input, they were not able to exclude 
other demands, and subsequently could not establish a strong identity that connected various 
social demands together in a claim. Although a call for more active participation could have 
acted as a challenge to the institutional order of water policy, this demand was styled as a 
request to the applicable authority and therefore lacked the force that characterises a claim. 
Environmental groups continued to follow social logics that do not have the capacity to 
significantly alter a discourse. The participatory approach that authorities had chosen 
favoured interest representation and an auxiliary role for civil society groups. Drawing on the 
conventional democratic norms of consultation and interest representation, this arguably 
better suited the political mode of engagement that gave rise to and sustained the feasible 
and affordable discourse. Because participatory and deliberative norms were not met, the 
inclusion of a broad range of civil society actors did not result in the inclusion of all social 
demands: demands that were connected to environmental quality were marginalised. 
 Although the requirements of political legitimacy, acceptance and justification, were 
largely met – there was broad acceptance of the implementation path chosen by 
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governmental authorities by civil society and it was justified to most – the same cannot be 
said for the more stringent demands of democratic legitimacy. In the context of governance, 
interest representation is arguably not sufficient to achieve democratic legitimacy. In the case 
described above, the central role of V&W in articulating the discourse of ‘feasible and 
affordable’ together with the dynamics of interest representation led to the skewing of power 
relations as this hegemonic discourse clearly favoured agricultural interests over 
environmental concerns. In addition, as civil society groups were mainly given an auxiliary 
role in decision making, there was a limited scope for active participation and no real 
empowerment of civil society. Therefore, the failure to meet the democratic legitimacy 
demands of a constitutive role for civil society and deliberation leads us to assess the basis for 
democratic legitimacy in our case as thin and incomplete. 
 The analysis demonstrates the interrelations between social demands, and participatory 
and deliberative norms. It shows how legitimacy is constructed within processes of 
governance and articulated within discourses. Consequently, an analysis of why governance 
processes often fail to live up to participatory and deliberative norms should not be sought in 
the organisation of participation alone but should also consider what happens in practice 
during governance processes. When democratic legitimacy is constructed in a political mode 
of engagement that draws on conventional democratic norms of elected authorities and 
interest representation, then these can come into conflict with participatory and deliberative 
norms. A participatory approach that would construct democratic legitimacy by drawing on 
these latter norms entails the articulation of a discourse at some distance from authorities 
(Dryzek 2005). As discourses are part of and structure power relations, so is the construction 
of democratic legitimacy. A discourse where a governmental authority (V&W) has had a 
central role in its articulation , as was the case in our study (even if resulting from a claim 
made by an interest group), is therefore unlikely to favour participation and deliberation. 
Conclusion 
In the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands, there was a need to open up the 
administrative process to a more democratic process. Although this was done, it is not clear 
whether this will also result in increased democratic legitimacy, support for decisions, and 
more informed and effective policies. Environmental groups have not supported the overall 
policy choices that were made and decisions have sometimes been made based on rhetorical 
imagery rather than a dialectical exchange of ideas . As the involvement of civil society 
groups in decision making was limited and deliberation was often hard to find, legitimacy 
was first and foremost found in the conventional democratic norms of elected authority and 
representation, with civil society only playing an auxiliary role. 
 This leaves a conundrum. The opening up of an administrative process can be achieved in 
more than one way. The established way of doing so in probably most EU member states is 
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by means of political activity that involves lobbying, agenda setting, mobilisation of elected 
authorities, and interest representation. As we have seen, this leads to the construction of 
legitimacy in a way that interferes with a participatory approach that builds on the norms of 
participation and deliberation to construct democratic legitimacy. The problem of 
competing and possible conflicting conceptions of democratic legitimacy has been 
recognised in literature, yet has hardly entered academic and policy debates on governance. 
Too easily, it is assumed that participatory governance brings about deliberation (Klijn and 
Skelcher 2007). Our analysis makes clear that in order to promote democratic legitimacy in 
EU environmental governance, more is needed than the inclusion of requirements of public 
participation in EU directives. The exclusionary effects of interest representation, particularly 
when participation is limited to an elite and select group of actors, call for increased 
attention to the democratic norms of participation and deliberation. 
Annex 1: list of interviewees 
I1: A researcher at the Dutch research institute Alterra: Interview, 24-04-2008. 
I2: A civil servant of the ministry of V&W: Interview, 18-03-2008. 
I3: National coordinator of the WFD in the Netherlands: Interview, 02-07-2008. 
I4: A spokesperson of VEWIN: Interview, 23-06-2008 
I5: A spokesperson of VNO-NCW: Interview, 18-06-2008 
I6: A spokesperson of LTO Netherlands: Interview, 02-06-2008. 
I7: A spokesperson of Produktschap Vis: Interview, 16-06-2008. 
I8: A civil servant from the water board ‘Rivierenland’: Interview, 14-03-2008. 
I9: A spokesperson of Natuurmonumenten: Interview, 18-06-2008. 
I10: A spokesperson of Natuur and Milieu: Interview, 31-06-2008 
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Abstract  
The study of effective and democratic governance continues to grow as a field of research. 
Multi-level governance, network governance and, more recently, experimentalist governance 
are important lines of scholarship. However, all of these approaches offer accounts of ‘the 
new governance’ that reproduce a number of functionalist assumptions. They simplistically 
link elements of governance to specific outcomes and undervalue how governance processes 
are shaped in historical and local contexts. This article advocates the analysis of governance 
from the perspective of multiple political rationalities to correct such assumptions. It analyses 
the implementation of the Water Framework Directive in the Netherlands as an example of 
the new governance, by showing how governmental, instrumental, and deliberative 
rationalities are at work in each of the governance elements that it introduces. The paper 
concludes by discussing the implications of a perspective of multiple political rationalities for 
our understanding of democratic and effective governance. 
 Political rationalities in the new governance 
87 
Introduction  
The term ‘governance’ has been propagated as a new form of steering since the 1990s by 
national governments (Bevir et al. 2003), transnational organisations like the World Bank or 
the United Nations (UN) (Doornbos 2001), and the European Union (EU) (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger 2006). Works such as those of Rhodes (1997) and Pierre and Peters (2000) 
have contributed to making governance a central theme in policy literature and political 
studies. Although governance is defined by authors in different ways, depending on their 
field and subject of study, it holds common elements that are more or less undisputed: 
governance is no longer the sole domain of states, but also of non-state actors such as 
markets parties and NGOs; governance takes place in networks and at multiple levels; and 
the changing role of the state in governance can be described as going from command-and 
control to ‘steering at a distance’. As such, governance is a departure from previous 
understandings of how policy is made. Policy is no longer made by the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state alone and the idea of government as a ‘single rational actor’ (Colebatch 
2009) has lost significance. Consequently, governance studies explicitly pay attention to the 
role of supra- and sub-national governments – as in multi-level governance (MLG) (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003) – and to non-state actors that are part of the policy process (Arts 2006, 
Bulkely and Mol 2003).  
 The shift in attention to multiple levels of government and non-state actors not only 
brings new understandings about how policy is made, but also what the implications of 
governance are on effective steering and democratic legitimacy. Historically, the norms of 
effectiveness and democracy have been intrinsically linked to liberal democracies (Mouffe 
2000). Over the last two decades, these norms have increasingly become relevant to 
governance and are often discussed in terms of ‘good governance’ (Sørensen and Torfing 
2009). Governance studies rearticulate the terms of effective steering by placing emphasis on 
output standards and decentralising tasks to lower authorities (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). 
Democratic legitimacy is rearticulated as well: as decisions are increasingly made in networks 
that lack formal accountability structures and by actors that have no political mandate in the 
form of elections, the democratic qualities of governance are instead located in an 
empowered civil society, increased accountability, and procedural rules (e.g. Scholte 2002, 
Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Following a shift in focus from the analyses of political 
integration to the EU as a system of governance (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004), effective and 
democratic governance has also become an increasingly popular research topic in EU studies. 
(Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). This has led to a proliferation of literature on how the 
EU can be governed effectively and democratically(Scharpf 1999) as well as a reflection of 
the European Commission (EC) itself on ‘new modes of governance’, as exemplified by the 
White paper on governance (European Commission 2001).  
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 New modes of governance in the EU have gained salience, both in scholarly debates as in 
their application in various policy areas (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004). Characteristic to this 
‘new’ approach to governance is a higher freedom for member states and public and private 
actors to make policy choices, and a greater involvement of relevant actors in the processes in 
which policy goals and instruments are defined (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). As a 
result, in the new EU governance, member states have more room for manoeuvre to define 
policy goals, to design policy instruments suited to a local context, and to involve relevant 
actors in decision making. According to Eberlein and Kerwer (2004), one promising 
perspective on the new governance is experimentalist governance, which operates from the 
premise that a deliberative logic is core to effective and democratic decision making and that 
deliberation can be promoted by introducing such governance elements as described above 
(Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). However, such accounts of governance have been frequently and 
repeatedly subjected to critique (e.g. Papadoupolos 2007, Arts et al. 2009, Turnhout et al. 
2010). In such critiques, specific elements of governance may actually obstruct democracy 
when they are performed within governmental or instrumental rationalities. Accordingly, 
they can lead to top-down, technocratic decision making that takes place beyond the eye of 
the general public. 
 This article criticises the premise that introducing the new governance unequivocally 
brings about a mode of governance that is effective and democratic. We do so by addressing 
two main points: (a) that this premise is based in functionalist accounts of institutions and 
policy instruments that do not do justice to how these perform in practice and (b) that 
political rationalities play an important role in shaping the performance of governance. The 
article is organised as follows: (1), a critique is offered of how current analytical approaches 
to governance conceptualise issues and challenges to effective decision making and 
democratic legitimacy in a functionalist way, after which we (2) present our theoretical 
perspective that discusses governance in terms of multiple political rationalities. The article 
then continues to (3) describe the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the 
governance elements that it introduces in European water governance as an example of the 
new governance. Next, we will use a case study of the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands to illustrate our theoretical perspective. The article concludes (4) by discussing 
the implications of our perspective for effective and democratic governance. 
From functionalist assumptions to political rationalities 
According to Schout and Jordan (2005), it is now widely accepted that the EU constitutes a 
system of governance that exhibits features of both multi-level coordination and multi-actor 
involvement. This system of governance is frequently analysed in terms of MLG (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003) and network governance (Torfing 2005). Each approach conceives of 
effectiveness and democratic value in somewhat different terms. MLG operates from the 
assumption that effective steering is best attained at higher levels of governance, whereas 
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democratic legitimacy is most likely to be attained at lower levels where there are increased 
possibilities for participation of relevant actors (Moss and Newig 2010). Consequently, 
MLG scholars tend to discuss effectiveness and democracy in terms of a trade-off or dilemma 
between participation and system effectiveness (Dahl 1994). From the perspective of scholars 
in network governance, the performance of (horizontal) governance networks in terms of 
effectiveness and democratic quality depends on societal context, institutional design, and 
the political struggles that shape them (Sørensen and Torfing 2009). To promote 
effectiveness and democracy, they therefore call attention to the importance of an 
institutional framework that can make governance networks robust in the face of a changing 
environment and to careful meta-governance by public authorities (Sørensen and Torfing 
2009). An alternative view on new modes of governance is presented by ‘experimentalist 
governance’. Its proponents believe that what shapes the performance of governance are not 
so much institutions or multi-level governance structures, but the systemic interaction of the 
elements of governance. This interaction is based on the governance elements of having a 
higher freedom for member states and public and private actors to make policy choices, a 
greater involvement of regional or local actors in the processes of defining of policy goals and 
instruments, and recursive revision of goals and procedures based on peer review of results. 
The resulting governance architecture is believed to systematically provoke doubt about its 
own assumptions and practices (Zeitlin 2011) and consequently promote deliberation.  
 Beliefs about how governance architectures and the institutional innovations and policy 
instruments which they introduce can lead to more democratic and effective forms of 
governance are widespread. They are central to accounts of ‘good governance’ that are 
reproduced by for instance the White paper on governance (European Commission 2001) 
and often uncritically adopted by scholars in their discussion of new modes of governance 
(e.g. Eberlein and Kerwer 2004, Holzinger et al. 2006). Such beliefs, however, build on 
functionalist assumptions that simplistically link single functions to specific elements of 
governance (Cleaver and Franks 2005) and in which the effects of these governance elements 
explain their presence (Pierson 2000). For example, they frame representative and 
participatory institutions to seek to perform similar democratic functions (Klijn and Skelcher 
2007), which consequently leads to an understanding of the EU where member states are 
leapfrogged by supra-national and subnational actors in processes of issue-definition, the 
proposal of policies, and their implementation (Pollack 1996). Second, proponents of new 
modes of governance place a high level of trust in the efficacy of institutional frameworks 
and formal rule-making. The performance of governance is consequently explained by 
factors that obstruct the functioning of these frameworks, for example the administrative 
capacities of governance actors (Schout and Jordan 2008). Third, the performance of 
governance is presented to depend on the functional interplay of different elements of the 
governance process, such as goal selection , goal coordination, implementation, and feedback 
and accountability (Peters 2011). These types of functionalist reasoning, however, lead to an 
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understanding of the effectiveness and democratic quality of governance that very much 
builds on a discussion of what elements of good governance should entail and detracts from 
issues of complexity, power, and more radical interpretations of democracy (Bevir 2010a).  
 As an alternative to functionalist reasoning, we propose a historical constructivist mode of 
enquiry. By doing so, we see that institutions are often performing other functions than they 
were originally intended to (Pierson 2000). Moreover, such a mode of inquiry shows that 
institutions are to a substantial extent dysfunctional in terms of the functions they are 
designed to perform (Miller 2000), due to the play of interests, bureaucratic rationalities, or 
simply because important aspects of human behaviour are not guided by instrumental 
considerations. A similar argument applies to the nature of policy instrumentation. 
Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) critique how policy instruments are wrongfully conceived of 
as pragmatic devices to solve problems and ‘naturally’ at our disposal; and that they are only 
studied in terms of their effectiveness in sorting the effects for which they were designed. In 
contrast, they hold that policy instruments ‘produce specific effects, independently of their 
stated objectives (the aims ascribed to them), and they structure public policy according to 
their own logic’ (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007, 10). Consequently, in order to study the 
effects of policy instrumentation, it is crucial to separate policy instruments from the aims 
that are ascribed to them. Similar critiques apply to accounts of MLG and network 
governance. These accounts build on the assumption that new modes of governance guide 
actors to new modes of interaction. By doing so, they however downplay the substantial role 
of ideas and paradigms in decision making and how these shape the actions of individual 
actors (Blatter 2003). 
 Criticising functionalist accounts of governance is not to deny the challenges that 
governance faces to be democratic and effective. However, we do want to correct the 
assumption that governance can be described to fulfil a number of necessary functions. Rather 
than being necessary, the above listed criticisms make clear that human behaviour is also 
guided by other considerations than a governance architecture is designed to promote. Such 
considerations are diverse and can be found in dysfunctions and unexpected effects, 
bureaucratic tendencies to resist change, managerial rationalities adopted from the market as 
in New Public Management, or other ideals that actors adhere to. Therefore, rather than 
ascribing single functions to governance elements, we situate these in the socio-historical 
fields in which they are performed and receive meaning. We do so by drawing on the 
analytical category of political rationality. Rose and Miller (2010) define political 
rationalities as ‘the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is 
conceptualised, … notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics, and 
conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks’ (Rose and Miller 2010 :273). In our 
view, the emphasis that political rationalities place on the exercise of power in the forms and 
conceptions of decision making counters a tendency towards functionalist explanations. 
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Unlike Rose and Miller though, who conceptualise power as monolithic and pervasive, we 
conceive of power to exhibit diversity, heterogeneity, and resistance within and over time 
(Bevir 2010b). In other words, rationalities are not only constructed historically, but also 
locally. Therefore, the next section introduces the analysis of multiple rationalities that shape 
governance.  
Rationalities of governance 
Rationalities describe the inherent logic of actions and decision making and connect drivers 
for action to actors. As such, rationalities provide the logic of action embedded in more 
comprehensive discourses that explain and guide decision making (Glynos and Howarth 
2009). We identify three types of political rationalities that can be found in governance 
processes: (1) governmental, (2) instrumental, and (3) deliberative. We base these 
rationalities on an extensive review of literature on governance of which a selection is 
discussed below. Although these three rationalities by no means are meant to be exhaustive 
of the rationalities that are enacted in the diversity and multiplicity of practice, we do hold 
that they cover a broad spectrum of rationalities that are employed by both scholars of 
governance as well as by the actors that we study.  
 The first type of rationality not only builds upon the notion of governmental rationality 
or ‘the reason of state’, i.e. the ‘conduct of conduct’ by the state to maintain control over its 
population through the promotion of well-being (Foucault 1994), but on the idea of 
bureaucratic self-interest as well, i.e. the inclination of any bureaucratic organisation to resist 
change and to protect its (self-perceived) interest, autonomy and identity against others 
(Allison and Zelikow 1999). Here governance is understood as a play between an effort to 
maintain control ‘at a distance’ by state bureaucracies through new technologies of power 
(Rose and Miller 2010) such as output orientation and the resistance to such efforts by 
lower-level bureaucracies. The second concept – ‘instrumental rationality’ – entails economic 
and managerial approaches. Whereas economics emphasise efficiency and the weighing of 
costs and benefits, managerialism strives for effective leadership (Covey 1991) and focuses on 
auditing and outputs (e.g. Power 1997). Here governance implies both an economisation of 
politics and a managerial turn in public policy making. Finally, ‘deliberative rationality’ 
stands for opening up the political process to communication and a search for the ‘common 
good’, for example through participation and transparency (Elster 1998). Here principles of 
democracy and citizenship as well as dialogue and inclusiveness are important sources of 
inspiration. Our thesis is that in governance theory and practice these three different political 
rationalities are all simultaneously, but not necessarily evenly, performed. 
 Our choice for the above three rationalities is based on a diverse literature that discusses 
how multiple rationalities can guide action and decision making. First of all, political 
philosophy is an important source of inspiration for considering multiple rationalities in 
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politics, policy, and governance. Well-known is Habermas’ distinction between instrumental 
and communicative rationality (Habermas 1996). In an attempt to escape from the 
‘Weberian cage’ of rational instrumentality, while rescuing the ideal of Enlightment, 
Habermas posits the idea of communicative rationality. This type of rationality ideally leads 
to power-free speech, open discussion, argumentative decision making, and deliberative 
democracy in the public sphere and should serve as an alternative for the cynical interest-
based and power-driven practices of representative democracy. Foucault (1994), takes a 
fundamentally different perspective on politics and democracy through his notion of 
governmentality, or ‘the reason of state’. This rationality is based upon control of the well-
being of a population in the interest of the state, while producing self-control by the people 
in parallel. Through technologies of power, institutional practices, and societal discourses, 
civilians are taught what social practices are good for them, thus reproducing the rationality 
of the state and disciplining themselves at the same time (Dean 1999). Secondly, public 
administration literature shows that the current dominance of effectiveness and efficiency 
criteria in the many variants of NPM is just an historical phase, rather than an end stage, and 
only one of the many rationalities possible in policy evaluation (Denhardt 2004). In the so-
called JEP triangle, Nelissen (2002) and Arts and Goverde (2006) distinguish three logics – 
or rationalities – for evaluating new modes of governance: Juridical, Economic-managerial 
and Political-civic. These three logics of evaluating governance employ different criteria (e.g. 
legality, efficiency, and legitimacy respectively), but all three are considered related and 
relevant by these authors. Finally, governance literature emphasises the need for a ‘new’ 
rationality in realising democratic governance. For example Bevir (2010) challenges the 
modernist notions of economic and sociological rationality in economics and 
institutionalism with what he calls ‘local rationality’ for democratic governance. Whereas 
economic rationality presupposes an universal but limited logic of action, the homo 
economicus , sociological rationality even loses sight of human agency, assuming that people 
automatically adapt to shared rules, norms and beliefs in a given community. ‘Local’ 
rationality, in contrast, emphasises the contingent, situated, often tacit but creative nature of 
reasoning and decision making by humans, thus going beyond modernist beliefs of 
rationality.  
 In the example of the WFD below, we show how rationalities are at work in separate 
elements of governance. The picture that thus arises provides a more dynamic, practice-based 
account of what effective and democratic governance actually looks like. The empirical data 
which is drawn upon to illustrate the various rationalities ‘at work’ is the result of an in-
depth case study of the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands by the first author, 
which comprises 38 qualitative interviews, numerous policy documents, and a number of 
meetings and conferences with diverse governance actors in the Dutch water sector.  
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Governmental, instrumental, and deliberative rationalities in the WFD 
The WFD: an example of the new governance 
The WFD came into force in December 2000. It is a framework directive that incorporates 
many elements of the new governance and according to Zeitlin (2011) also serves as a good 
example of experimentalist governance. The WFD combines elements of quality standards 
and output control with that of specific programmes of measures and introduces elements of 
public participation and decentralisation. Taken together, these elements form the 
governance architecture of the WFD. They are: 
1. Water quality objectives (i.e. achieving ‘good status’ by 2015), set by national and 
local authorities according to a systematics outlined by an annex of the WFD. 
2. Active involvement of interested parties and information and consultation of the 
(general) public. 
3. Regular reporting on implementation milestones, setting up a monitoring network, 
and publishing of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). 
4. Lower-level authorities design programmes of measures (that provide the basis for the 
RBMPs). 
 As such, the WFD places emphasis on output steering and decentralises tasks to lower-
level authorities that according to functionalist accounts of governance should lead to more 
effective steering. Moreover, by dispersing decision making over multiple levels of 
government and actively involving non-state actors, the WFD invokes accounts of 
democratic legitimacy that base the democratic quality of governance in an empowered civil 
society, increased accountability, and procedural rules. Within a logic of experimentalist 
governance, the systematic interaction of the governance elements listed above will bring 
about systematic doubt about assumptions and procedures that is facilitated by the scrutiny 
of civil society and peer pressure by member states and neighbouring authorities, which in 
turn leads to deliberation. In addition, having lower-level authorities design programmes of 
measures and allowing them the freedom to adjust water quality objectives to local 
circumstances is believed to result in efficient and pragmatic management. 
 The functionalist assumptions that are thus associated with the WFD have led scholars to 
discuss the main challenges of the WFD in terms of MLG or network governance. For 
example, Lundqvist (2004) describes the challenge of the WFD in terms of the tensions 
between effectiveness, participation, and legitimacy and Moss (2004) considers the main 
obstacle to an effective implementation of the WFD to be the willingness by water 
authorities to take on a governance approach. Such accounts tend to ignore how the 
governance elements of the WFD can all be subject to either one of the three rationalities 
listed in the preceding section and how these rationalities cannot be simply linked to one 
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specific element alone. Therefore, each element is discussed individually to show that the 
way in which these elements perform is contingent on historical and local contexts and 
performed within multiple rationalities.  
Water quality objectives 
The WFD sets objectives for water quality for each water body based on water type, of which 
it distinguishes three: natural, heavily modified, and artificial. The status of a water body is 
determined by measuring four biological quality elements, a chemical element, and a 
hydromorphological element. That status is defined qualitatively by categories ranging from 
high to poor. Although the status of water quality is reported in qualitative terms, the 
method by which to determine such a status is not. A coefficient between 0 and 1 is 
produced for each water body in reference to a natural state (called the reference condition) 
with 1 being a completely undisturbed water and 0 ‘dead’ water. All water bodies are 
measured in reference to a natural water body of a similar type, yet for heavily modified and 
artificial water bodies the scale is adjusted to incorporate non-reversible human interventions 
in the water system (such as dams or economic functions of overriding public interest such as 
agriculture). As such, water quality objectives appear to be scientifically neutral, to be 
designed to inform policy makers and non-state actors in clear terms about the status of a 
river basin and its water bodies, and to provide a basis for deliberation. 
 However, water quality objectives were performed in a governmental rationality. Having 
legally binding targets within a set timeframe worked disciplinary on lower-level authorities. 
Ecological quality standards turned into undisputed values which seemed to be decided from 
above (i.e. the EU). In the Netherlands, especially the ‘reference condition’ functioned as 
such. The mere fact of having people write down quality objectives led in many instances to 
water boards14 setting more ambitious targets than was formally required. Water managers 
did not want to give the impression that they did nothing to improve water quality. 
Moreover, the legal status of water quality objectives was not (and still is not) very clear to 
most managers. The idea of having undisturbed, natural waters in a highly urbanised country 
such as the Netherlands was considered infeasible by a segment of Dutch society that was 
represented by market groups and agricultural groups. This led to resistance to being held 
accountable to water quality objectives. In addition, the nature of legally binding targets 
invited strategies to circumvent these legal requirements, a well-known issue in performance 
based policy. The junior minister responsible for water management wrote a note on 
‘pragmatic implementation’ of the WFD (Verkeer en Waterstaat 2004) in which a number 
of strategies were set out to avoid obligations towards the EU. In addition, discussions were 
held in parliament to designate all waters in the Netherlands as ‘artificial’, so that a lower 
                                                 
14 The main lower-level authorities in the Netherlands on water issues. The Netherlands is divided in 26 water 
boards that set goals for and manage all regional waters. National waters, such as big waterways, are managed 
by a national agency called Rijkswaterstaat. 
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objectives could be set. In the end, peer pressure from neighbouring countries as well as the 
general inclination of authorities to ‘follow rules’ brought a balance between engaging into 
strategies to avoid obligations and following policy objectives to reach water quality that 
equals an undisturbed state. The compromise consisted of designating most waters (around 
95%) in the Netherlands as heavily modified or artificial, so that water quality standards 
could be adjusted to account for urbanisation, agriculture, or industry.  
 Water quality objectives have also been performed in an instrumental rationality. In the 
Netherlands, the clearly defined status of water bodies (from poor to good) led water 
managers to place a strong focus on measures to attain progress within these statuses (i.e. 
from poor to moderate, or from moderate to good). The focus of water managers was not so 
much on achieving good ecological status or potential by 2015, but to make progress from 
one category to the next. This focus on output was also shown in the fact that most water 
boards turned out to be very limited in the choice of the kind of measures they would take. 
More than 90% of the measures that are planned are one of three: creating ‘natural’ or soft 
river beds, installing fish traps; and creating artificial meanders (or bends) in rivers and 
brooks. These measures all provided ecological benefits, but they were also measures that in 
which water boards had knowledge and experience. More importantly, those measures were 
within their field of authority. Economic considerations also played a major role in the 
setting of water quality objectives and the selection of measures. Water quality objectives for 
heavily modified and artificial waters were set by a number of methods, one called the 
‘Praagmatic method’15, which was widely used. This method set objectives by first listing all 
measures that could be taken and then removing those measures that would be too costly to 
carry out. Water quality thereby became defined by the range of measures that could be 
taken ‘cost-effectively’. Furthermore, programmes of measures were intentionally spread out 
over implementation periods beyond 2015 in order to spread cost. Having economic 
considerations play a large role in the setting of quality objectives and in the selection of 
measures brought about decision making based on efficiency. However, it also hindered a 
broad deliberation on goals and measures and left water management in the hand of experts 
and managers. 
 Water quality objectives have nevertheless also been performed in a deliberate rationality. 
They acted as a catalyst to open discussions on how to arrange the water system and debates 
on how society should concern itself with water quality in terms of health, environment, and 
economic and social functions. Especially environmental groups in the Netherlands tried to 
promote this perspective. They did so in a number of ways. First, they tried to spark 
discussion on the benefits that clean waters could have for all sectors connected to water 
policy, including industry, agriculture, recreation, and nature. They also tried to use 
ecological quality as a way to frame water as a public good rather than as a commercial 
                                                 
15 As it was develop during a meeting of water managers in Prague. 
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commodity. Moreover, they organised public campaigns, including short movies on how to 
achieve good water quality. They also set out to find best practices on how to improve water 
qualities and sponsored experiments, for instance with helophyte filters, where water is 
purified from nutrients by reeds16. Finally, they tried to initiate discussion on what would be 
possible for specific waters and how good ecological status or potential could be achieved. In 
general however, they failed in their attempt to make water policy more deliberative and 
responsive to their preferences in the Netherlands.  
 We conclude from the above that how water quality objectives perform depends on which 
rationality is performed by the actors in the field. A governmental rationality has 
strengthened the ecological standardisation of water policy, yet did so without reflection. It 
invoked a closing off of authorities from further inquiry, either by peers or by civil society. 
An instrumental rationality led to the drawing up of concrete plans of measures to improve 
water quality and a more professional management of water bodies, including the weighing 
of economic, environmental, and social considerations. Yet this was carried out with a focus 
on results and with less attention for issues of legitimacy and accountability. Finally, a 
deliberative rationality regarding water quality brought some form of accountability and 
democratic legitimacy through discussions and debate, as well as the impetus to discuss what 
is considered to be clean water. However, these discussions did not necessarily inform 
government authorities, nor did they easily translate in concrete measures. 
Public participation 
The WFD, in article 14, calls for Member States to ‘encourage the active involvement of all 
interested parties in the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, 
review and updating of the river basin management plans’(European Commission 2000). In 
addition to active involvement, consultation and information is required with regards to the 
work programme, key issues, and the RBMPs. In the Netherlands, the consultation and 
information requirements were considered sufficiently covered by existing law, yet the active 
involvement of ‘interested parties’ was to some extent new. This call for the encouragement 
of active involvement was taken up as a requirement to organise public participation on 
multiple levels. On the national level, connected to the ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, a deliberative body with national societal groups was reformed to better suit 
the demands of the WFD. On the level of river basins, sounding boards were established. 
Finally, water boards organised public participation events as well. Especially on this lower-
level, the organisation of participation was diverse, ranging from information meetings to 
joint selection of measures with societal groups. On all levels however, the same types of 
actors were invited. These were representatives of the sectors of agriculture, industry, the 
market, drinking water, and environment. All were full-time, paid professionals whose job it 
                                                 
16 Reed is a common water plant. 
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was to lobby for their sector or interests and to influence government policy. Private citizens 
did not play a role to speak of on any level. In total, and spanning across levels, over a 
hundred public participation events have taken place. Although participation is usually 
represented as a democratic good or as a tool to promote enforcement and efficiency, 
different rationalities have been at play during the participation processes. 
 In academic literature, participation has been prized as a democratic good, but the practice 
of participation has also received strong criticism. In her seminal article on public 
participation, Arnstein (1969) discusses participation in terms of empowerment on the rungs 
of a ladder. The bottom rungs of the ladder describe the levels of manipulation and therapy, 
where the objective of participation is not empowerment, but ‘to enable powerholders to 
“educate” or “cure” the participants’(Arnstein 1969 :2). In Cook and Cothari’s book 
Participation: the new tyranny’ (2001), this insight is used to describe three forms of 
‘tyranny’: when facilitators of participatory processes override existing legitimate decision-
making procedures; when group dynamics reinforce power structures; and when 
participatory methods exclude other forms of involvement that provide benefits which 
participation cannot provide. In addition, participation is often criticised for the elite 
characteristics of its participants (Saurugger 2008, Turnhout et al. 2010), which hampers 
their capacity to increase democratic legitimacy. These criticisms relate to a governmental 
rationality, when they point out that participatory processes can reinforce top-down steering. 
Participatory processes in the Netherlands in general have performed above the bottom 
rungs of the Arnsteins ladder: there was room to make different voices heard and advice 
could be given, but top-down steering remained dominant. Policy makers considered the 
WFD to be a very complex directive and consequently some demands that were made by 
civil society – for instance for a higher goal achievement rate by 2015 – were viewed as based 
in a lack of understanding. As a result, the facilitators of these participatory processes, 
especially on the level of water boards, took on a strongly guiding role. Processes were usually 
shaped to choose measures, where civil servants would decide which measures were cost-
effective, leaving little room for participants to bring in their own ideas. Finally, sitting ‘on 
the table’ with decision-makers meant for environmental groups that they were more 
reluctant to engage into legal action (against these same decision-makers), as, according to 
one of our interviewees, they were informally told that this would cost them their place on 
the table. Although such more or less subtle forms of disciplining of civil society groups took 
place, these groups also represented the established field of stakeholders or the ‘usual 
suspects’, consequently reaffirming the status quo.  
 Participation can serve purposes other than democratic legitimacy as well. Participation is 
often promoted as a way to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation 
processes. This can be done in a number of ways. To start, local knowledge brought in by 
participants can prove helpful in managerial issues like the selection of measures. Moreover, 
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having broad support for specific decisions aids in their successful implementation. In terms 
of efficiency, participation can save time and money in the long run (Woltjer 2002), for 
instance by preventing legal action or obstruction. Indeed, the participatory processes around 
the WFD in the Netherlands showed such instrumental rationality. For example, 
recreational fishing groups pointed out existing fishing spots so policy makers could take 
these into consideration while planning measures, thereby saving time and money. 
Environmental groups set up a search for best practices and land surrounding water has been 
made available by both agricultural and environmental actors to perform measures on, such 
as creating soft river beds. The organisation of participation also led to a reformulation of 
strategy by environmental groups, going from an antagonistic, legal-based role to a more 
cooperative, participatory role. 
 Participation is also intricately linked with a deliberative rationality. Both the ideals of 
participatory and deliberative democracy seek to challenge the hegemony of economy and 
state over democratic citizenship. Moreover, both want to re-absorb citizens or civil society 
groups into public debates by means of participation and deliberation (Vitale 2006). This 
was partly the case in the Netherlands. Many civil society groups now feel they have become 
more involved in water policy. Civil society groups have been actively involved in the 
formulation of policy-lines and the selection of measures since the beginning of 2004, 
working up to the RBMPs of 2009. They entered into debates with decision-makers and 
each other about the ambitions of the WFD and what its goals should be. For example, a 
coalition of environmental groups, drinking water companies, and recreational groups 
formed a coalition to promote the ‘common good’ of clean waters. However, the hegemony 
of economic interests has not been overcome and is not likely to be in the future. Moreover, 
private citizens have not become involved, even though public campaigns were held. 
 As the above shows, how public participation functions depends on what rationality actors 
perform. Participation both empowered civil society groups and disempowered them by 
reproducing power relations and upholding the status quo. In the long run, it may bring 
more effectiveness and efficiency to the implementation of policy as happened in some 
instances, and it can open up policymaking to new actors. In what measure, if at all, this all 
actually happens depends on the rationalities that are at play. 
Monitoring and reporting 
The WFD sets out detailed requirements for monitoring and reporting. To begin with, a 
detailed step-by-step timeline is set out for the implementation process. This timeline is 
accompanied by reporting requirements. The most important of these are the 
characterisation of the water basin district, including a review of the environmental impact of 
human activity and economic analysis of water use (2005); the establishment of a program 
for monitoring (2007); the publication of RBMPs according to detailed list of elements and 
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a program of measures. All these reports are to be sent to the EC Directorate General of 
Environment (DGXI) and are published on an official EU website. DGXI gives ‘smiley 
faces’ to countries that have satisfied their reporting requirements and ‘unhappy faces’ to 
countries that have not. These reports are then analysed by the DGXI and compared across 
countries. As a result, member states can see how they perform in relation to other member 
states. Monitoring networks are also established. Water bodies were surveyed by 2006 in 
order to establish their current conditions and to determine whether they were at risk of 
failing to meet good ecological status or good ecological potential by 2015. They are 
monitored every six years on all quality elements, which is called ‘surveillance’ monitoring. 
Surveillance monitoring is aimed to give a general overview of the condition of a river basin 
and to act as a basis for operational monitoring. Operational monitoring is undertaken when 
a water body is at risk of failing to meet good status by 2015 and monitors whether measures 
that are taken to improve the status of that water body. Operational monitoring only 
monitors the quality elements that are indicative of pressures that cause the failing to meet 
good status. Finally, investigative monitoring should be undertaken when the reasons for 
failing to meet good status are not clear. 
 In the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands, monitoring and reporting 
operated as ‘technologies of power’: they had disciplinary effects and followed governmental 
rationalities. According to Power (1997), these systems of control show a commitment to 
push control further into organisational structures, in an attempt to ‘re-order the collective 
and individual selves that make up organizational life’ (Power 1997:42). A good example of 
such a re-ordering of organisational life is the reporting requirement on the characterisation 
of the river basin district by 2005, which spurred Dutch policymakers to create water types 
and develop water quality objectives. These water types and objectives were created within a 
period of months only, and therefore without much reflection. Similarly, much focus has 
been put on the drafting and reporting of RBMPs. To be able to have these plans ready by 
2009 was, according to a high-ranking civil servant, more important than what its actual 
contents turned out to be. As a result, all the elements that should be listed in the RBMPs, 
which consist predominantly of what measures have been taken to achieve different WFD 
goals, such as cost-recovery, public participation, and good chemical and ecological water 
status, have led to a substantial re-ordering of how water is managed, especially with regards 
to water quality. Yet this restructuring of management has not necessarily brought any new 
measures to be taken on the ground. This has led most actors involved in water management 
to assess the impact of the WFD on actual water quality to be slight. In additions to 
reporting requirements, the monitoring network has already shown disciplinary effects as 
well. When water managers needed to choose between WFD water bodies and non-WFD 
waters (which make up more than 50% of the Dutch water system) to plan measures, they 
favoured WFD water bodies because these are monitored and data are reported to Brussels. 
In addition to disciplinary effects, monitoring and reporting also brought about bureaucratic 
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tendencies. As already mentioned above, the process of reporting gained primacy over actual 
policy formulation and the planning of measures. What is most important in this rationality 
is to get the ‘smiley face’ of the DGXI. In other words, the need for authorities to show they 
have fulfilled what is required of them took primacy over their need to achieve good water 
quality. Such bureaucratic tendencies were also present in the monitoring network. Although 
the Netherlands has a tradition of monitoring for water quality that predates the WFD, the 
monitoring network for official WFD reporting has a relatively low number of monitoring 
points, also when compared to other member states. This has been rationalised from a 
tendency of authorities not to be held accountable. Although monitoring of water quality in 
the Netherlands takes place on an extensive scale to inform authorities about the status of 
their waters, they only report a fragment of it to the EC. 
 The requirements for monitoring and reporting were also performed within an 
instrumental rationality. Performance-based policymaking, as has become popular in the 
NPM paradigm (Hood 1995), stresses the creation of manageable units, private-sector styles 
of management, discipline and frugality in resource-use, and greater emphasis on output 
controls, amongst others. Monitoring and reporting fit in such a paradigm as they are 
supposed to promote management based on clear targets and the economic use of resources 
to achieve these targets. Indeed, the WFD has changed water policy in the Netherlands from 
one based on intentions and horizons – where broadly framed visions for the future were set 
out in policy notes, yet without a clear strategy to achieve those visions – to one based on 
clear targets within set timeframes with programmes of measures to achieve these targets. 
Moreover, by managing waters as water bodies within a river basin, a more private sector 
style of management has gained terrain over management based on administrative 
boundaries. In addition, economic considerations have become more explicit in the selection 
of measures. Where earlier measures should primarily fit into a budget, now they also have to 
be cost-effective in relation to the achievement of good water status. Moreover, the reporting 
requirements bring in economic considerations by specifically asking for an economic 
analysis of water use, measures taken to achieve cost-recovery of water use, and allowing 
economic considerations as an argument not to achieve ecological targets.  
 By bringing transparency, monitoring and reporting can also be part of a deliberative 
rationality. For example, the characterisation of the river basin district has spurred discussion 
in parliament and civil society on whether Dutch water bodies can be considered natural, 
and accordingly on what objectives should be established for these waters. As one member of 
parliament from the populist freedom party (PVV) put it: ‘as long as my children can swim 
in it and don’t get sick I consider it clean’. Most would disagree with such a statement, but it 
shows how water quality and the question how to define it entered the debate. In addition, 
the requirements set out by the WFD have led to various reports on the economic and social 
impacts of the WFD (e.g.Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving 2008a), or booklets about the 
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economic value of water (e.g. Bade and van der Schroeff 2006). These reports, in turn, were 
meant to facilitate debate and present different visions on ‘the common good’. Monitoring 
networks served to bring the quality of water to public attention, and subsequently led to 
debates about what pressures keep water bodies from achieving good ecological status, being 
urban, industrial, or agricultural pressures. Consequently, they helped facilitate debates on 
land use planning in terms of development of nature, urban areas, agriculture, etc. 
 Monitoring and reporting did not bring the heightened efficiency that NPM predicts, it 
did not lead to the disciplining of authorities towards ecological goal achievement by default, 
nor did it unquestionably promote debate and discussion. How these requirements 
performed depended on how actors dealt with them. Whether they simply went to the task 
of meeting all requirements, whether they chose to meet only policy goals that are cost-
effective, or whether they made use of the transparency these requirements bring to initiate 
public debates differed for each actor and changed over time.  
Lower-level authorities 
The WFD requires each member state to provide a list with competent authorities on the 
WFD. In the Netherlands, these competent authorities include the ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment for national waters (which are managed by its executive arm called 
Rijkswaterstaat), the water boards for regional waters, and provinces for ground waters. 
Although officially not placed within an hierarchical accountability structure (and having 
only functional differentiation), water boards and provinces represent lower-level authorities 
when compared with the ministry. Coordination between these authorities takes place on the 
scale of river basins, within regional consultation bodies of water managers and of civil 
servants. In addition, a national coordination body for the WFD exists that handles 
reporting to Brussels and drafting the RBMPs. In the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands, most programmes of measures are drafted by water boards as they manage the 
largest share of WFD water bodies. Moreover, for heavily modified and artificial waters they 
are also allowed to set water quality objectives. As such, they have had a large impact on the 
implementation process of the WFD as a whole. 
 Although formally ‘competent authorities’, meaning they have the discretion to make 
their own policy choices, the water boards are actively steered from coordination bodies on 
the river basin and national scales. In the coordination bodies at these scales, regional water 
directors and civil servants come together to attune their efforts with each other. The main 
role of these coordination bodies in the Netherlands has been to create a homogenous 
approach to the WFD. That is to say, different water boards should not set water quality 
objectives for the same water types that were too far apart and that a uniform level of (low) 
ambition towards reaching these objectives should be present. More in general, a discourse of 
selecting measures that were ‘feasible and affordable’ emanated from the national level and 
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was taken up by most water boards. This disciplinary force from above was also resisted by 
bureaucratic tendencies from below. Most notably is a meeting of water directors in which 
they decided not to report all measures they had planned to improve water quality to the 
national coordinative body that drafted the RBMPs. The rationale for this was that water 
boards did not want to be held accountable in the case that budgetary cuts or changing 
political circumstances would prevent them from executing these planned measures. In 
addition, some measures entailed the purchase of land, and water managers feared that 
publishing such measures would drive up land prices. Water boards also tried to circumvent 
accountability by designating larger water bodies rather than smaller and by keeping WFD 
monitoring very limited.  
 Decentralisation is most often understood within an instrumental rationality. Having 
decisions made as close as possible to ‘the ground’ is intended to lead to more context-
specific solutions as well as higher public support. Moreover, smaller administrative bodies 
are expected to work more efficiently than large, centralised planning. In the WFD, some 
success have been booked as a result of this. Water boards have cooperated with local actors 
such as farmers or nature conservation organisations to implement measures for one specific 
water body. These were at times accompanied by participatory processes that focused on one 
specific water body. Another success story is the instalment of fish traps to facilitate upstream 
fish migration. Within the framework of the WFD, water boards actively sought for 
measures that they could implement within their competence, and a series of fish traps is 
now in place. An example of finding context-specific solutions are the ‘default’ water quality 
objectives that can be applied to set objectives for comparable water bodies in a specific 
region that have been developed in the river basin Meuse. Having water boards draft 
programs of measures has arguably also resulted in lower costs than originally estimated 
(Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving 2008a). 
 As lower-level authorities are considered to be at closer proximity to the public, they are 
expected to promote a deliberative rationality as well. Indeed, water boards have organised 
the largest number of participatory processes. Moreover, the joint task of 26 water boards to 
implement the WFD promoted discussion and cooperation between water boards, which is 
one of the most positive outcomes that many water managers list. Communication between 
water boards and civil society groups, although already present, significantly improved as 
well. Civil society groups now know whom to address when they are dealing with water 
issues and water boards have become more sensitive to the different demands that exist 
within civil society.  
 Assigning higher levels of competence to lower-level authorities can be a way of ‘steering 
at a distance’, by replacing formal decision-making authority with coordinative force. 
Certainly, this has for a part been the case in the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands. But lower-level authorities also made use of their competence in unexpected 
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ways, by circumventing reporting requirements, by creating new networks of cooperation, 
and by finding more cost-effective programmes of measures than national authorities could 
have. Moreover, having multiple smaller authorities rather than one big authority promoted 
diversity, greater involvement of civil society, and ultimately more communication and 
deliberation across networks.  
Conclusions 
The analysis of political rationalities in the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands 
allows us to draw two main conclusions about the challenges to democratic and effective 
governance in the EU. First, that functionalist accounts of governance cannot adequately 
describe the practices of governance without taking into account that these are performed 
within the multiple political rationalities that are contingent upon the time and place in 
which they are performed. Second, that the assumption that a single deliberative logic can be 
realised in practice as a result of the interaction of a number of governance elements within a 
governance architecture seriously overestimates the extent in which rules and institutions can 
exert influence over the behaviour of human actors.  
 To conceive of the challenges of governance in terms of democratic quality as either trade-
offs between system effectiveness and participation or as (potential) conflicts between 
representative and participatory democracy does not do justice to the multiple political 
rationalities that are at play in governance. Reducing the complexity of political reality to 
such dichotomies does not help in clarifying the real challenges that governance faces. The 
case study above shows how participation can take shape as a top-down phenomenon, can be 
instrumental to policymaking, and can also bring about deliberation. These rationalities were 
each present, at varying periods and instances. and were specific to the contexts in which 
actors were situated. Equally, the effects of the governance elements of water quality 
objectives, reporting and monitoring, and decentralisation in terms of effective and 
democratic governance depends on the rationality in which they are performed. All these 
elements may promote effectiveness and deliberation, but can equally work disciplinary and 
obscure reflection.  
 Answering challenges to effective and democratic governance with meta- or better 
institutional frameworks, as some scholars suggest (e.g., Moss and Newig 2010, Sørensen 
and Torfing 2009), would be politically naïve at best. As was shown, meta-governance can 
be undercut when lower-level governance units engage in strategies to avoid accountability. 
Moreover, it can have a disciplinary effect, resulting in closure of the governance process 
rather than its opening up to deliberation. Too much faith in institutional frameworks to 
ensure effective and democratic governance is naïve for similar reasons. In the case of the 
implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands, a complex and extensive institutional 
framework was present, with many opportunities for participation, high levels of competence 
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for lower-level governance units, and the possibility for local formulation and revision of 
goals. Even so, the performance of the resulting governance network was ambiguous. Finally, 
explaining the performance of governance by referring to the governance capacities of actors 
or the willingness of government actors to take up a governance approach (Schout and 
Jordan 2008) does not sufficiently do justice to processes of disciplining and resistance in 
governmental rationalities, to instrumentalist reasoning of both state and non-state actors, 
and to the often limited impact of deliberative reasoning on the actual decision-making 
process. 
 Conceiving of governance as an architecture and locating the conditions for effective and 
democratic governance in the interaction of different governance elements rather than in 
their single functions (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008) provides no satisfactory answer to the 
challenge of democratic governance either. To continue to hold functionalist assumptions 
about governance foregoes our observation that governance does not perform as a closed 
system. Rather, it is characterised by heterogeneity and diversity, with elements that are only 
loosely coupled and often do no present feedback loops. Even if they do, they do so in 
unexpected and new ways in every new situation that presents itself. The separate elements 
of governance in many instances do not function according to what is assumed by scholars or 
policy makers, nor can the system as a whole be expected to function according to a single 
logic. 
 We end with the observation that current scholarship of the EU as a system of governance 
does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the challenges to effective and democratic 
governance that society faces. We have argued to correct the functionalist assumptions of this 
body of literature by the analysis of multiple political rationalities. With our analysis, we 
have intended to shift focus from the EU as a system of governance to the rationalities and 
actors that shape governance in practice. We understand that we have only partly succeeded 
in doing so. Analysing the multitude of rationalities that have their own nuances in each 
local context was beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, we believe that political 
rationalities present a subject of inquiry that requires more attention of governance scholars 
and can offer a perspective on governance that regulators and policymakers should be more 
attentive to.  
 
 105 
The performativity of environmental quality standards: 
convergence and resistance in the constitution of water 
quality 
 
Jelle Behagel and Esther Turnhout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to: Geoforum 
  
 106 
Abstract 
In environmental governance, increasing emphasis is placed on the assessment of 
environmental policies by means of quality standards. This emphasis follows wider trends in 
governance where the uses of performance standards and auditing processes are considered to 
contribute to new modes of accountability. However, the uses of such calculative techniques 
have also been criticised for extending control by the state and disciplining environmental 
and human subjects. This article engages with the use of standards by studying their 
performative dimensions. It uses the example of the creation and use of water quality 
standards in the European Water Framework Directive to illustrate how they (1) constitute 
reality;(2) act as sites for political action; and (3) behave in unpredictable ways. By applying 
these dimensions of performativity as analytical tools, the article discusses the processes of 
convergence and resistance involved in the creation and use of water quality standards and 
the role of scientific experts in these processes. In particular, the article demonstrates how the 
performativity of standards in practice undercuts the imagined aims of accountability and 
efficiency. The article concludes by discussing the diverse and heterogeneous practices in 
which standards perform and produce their effects.  
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Standards as techniques of governance 
Under the influence of a new public management (NPM) ideology, we have witnessed a rise 
in the use of performance standards and auditing processes in such domains as healthcare, 
education, and environmental protection over the last decades. As NPM entails the 
transferral of the methods of business management to government (Arts and Goverde 2006, 
Nelissen et al. 1999, Osborne and Gaebler 1992), the use of performance standards and 
auditing processes in policy fields that are traditionally considered to be public affairs have 
been critiqued for leading to a marketisation of ‘spheres of life on which social solidarity and 
active democracy have always depended’ (Leys 2001: 4). In such critiques, the use of business 
methods by governments is frequently subsumed under a critique of the hegemonic project 
of neoliberalism (e.g. Mansfield 2004, Prince et al. 2006, Robertson and Dale 2002, Rose 
and Miller 2010). The core of this critique is that the neoliberal project seeks to extend the 
power of the state over previously autonomous or semi-autonomous spheres and disciplines 
subjects within a market rationality, consequently undermining democratic governance.  
 Equally however, NPM has been presented as an alternative to an outdated mode of 
accountability that is based in the processes and procedures within a hierarchical system of 
bureaucracy in which civil servants are answerable to elected politicians (Bevir 2010) and 
that has been associated to ‘big government’ or ‘the overloaded state’ (Skelcher 2000). In 
response to the legitimacy crisis of the state that followed notions such as big government in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, NPM stresses a mode of accountability that is based on 
results rather than processes, by having clearly stated aims and a strong focus on meeting 
these aims (Hood 1995). Notwithstanding early and on-going critiques of the disciplinary 
effects of performance measurement (e.g. Rose and Miller 2010) and the identification of 
auditing processes with the extension of control (e.g. Power 1994), these methods also 
continue to be promoted as a key ingredient of democratic governance. Thus, by promoting 
horizontal coordination and by putting the activities of public officials and bureaucrats up 
for public scrutiny, NPM presents itself as a way to strengthen democratic governance. 
 The European Union (EU) in particular, in its White Paper on Governance (European 
Commission 2001), advocates the use of framework directives that include the use of 
standards, indicators, performance measurement, and auditing as a ‘new mode of 
governance’ and belives that these techniques are able to address issues of democratic 
legitimacy (Knill and Lenschow 2004). A good example of such a new mode of governance is 
the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) (European Commission 2000), as it operates by 
setting objectives and standards for ‘good water quality’ and requires monitoring and 
reporting of results. Moreover, standards and auditing have become key elements of 
discourses on democratic governance. They play an important role in ideas on participatory 
accountability that consists of stakeholders being satisfied with outputs (Bevir 2010) and 
ideas on peer accountability that consists of the mutual evaluations of organisations by their 
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counterparts (Bäckstrand 2008). In the WFD, these forms of accountability are expected to 
contribute to a ‘direct, deliberative polyarchy’ (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), because they are 
expected to open up settled practices to the involvement of different groups and build on the 
experiences of these groups to generate new solutions. Whether performance standards and 
auditing processes in the WFD indeed lead to an opening up of policy processes, as 
suggested by the EU and by the governance scholars cited earlier, or whether they rather do 
the opposite by extending control of the state and disciplining subjects (and water systems), 
as suggested by critiques of neoliberalism, is the main question that this article addresses. 
 In order to answer the question as formulated above, the uses of performance standards 
and auditing processes in the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands are taken as a 
case study. Placing attention on water rather than only on human interaction implies two 
important considerations. First, as water can be called an ‘environmental subject’ rather than 
a human subject, efforts of control and disciplining are expected to be directed at waters or 
water systems in addition to the human actors that are their managers, users, or protectors. 
In this matter, we follow the argument that describing certain realities through water quality 
standards also entails the creating of these realities (Callon 1998). Second, water invokes the 
concept of materiality: it recognises that ‘the “things” (pumps, dams, canals), which make a 
difference for the way social relations unfold, are not merely pre-given substrates that enable 
and constrain social action’ (Bakker 2012:6), but can also be sources of unpredictability, 
unruliness, and resistance to human intentions (Bakker 2012). Therefore, waters or water 
systems are implicated in and part of modes of accountability and can either further or 
obstruct these.  
 The choice for studying the water quality standards and processes of monitoring and 
reporting in the WFD in the Netherlands was the result of earlier research of the authors 
(Behagel and Turnhout 2011) that showed how these methods in the implementation of the 
WFD of the Netherlands had become part of intense political processes. The next section 
will detail how such political processes can be linked to the role of water quality standards in 
governance practises. These linkages are conceptualised as relations of power, specifically as 
processes of convergence and resistance. Section 3 will describe these processes as 
performative and highlight how water quality standards: (1) constitute reality; (2) act as sites 
for political action; and (3) behave in unpredictable ways. In section 4, the concept of 
performativity is applied to a study of the creation and use of the water quality standards and 
monitoring and reporting of results in the Netherlands. The article concludes in section 5 by 
demonstrating the value of the concept of performativity for a critical understanding of how 
water quality standards in the Netherlands have impacted environmental protection and 
practices of democratic governance .  
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Accounting by standards 
According to Lemke (2002), neoliberalism can be viewed as a political project that aims to 
create a reality that it suggests already exists. By using calculative techniques, it makes 
specific domains of society or the environment readable, recordable, and calculable, and 
produces knowledge that makes these domains governable (Raj-Reichert 2012). 
Neoliberalism requires the depoliticisation of governance; it uses methods such as 
performance measurement and auditing to turn complex social conditions into standardised 
concepts and categories that can be easily governed through ‘check-lists’ (Raj-Reichert 2012). 
By doing so, they ‘re-code’ the complex relationships within a social domain to a new, 
ordered whole. The increasingly central role of standardisation and the emergence of 
performance indicators and output controls in environmental governance (Borraz 2007) 
have a similar effect: they create and reflect an understanding of how human and 
environmental systems operate and what their linkages are (Rametsteiner et al. 2011). This 
understanding does not only lead to the construction of an ideal image of what an 
environmental system looks like, but also steers the selection of measures to achieve 
environmental objectives (Turnhout 2009). Studies by Bowker (2000), Waterton (2002), 
and Turnhout and Boonman-Berson (2011) have also pointed to how nature and 
biodiversity are constituted through scientific practices of classification and databasing. 
Bowker (2005:659) explains this as follows: ‘A set of data structures and information 
retrieval models are set up so that a particular, skewed view of the world can easily be 
represented. […and…] The world that is explored scientifically becomes more and more 
closely tied to the world that can be represented by one’s theories and in one’s databases: and 
this world is ever more readily recognised as the real world’. Consequently, one can say that 
standards do not merely represent reality, but also constitute it (Pickering 1993, Callon 
2007).  
 Standards constitute reality by providing a basis for common action. In order to do so, 
they need to be able to place actions and objects outside the realm of politics in which public 
contestations take place (Barry 2002). However, these processes of depoliticisation are 
themselves political activities as they determine what is and what is not to be the subject of 
political debate (Flinders and Buller 2002). It follows that standards are not neoliberal by 
themselves; they are only neoliberal to the extent that they are deployed in a depoliticising 
way (Guthman 2008). Consequently, neoliberal techniques do not necessarily lead to 
neoliberal outcomes (Higgins et al. 2008). In other words, in order for standards to have 
disciplinary effects and provide control they need to be actively protected from external 
scrutiny or ‘external scrutiny must be managed in a way that does not provoke an excessive 
politicisation’ (Barry 2002:280). In the case of water quality standards, as in many other 
examples in environmental and conservation policy, external scrutiny is often minimal and it 
is mainly ecologists and other experts that struggle with the question over how to measure 
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and evaluate nature and the environment. They are concerned with how to best represent 
complex ecosystems in a comprehensive and objective way that is at the same time relevant 
for policy practice and easy to measure. As such, they protect water quality standards from 
being contested and politicised. In addition to using scientific expertise, politicisation is also 
avoided by channelling political processes within specific modes of interaction. The 
mechanisms of participatory and peer accountability can serve such a protective function. 
These mechanisms do involve possible contestations, but only in specific ways that do not 
provide room for contestation of the standards themselves as these provide the units of 
measurement that makes participatory and peer accountability possible. As such, they 
channel possible contestations to specific depoliticised spaces and refigure them as 
interactions between organisations and civil society or between different organisations. 
 Depoliticisation does not always succeed: proposals for ecological standards and indicators 
or water quality objectives often meet with severe debate, criticisms, and opposition 
(Rametsteiner et al. 2011, Turnhhout 2007). Such debates are not limited to the field of 
expertise as standards can be important sites for societal resistance, when for example citizens 
use standardised methods for the monitoring of air quality in creative ways (Ottinger 2010). 
As such, standards can have political effects as they yield results that are employed for or lead 
to political contestations. In other words, they do not only provide a clean way to ‘steer at a 
distance’, but can also become a ‘conduit for contamination’ (Barry 2002:280). Moreover, 
ecological classifications have been shown to be negotiable and can be used in support of 
social or political goals (Waterton 2002). This means that neoliberal techniques such as 
standards and performance measurement do not simply reproduce neoliberal rule, but that 
their performance is negotiated in and shaped by their local application in practice. In this 
regard, it may not be surprising that environmental concerns have historically been the most 
political effective resources of resistance against neoliberal projects (Higgins et al. 2008). The 
struggles, contestations, and negotiations that take place around standards are not some type 
of break with these standards – and the programs and technologies behind them –, but the 
very condition of their existence (Lemke 2002). 
 Reflecting on the above discussion, we can identify two types of processes that standards 
can simultaneously be a part of. First, they can be part of processes of control and 
disciplining. In order for these processes to occur, a political activity of depoliticisation is 
necessary in which standards are presented as objective and are protected from contestations. 
When successful, these processes lead to the extension of control by the actors that engage in 
this political activity through the disciplining of environmental and human subjects. Second, 
standards can also be used in support of social or political goals by creatively negotiating 
these in local contexts and using them for societal resistance. Both processes are believed to 
occur simultaneously, as full depoliticisation is not deemed possible and depoliticisation itself 
requires continuous political activity (Barry 2002). Therefore, the question whether water 
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quality standards lead to an opening up or a closing off of the policy process is ultimately a 
question about how these standards are situated in relations of power. Giving lower-level 
authorities a degree of competence to set standards themselves, as the WFD does, is a good 
example. Whether these actors deal with this responsibility by faithfully carrying out 
measures in order to meet water quality standards or whether they use it to shape these 
processes in their own way is a matter of how they position themselves in a field of power: 
whether they succumb to the disciplinary force of the WFD, or whether they manage to 
creatively adapt the methods and techniques of the WFD to their own goals. National or 
local contextual factors such as the institutional history of water management, the strength of 
civil society, or the administrative culture of the state therefore all contribute to whether 
water quality standards are locally adapted or whether they are resisted and contested (Bonal 
2003).  
 In the ideology of NPM, performance standards and auditing processes lead to a mode of 
accountability that is based on results. In the WFD, these results can provide a basis for 
participatory and peer accountability (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). However, to situate standards 
in a field of power brings two important issues to the fore. First, the question arises to whom 
the transparency or disclosure of results are directed (Gupta 2008): whether that is to the 
central state, to the European Commission (EC), to interest groups, and/or to peer 
organisations. Second, the question arises what it is exactly that is made accountable: 
whether information is standardised or not (Gupta, 2008); whether accountability is about 
the processes of ‘control of control’ (Power 1994) or the actual state of water quality; and 
whether the purpose of accountability is to make informed decisions or to empower lower 
levels of government and civil society (Gupta 2008). In other words, to situate standards in a 
field of power raises the question in what way and to what extent the practices of water 
policy in the Netherlands are invested in the methods and techniques of the WFD (Law 
2009). This includes the governance actors of the WFD, but also distinct aspects of ‘the 
natural world’; of water systems that participate in such social processes of ‘giving account’ 
(Mansfield 2003). Importantly, the mode of accountability that emerges from this 
situatedness of water quality standards is a contextualised rather than a universal one. To 
understand how such a mode of accountability takes shape, the next section highlights the 
performativity of knowledge. 
Performativity: convergence and resistance 
The concept of performativity as pioneered by the work of Judith Butler (1990) is often used 
to refer to ‘the disciplining and production of subjects through institutions and particular 
practices’ (Tucker 2005:46). When applied to expert models and standards, performativity 
shows how knowledge produces the reality it aims to describe. As Callon (2007:231) 
explains: ‘scientific theories, models and statements are not constative; they are performative, 
that is, actively engaged in the constitution of the reality that it describes.’ As such, 
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knowledge appears as a constitutive force, rather than a neutral vehicle for representation 
(Pickering 1993). Only those items that are measured and represented can be made to count 
and are taken into account. Conversely, what is not measured, is not known, will not be 
represented or taken into account and will not become part of the world (as we know it). In 
other words: only what is counted counts (Turnhout and Boonman-Berson 2010). This 
aspect of performativity is called convergence (Bowker 2005).  
 Although the process of convergence can be seen to be rather deterministic, the previous 
section has discussed how standards can also include resistance and afford scope for political 
action. Resisting convergence may involve deliberate practices and strategies that constitute 
political action (Tucker 2005, Buizer and Turnhout 2011). This specific form of political 
activity uses creativity in order to change outcomes, or to make – hidden – political 
statements. Not only actors can be seen to resist convergence, but nature as well. Arguably, 
nature resists representation as ‘classifications [...of nature…] seem to perform in highly 
unpredictable ways, dependent upon often un-envisaged contingencies and local contexts, 
and shooting off in unanticipated directions.’ (Waterton 2002:197). As classifications only 
become real as they are continually and repetitively performed (Bowker and Star 2000), 
there is always the possibility for change to enter in, even when following strict scripts 
(Waterton 2010). Consequently, the concept of performativity highlights the contingency of 
outcomes in the sense that no act is inevitable in the form that it takes (Waage and 
Benedictson 2010). The two processes of convergence and resistance – in the form of 
political action and in the form of unpredictability - make clear that standards perform in 
multiple ways. 
 By highlighting the contingency of how standards perform, the concept of performativity 
is sensitive to processes in which the possibilities for contestation and/or negotiation are 
closed off or opened up (Thrift 2003). On the one hand, it does this by highlighting the 
process by which the world is made to conform to and converge with our abstract models of 
it (Carrier 1998). On the other hand, it does so by stressing that knowledge performs on the 
amalgam of nature and society in ways that bring in agency, unpredictability, and change. As 
such, the concept of performativity, by highlighting processes of convergence and resistance, 
brings out how standards can be deployed both in a depoliticised and in a politicised way 
and how this impacts on accountability. Moreover, the specific nature of environmental 
quality standards allows us to invoke the concept of materiality so as to include the following 
three dimensions of the performativity of standards: how they come to constitute reality 
through processes of convergence, how they offer a site for political activity, and how they 
behave in unpredictable ways. The following section uses these dimensions of performativity 
to discuss how accountability was shaped in the implementation of the WFD in the 
Netherlands.  
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The performativity of water quality standards in the WFD 
Water quality standards and processes of monitoring and reporting have a central role in the 
governance processes of the WFD (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). As the analysis below details, 
they impact which waters are managed for water quality and which are not, they provide a 
reference for what measures to improve water quality are taken, and they co-define policy 
goals. They have this central role due to the formal requirements of member states to report 
to the EC about the water systems and quality objectives they identified, the monitoring 
networks they set up, and the management plans they designed to improve water quality. 
The member states set water quality standards using a method that is defined by the EU in 
the legal text of the WFD and that draws on different ‘quality elements’ such as aquatic flora 
and fauna ,and uses a ‘natural, undisturbed state’ or ecologically pristine condition as a 
reference. In line with the scientific character of these quality elements, ecological experts 
have gained a prominent role in the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands, as they 
created water quality standards, set up monitoring networks, and measured and reported 
water quality. The Netherlands presents an interesting case to study the performativity of the 
water quality standards of the WFD as there was considerable pressure to come to results and 
little time for scientific debates about how to measure and evaluate water quality. This has 
shown quite visibly how several methods to establish water quality standards were devised 
and used, how official reports were repeatedly adjusted or diverted from, and how 
adjustments continue to be made today. 
 The material for the case study was collected by means of in-depth interviewing of ten 
experts, two workshops, and document analysis. Interviewees were selected based on their 
involvement in the WFD, on the role they had in the production, use, and evaluation of the 
water quality standards, and to include a strong variety in expertise and institutional 
affiliation. Moreover, two reflection meetings were held on the role of ecological knowledge 
in the WFD implementation process with a group of another eight experts. In addition, 
extensive use was made of official and other policy documents, including drafts of the water 
quality standards, their final versions, documents that related concrete water quality 
standards for water bodies, evaluation reports, and monitoring results. Finally, the results of 
further research on the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands carried out by the 
author (Behagel and Turnhout 2011, van der Arend and Behagel 2011) were used to be able 
to assess the role of the water quality standards in the broader implementation process. The 
empirical examples that are described in the three subsections below were identified by the 
interviewees as key issues in the creation and use of water quality standards, monitoring, 
performance assessment, and expertise. 
Constituting water quality 
According to article 5 of the WFD, all member states had to complete, by the end of 2004, a 
detailed analysis of the characteristics of their river basin districts, including a review of the  
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Figure 2: WFD and non-WFD waters in the Netherlands 
pressures and impacts of human activity on surface and groundwater, and an economic 
analysis of the use of water. A web communication by the DGXI states: ‘The results of these 
analyses serve as a starting point and a source of information [...] which the River Basin 
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Management Plans (RBMPs) and the Programme of Measures will be built upon’ (European 
Commission 2012). Part of the characterisation of the river basin district was to identify the 
water bodies that would fall under the WFD. This has been a highly selective process that 
left a large number of waters outside of the scope of the WFD. First, in order for a water to 
be designated as a water body, it needed to have a substantial geophysical size; in practice 
above 5 square kilometres of water surface. As a result, many smaller waters are not 
considered WFD water bodies. Next, a typology had to be made of all the types of waters 
that were present in the Netherlands. To this purpose, 55 types of water bodies were drafted 
by a group of ecological experts and over a 1000 waters were designated as WFD water 
bodies. Only 900 of these made it to the article 5 report. After the initial article 5 report, the 
typology of water bodies was ‘revalidated’ and in the concept RBMPs that were published by 
the end of 2008, only 35 of the original 55 water types had remained. Moreover, of these 35 
types, now only 27 were actually used to identify water bodies. In addition, of the original 
900 water bodies that were reported in 2005, by the time of 2008, 623 remained as a result 
of the combining of smaller water bodies into larger ones. 
 One consequence of these processes to identify the WFD water bodies was that a 
substantial amount of waters were not held to be representative for the water system. 
Although no absolute figures are available, most respondents estimate that around 60% of 
the Dutch water system consists of non-WFD waters. Figure 2 shows both WFD and non-
WFD waters in the Netherlands, based on GIS-data. Some of these non-WFD waters have 
high biodiversity values and are so-called ‘water pearls’ (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving 
2008b), which used to take a prominent place in the management of waters by water 
boards17. However, as budgets are limited and the WFD has taken a central role in water 
policy, funds are now first and foremost directed towards WFD water bodies. This is 
expected to lead to a deterioration, or at least a lagging behind of the water quality of non-
WFD waters. One respondent related an anecdote on how the management of amphibian 
pools was completely forgotten by a water board, leaving the pools to turn into huddles of 
sand. Thus, the identification of water bodies was the first step towards constituting water 
quality in the Netherlands according to the water quality standards of the WFD. 
 Creating larger water bodies did not only mean that smaller waters would not become 
representative for the whole water system, but also that more water bodies could be 
designated as heavily modified or artificial. Water bodies in the WFD are designated by one 
of three statuses: natural; heavily modified; or artificial. A body of water is in principle 
designated as natural. However, when a water body is substantially changed in character due 
to human activity, it can be designated as heavily modified. Finally, when a water body is 
created by human activity, it can be designated as artificial. Depending on their status, 
different objectives are set per water body, with higher objectives being set for natural bodies 
                                                 
17 Water boards are regional water authorities. The Netherlands has 26 water boards. 
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than for heavily modified and artificial water bodies. Figure 3 gives an example of how this 
works. Consider a brook that consists of three parts: part one (blue) contains hard concrete 
river beds, part 2 (green) flows freely, and part 3 (red) has been channelized (taking out 
natural bends in the river flow). This brook can be split into three water bodies: one artificial 
(blue), one natural (green), and one heavily modified (red). Although this would mean that 
you would have three different objectives for the three water bodies, the fear was that – since 
water does not stop flowing on the border of one water body to the next – the highest 
objective of the natural water body would become critical for the selection of measures that 
needed to be taken for this brook. However, if the same brook is identified as one water 
body that is heavily modified, a lower objective will become leading for the whole brook. 
Depending then on how a water body is identified in terms of type and size, monitoring 
requirements and objectives change, which in turn translates into what measures will be 
taken, and what is considered the current status of water quality of this water body. 
 Figure 3: Schematic example of a brook split in three water bodies 
Because water quality is defined in terms of 6 quality elements - chemistry; 
hydromorphology; phytoplankton; macrophytes (surface plants) and phytobenthos (bottom 
plants); benthic invertebrate fauna; and fish fauna - measures are specifically designed to 
address these elements. Moreover, as the quality elements are described in terms of a 
reference to an ecologically pristine condition, measures are more likely to be designed to 
mimic such a condition. Meandering offers a striking example. The re-meandering of rivers 
and brooks is one of the most common measures that is scheduled to improve water quality 
in the Netherlands. Re-meandering diversifies the flow of water, decreasing water flow in the 
centre of the river and increasing it in bends. Such a single measure addresses three out of six 
quality elements: hydromorphology, macrophytes and phytobenthos, and fish, and is 
therefore an appealing measure to choose. Re-meandering doesn’t give a river back its natural 
flow, which would mean a constantly changing river bank. Nevertheless, it does resemble a 
natural, undisturbed state in terms of hydromorphology more closely and will score higher 
on that element. Moreover, the diversification of water flow will also bring a higher 
diversification of macrophytes, phytobenthos, and fish, leading to a higher score on those 
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quality elements. A similar popular measure that forms a substantial part of the programme 
of measures is the creation of soft river beds. Soft river banks allow for more plant life and 
can serve as breeding grounds for fish, again addressing multiple quality elements. Yet, the 
effect of these soft beds on overall water quality is uncertain, and many interviewees 
expressed scepticism about their impact on water quality. As in the example of re-
meandering, the natural reference that informs the water quality standards appears to be 
driving these measures. Natural waters have soft river beds, and it is relatively simple to 
recreate this condition. Importantly, both measures do nothing to reduce nutrient pollution, 
despite the fact that this is the major source of water pollution in the Netherlands and likely 
to mitigate the potential effects of re-meandering and the creation of soft river beds on 
macrophytes, phytobenthos or fish diversity. In general, the problem of nutrients pollution is 
hardly dealt with in the programme of measures. This is partly due to the fact that water 
authorities have little or no authority over agricultural policy, which is formulated centrally 
by a different ministry18. Thus, the majority of measures taken by the Netherlands is aimed 
at recreating (or to be more precise: mimicking) natural ecosystems, rather than addressing 
pressures by pollution and this is illustrative for how water quality standards have begun to 
start constituting waters bodies in the Netherlands. 
Water quality standards as sites for politics 
The WFD’s water quality standards did not only lead to convergence but also triggered 
resistance. Following a political uproar over the WFD in the end of 2003 (Behagel and 
Turnhout 2011), the Ministry of Traffic, Public Works, and Water Management (V&W) 
published a ‘strategy note’ (Verkeer en Waterstaat 2004) that actively sought to protect the 
agricultural sector from possible detrimental effects of the WFD. The note recognised that 
the standards for water quality provided room for political manoeuvre and proposed to 
characterise as many water bodies as possible as either heavily modified or as artificial because 
this would avoid the setting of what were considered unduly high ecological standards. The 
aim of the note was to evade the requirements of the WFD and it did so by using creativity 
and procedural ‘tricks’. As the note explains, it was considered important to come to a: 
[…] provisional characterisation of water bodies: If possible water bodies will be 
characterised as artificial or heavily modified because that will create room for the 
government to weigh and select objectives and measures. (Verkeer en Waterstaat 
2004) 
One member of the national parliament even went as far as to propose to characterise as 
many water bodies in the Netherlands as possible as artificial, giving the rationalisation that 
                                                 
18 In the specific case of the Netherlands, non-point pollution by agricultural use is regulated on a national level by the 
implementation of the EU Nitrates Directive (EC 1991) and handled by the ministry of Food, Agriculture and Nature 
Quality. It is kept separate from the implementation of the WFD. 
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the most of the Netherlands are below sea-level and therefore artificial in itself (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2004, July 1). Although this proposal was not completely 
adopted by the junior minister, and the lower governmental bodies of the water boards had 
their own authority to characterise water bodies, about 95% of the water bodies in the 
Netherlands ended up being characterised as either heavily modified or as artificial. This is 
by far the highest percentage in the EU – the average being 16% -, only followed by Belgium 
at just over 50%. According to many of our interviewees, this was clearly a political decision. 
There are waters in the Netherlands that have been regarded as natural by ecologists for 
decennia and have not been modified over centuries, yet that are still characterised as heavily 
modified water bodies in the WFD. The article 5 report of 2005 also required member states 
to indicate which water bodies were at risk of not achieving good ecological status or good 
ecological potential after the first implementation period of RBMPs between 2009-2015. 
The Netherlands designated 98% of water bodies at risk of not reaching the water quality 
standards against an EU average of 40%. The rationale behind this was to prepare the EC for 
the Netherlands not achieving its objectives in 2015: ‘Risk assessment [should not be] 
optimistic but realistic, otherwise there will not be legitimate grounds for the possible 
phasing of the reaching of objectives or the lowering of objectives in 2027’ (Verkeer en 
Waterstaat 2004). 
 Designating water bodies as heavily modified or artificial does not in itself result in the 
lowering of the ambitions for water quality because the ecological reference remains the 
yardstick by which to assess water quality. However, it does give water authorities the 
opportunity to set standards for each water body individually and lower them. They used a 
number of strategies to lower water quality standards. As a first strategy, the so-called 
‘Praagmatic method19’ was widely used. This method does not take a natural condition as a 
starting point but sets a maximum ecological potential by listing all the measures that can be 
taken to improve water quality. Then, the water quality standards are arrived at by removing 
all measures that would prove too costly to carry out (for example buying large quantities of 
agricultural land and turning it into nature area). The standards are thereby no longer 
derived from a natural situation but, pragmatically, from the measures that are considered 
feasible and affordable. A second strategy was to place a water body at risk of not achieving 
its objective. This downplayed the necessity of taking measures, even those that were 
identified as feasible and affordable. In a way, it was already creating an argument for why 
the WFD’s deadline of 2015 would not be met. As a third strategy, water authorities further 
lowered water quality standards for heavily modified and artificial waters by integrating 
surrounding land use and local contexts in the objectives. For example, a group of water 
                                                 
19 This method was first devised in a meeting in Prague, (in Dutch: Praag), and contains a reference to the word 
‘pragmatic’. It is a pun. 
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boards in the Meuse river basin in the south of the Netherlands created a taskforce to make 
templates or ‘dummies’ for specific types of heavily modified water bodies. These dummies 
operate from the assumption that the pollution pressures resulting from a predominantly 
urban or agricultural environment cannot be changed and they therefore no longer used a 
natural standard to measure quality. Yet another strategy of some water boards was to not 
adopt the full list of species that was described in the quality standards. For instance, they 
argued that when a specific type of water plant had not been native to a region for over a 
hundred years, there was no need to include it at all. As a result, the desired water quality 
became easier to meet. Finally as a fifth strategy, central water authorities made ’dummy’ 
standards for artificial water bodies like trenches and channels that no longer referred to any 
type of natural water at all. Consequently, there was no reason to adopt the list of species 
described in the natural standards. This resulted in short lists of species to describe each of 
the quality elements and sometimes the complete omission of one of the quality elements 
(such as phytoplankton for ditches). 
Unpredictable outcomes 
In the philosophy of NPM, clearly defined objectives bring about higher efficiency. In order 
for that logic to work, measures need to have predictable results and monitoring data of 
water bodies need to be able to show those results. Yet not much is known about the effects 
of measures on the improvement of water quality and monitoring programs do not always 
deliver expected results. Moreover, standardisation improves comparability, but also – by 
definition – negates differences between water bodies. These issues came to the fore in the 
process of monitoring. Monitoring results did not always line up with the outcomes that 
were expected based on the measures that were taken. In addition, standards yielded results 
that were either unintelligible to experts, or undesirable. 
 As we described above, the Netherlands designated 98% of its WFD water bodies to be ‘at 
risk’ of not achieving their objectives by 2015. When the monitoring network required by 
article 8 of the WFD was set up, everyone expected the first measurements to show all water 
bodies to be below the ‘good ecological potential’. Yet that was not the case. Take the earlier 
example of the brook (figure 3). Although this brook contains natural and artificial elements, 
the heavily modified character of the brook is leading in the formulation of its quality 
standard, with the expectation that this will produce favourable outcomes and require 
affordable and simple measures. However, when a single point was monitored in 
‘surveillance monitoring’ (which takes place every six years and is considered to give a 
representative picture of the water system), it turned out that the water quality of that water 
body already complied with the standard (figure 4). And, as this single water body (a brook) 
represented a cluster of water bodies, all these water bodies – in this result – were required 
according to the requirements of the WFD to not deteriorate below this quality standard. 
This unsettled water managers: ‘That was quite a scare, an image appeared that did not fit 
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with the article 5 report where those problems were listed’ (expert at consultancy firm, 
personal communication, 25 May 2010). This outcome was not only unexpected but also 
undesired, especially since almost all water bodies were designated as at risk of not achieving 
their objectives by 2015. Accordingly, the monitoring network was revised to include more 
monitoring points in the scheme of ‘operational monitoring’ (as represented by the right side 
of figure 4). Operational monitoring is targeted at the specific quality elements that are 
decisive in placing the water body at risk with the aim to assess whether the measures that are 
taken are sorting effect. By monitoring those quality elements that were causing the water 
bodies to be ‘at risk’, a more differentiated picture emerged in which many water bodies 
ended up as not yet achieving their quality standards.  
 
Figure 4: The same chart of operational monitoring for hydromorphology (red, circle) and biology (green, 
square) is represented two times. To the left is the draft chart of 2007, to the right the official chart taken from 
the RBMP of 2010. 
 Unexpected results like the one documented above were common. On the one hand, high 
status was sometimes achieved when expert judgment said otherwise. ‘Then you would get 
scores of waters of which you could see, the water looked so appalling, and nonetheless you 
would get a good score, so that couldn’t be right’ (expert from V&W, personal 
communication, 14 April 2011). For instance, the quality element of macrophytes was 
especially prone to score a high status. In some water types, only one specimen of a plant was 
needed in order to reach a good status. In another example, the quality element of fish 
showed some very interesting scores on the quality standard as a result of monitoring. This 
quality element is primarily built up out of fish abundance and of the composition of 
species, both of which are weighed equally. Now, when there was a very good species 
composition, but almost no fish in the water, the water body would still reach a good status, 
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even though experts would not call such a sample representative of good water quality. As 
one interviewee explains: ‘For flowing waters it is not so much about kilograms per hectare, 
but about the relationships between species. This percentage of that, well, that is also a 
shortcoming, because when you catch each group of species in a relationship of 1:1:1, than 
you might have an abundance of 25 per cent, and this will give you a very good score on the 
water standard. But you will know perfectly well: I have only caught a very small amount of 
fish, in reality it doesn’t work here at all’ (expert at consultancy firm, personal 
communication, 6 April 2011) Another issue was the large number of very young fish, which 
sometimes made up almost 90% of the sample. This skewed results as fish younger than a 
year are not representative for longer periods according to experts, and it makes little sense to 
hold them representative for a the 6 year period that surveillance monitoring is intended to 
describe. Nevertheless, they do count according to the WFD standards. 
 Water bodies have not always responded to the measures that were taken in the sense that 
water quality was improved. Or alternatively, water bodies that according to experts had a 
low water quality, ended up scoring high on the water quality standards and as a result did 
not need any more measures to improve their quality. To improve the alignment between 
expert expectations, political desires, and monitoring outcomes, adjustments were made in 
the monitoring program and the sampling practices and water quality standards were re-
evaluated. More radically, the unpredictable and undesirable outcomes also led to a general 
resistance to the use of the WFD water quality standards. For instance, water boards often 
preferred to use the water quality standards that were in use before the introduction of the 
WFD , or they preferred to use expert judgments over monitoring data to report on water 
quality. As a senior civil servant working for the ministry voiced it: ‘in half of the cases those 
people that submitted the score on the water objectives, they didn’t agree with the results 
according to the WFD method, because it was too high or too low, and they adjusted them 
on their own authority’ (expert from V&W, personal communication, 14 April 2011). The 
unpredictable outcomes of monitoring brought to the fore that convergence often failed – in 
the sense that Dutch water bodies did not successfully align with the set water standards. 
This directly led to resistance, evoking the agency of experts to trust their own judgement 
over the standardised measuring of water quality as set out by the WFD. 
The performative dimensions of environmental quality standards 
In the above, we have demonstrated the performativity of water quality standards and how 
this involved processes of convergence as well as resistance. The concept of performativity 
highlights how measuring and evaluating water quality are not just a matter of finding the 
right classifications of water types, selecting the proper indicators or quality elements, and 
establishing the most objective quality standard. It shows how measuring and evaluating 
water quality involves the constitution of reality while at the same time it brings 
unpredictability and political action. Already in the first step of the classification of water 
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types and the designation of water bodies, selection and marginalisation were brought about 
(Law and Urry 2004) as WFD water bodies were put in the centre of water management 
while other waters, for example waters with a surface smaller than five square kilometres, are 
excluded from the WFD and pushed into the periphery. The examples of re-meandering and 
creating soft river beds demonstrate that similar processes occurred with the selection of 
measures that led to convergence of WFD water bodies with the presumed pristine condition 
of waters as described in the WFD standards. This exemplifies that by classifying waters and 
creating standards, reality is not so much represented but actively constituted (Callon 2007). 
Also, we see processes of depoliticisation and marginalisation taking place: water bodies are 
being disciplined by standards into certain shapes that mimic what are taken to be natural 
conditions in ways that do not offer room for alternative images of water quality. Experts 
and water managers are part of these process as they feel compelled to perform the WFD 
methods of standardisation and evaluation and direct funds to measures that contribute to 
reaching the WFD’s objectives. 
 The analysis has also demonstrated how both people and waters resist. What would count 
as a water body – and what not – had been subject to negotiation from the start, and 
continued to be under negotiation up until the publication of the RBMPs. In these 
processes, water quality standards became sites for political action as methodologies for 
identifying water bodies and formulating water objectives were employed to lower ambitions 
of environmental protection. Finally, although water quality standards produce a specific 
kind of reality and can become the site for politics, their performativity also entails 
unpredictability (Waterton 2010). We have seen how monitoring led to unexpected results, 
due to the unpredictability of how ecosystems behave. Moreover, we highlighted how the 
uniformity that standards inevitably represent could not be unequivocally imposed upon 
practice. Each water body, all things considered, is unique as a result of its circumstances and 
will behave in a similar unique way. This resistance that was carried out both by the political 
actions of governance actors and the unpredictability and unruliness of waters to being 
standardised brought about processes of politicisation and an opening up of different ways of 
evaluating water quality. Water quality standards were contested and tinkered with by 
experts and water managers; and flexible and alternative ways of evaluating water quality 
were used. Processes of resistance therefore appeared to bring democratic values such as 
inclusion and multiplicity whereas processes of convergence brought about the extension of 
control over waters and the disciplining of experts and water managers into a rationality of 
pristine waters. 
 While there is a considerable literature on de disciplinary and depoliticising effects of 
standards and other calculative techniques (e.g. Dean 1999, Guthman 2008,Robertson and 
Dale 2002), less attention has been paid to how knowledge and expertise can act in 
contradiction with the objectives for which they are deployed (Higgins and Larner 2010, 
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Waterton 2002). This last point is important in order to critically engage with claims to new 
modes of accountability that are associated with standardisation. The case showed that the 
role that water quality standards, monitoring, and reporting played in creating accountability 
towards the EC stimulated these standards to become sites for political action. First of all, 
the resulting strategies and tinkering with water quality standards undercut accountability 
towards the EC as measures and monitoring were designed to fit with what was considered 
desirable to report. Second, it also undermined mechanisms of participatory and peer 
accountability as monitoring results could not be used by interested citizens and civil society 
organisations to assess the performance of the government in enhancing water quality. In 
processes of resistance, the purpose of water quality standards was reduced from making 
informed decisions or empowering lower-level actors to complying with formal 
requirements. As standards were adapted to local contexts and as monitoring and reporting 
became based on expert judgement rather than on the WFD standards, performance 
measurement and evaluation in the WFD became the ‘control of control’ (Power 1994) 
rather than the means to make water quality transparent to different state and non-state 
actors. The water quality standards of the WFD in the Netherlands were not able to provide 
a basis for the channelling of political action in forms of participatory and peer 
accountability as they became sites of political action themselves. Consequently, a new mode 
of accountability was not achieved. Instead, an ‘outdated’ form of accountability that is 
based in the processes and procedures within a hierarchical system of bureaucracy in which 
experts and water managers remain answerable to elected politicians prevailed. Contrary to 
the ideology of NPM, such bureaucrats were not evaluated based on their performance in 
improving water quality, but on the processes of reporting water quality standards in line 
with political choices to lower environmental protection ambitions.  
 To conclude, this article has shown that agencies also make standards not work and argued 
that by showing the unruly and contradictory effects of standards one does not only show 
how standards sometimes fail to perform, but that this unpredictability is a key dimension of 
the performativity of standards. Thus, although standards can be seen as not working 
according to set objectives or intentions, this does not mean that they do not do work. By 
including the dimensions of political action and unpredictability we have shown how the 
concept of performativity can be employed to produce a rich account of power and 
resistance, and of the creative and contextualised ways in which quality standards perform in 
practice. In order to interpret practices of power and politics in their many aspects, accounts 
of the disciplinary power of government programmes that critiques of neoliberalism offer 
and accounts of the convergence between systems of knowledge and reality need to be 
supplemented with stories of resistance and descriptions of local sites of action and agency. 
In our view, it is exactly in the exchange and meeting of processes of convergence and 
resistance that performativity ‘happens’, that power effects become real, and that agency is 
Chapter 6 
124 
exercised. Such an approach to performativity gives diverse and heterogeneous accounts of 
standardisation practices, and shines new light on what it is that standards actually ‘do’. 
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Abstract 
The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) requires member states to organise public 
participation in the implementation of the Directive. In the Netherlands, neither the great 
effort put into organising such public participation in the WFD nor the numerous 
participatory processes that have taken place have been evaluated very positively by societal 
groups. This dissatisfaction leads us to question to what extent it is possible to design and 
organise participation that the organisers experience as successful and the participants accept 
as legitimate. In this chapter, we apply the practice based approach to analyse both the 
organisation of public participation in the Netherlands and the ways in which participants 
have used and experienced it. The chapter draws on literature on institutional design, 
practice theory, and public participation in order to describe the practice of participation and 
the logic it exhibits. The case study of the design and organisation of public participation in 
the context of the WFD in the Netherlands shows how newly introduced participatory 
institutions were introduced in an effort to reorder the three fields of practice in which 
participants were situated: the public sphere, the governance network, and the economic 
sphere. Our findings show that the participants’ logic of practice changed very little. These 
findings are not to be interpreted as a disincentive for the institutional design of public 
participation, but rather as a call to policy makers and academics to pay due attention to the 
fields of practice in which actual or potential participants are entwined and to the principles 
that implicitly guide these actors’ doings and sayings. 
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Introduction 
Under the Water Framework Directive (WFD), which came into force in 2000, EU member 
states are required to adapt the institutions that organise their water management in 
accordance with the model of integrated river basin management (Biswas 2004, 
Rauschmayer et al. 2009). The WFD introduces river basins as the primary unit of 
management through a number of formal requirements, such as the drafting and reporting 
of River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). In the process in which these RBMPs are 
drafted, informing and consulting the general public is legally required; whereas active 
involvement of interested parties is to be encouraged. The WFD – in preamble 14 – states 
that public participation is a key factor for successful implementation:  
The success of this Directive relies on close cooperation and coherent action at 
Community, Member State and local level as well as on information, consultation 
and involvement of the public, including users. (European Commission 2000: 
preamble 14)  
Consequently, article 14 of the directive calls for the active participation of societal groups: 
Member States shall encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the 
implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, review and 
updating of the river basin management plans. (European Commission 2000: article 
14) 
Although this is not a de jure requirement to organise participation – one can imagine ways 
of encouraging participation without actually organising it – it is so de facto (Rauschmayer et 
al. 2009), specifically in combination with the reporting requirements stipulated by the 
WFD. Indeed, in common with most member states, the Netherlands have taken article 14 
of the WFD as a strong incentive to design and organise participation: In the years leading 
up to the publication of the RBMPs in 2010, Dutch government officials have created or 
modified a considerable number of participatory institutions in order that they might play a 
key role in the process of implementing the WFD. During an interview conducted by the 
authors, the national coordinator of the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands at 
the time commented on his own role as follows: 
Every year we have made governmental notes built up by following the line: first, 
societal groups, then the bureaucratic considerations, and then the political arena. 
We have organised everything: [the national consultation body], three times a year 
the sounding boards in the [sub-river basins], and below that the area based 
processes. This structure has been fully directed so that it has become unavoidable 
[…] for all the groups to be confronted with [public participation]. We fully staged 
that in order to drag everyone into the process.  
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The quote shows that participation had been deliberatively designed to actively involve all 
societal groups and that considerable effort was made to organise formal participatory 
processes.  
 Even so, the organisation of public participation in the WFD has not been viewed as 
particularly successful by everyone in the Netherlands. An evaluation of the implementation 
of the WFD in the Netherlands carried out by Delft University of Technology (Ten 
Heuvelhof et al. 2010) revealed that officials and civil servants were generally positive and 
believed that societal groups had been listened to sufficiently, whereas most societal groups 
did not (Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2010:78). Several societal groups (e.g. those for nature 
conservation, recreation and drinking water), have felt frustrated with what the participatory 
institutions offered, and sometimes dropped out of participatory processes. This divergence 
of opinion and experience is remarkable, given the effort invested in organising participation. 
Other than being remarkable, it also raises the issue of legitimacy. When societal groups 
become frustrated with participatory institutions and do not feel listened to, this can have 
detrimental effects on democratic legitimacy (Abelson et al. 2003). Furthermore, when 
societal groups pursue venues outside of formally organised participatory institutions to 
accomplish their goals, it can undermine the authority of these institutions (Lowndes et al. 
2001).  
 The diverging valuations of processes of participation led us to question to what extent it 
is possible to design and organise participation that is not only successful in the eyes of 
organisers, but is also legitimate in the eyes of participants. Research on participation in 
water management by Cleaver and Franks (2005) has shown that designers and organisers 
alike often have an unrealistically high level of trust in the efficacy of participatory 
institutions (see also De Koning and Benneker, this volume). Moreover, institutional 
approaches to participation can be criticised for a failure to understand the social, cultural 
and political contexts in which participation takes place (Cleaver and Franks 2005, Fischer 
2006). Accordingly, we set out to find out how the design and organisation of participation 
in response to the requirements set by the WFD affected participatory practices in water 
management in the Netherlands. To this end, we apply a practice based approach to the 
design and organisation of participation. We will focus on what participatory institutions do 
and how the established practices of participants resist being shaped. By drawing on practice 
theory, we conceptualise the introduction of new (participatory) institutions as more or less 
deliberate attempts to change different fields of practice. The disparity that we encounter 
between the considerable effort invested in organising participation and the negative 
evaluation of a number of aspects of the resulting participatory processes by societal groups 
will be fleshed out by showing the tension that unfolds between purposefully designed 
participatory institutions and the established fields of practice in which participants are 
situated. We identify three fields of practice, which are (1) the public sphere, (2) the 
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governance network, and (3) the economic sphere, and analyse how or to what extent 
practices were changed with the introduction of participatory institutions. 
` The chapter offers a reading of participatory institutions and practices in the context of 
the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands at the levels of the nation, river basin, 
and region. In the following section, we will describe how we understand the linkages 
between institutions and practices in a practice based approach. Next, we apply this 
understanding to shed light on the case study that we carried out. The case study is confined 
to the Netherlands and spans the period from the adoption of the WFD in 2000 up until the 
publication of the RBMPs in 2010. It addresses both national and regional levels of public 
participation and was carried out with specific attention to the participatory practices. That 
is to say, we did not follow formal events only, but also examined informal forms of 
participation. The case study draws on 23 qualitative open interviews conducted in 2008 and 
2009, approximately one year after most regional processes had concluded and at the time 
when the RBMPs were drafted, of which some are cited in the text (see Annex 2). During 
the interviews the interviewees were asked to give their own historical account of the 
implementation of the WFD, occasionally being prompted with key events by the 
interviewer. In addition, the interviewees were asked to give their personal opinion on the 
implementation process. The interviewees were selected on the basis of their participation in 
organised participatory processes, presence in governance networks, and snowball sampling. 
The final section discusses the limits of institutional design. It does so both in terms of the 
possibility of achieving democratic and governance ambitions by deliberately introducing 
institutions, and in terms of the extent to which participants view participatory institutions 
as legitimate. We conclude by offering an answer to the question of whether it possible to 
‘grasp’ participatory practices.  
What participatory institutions do 
According to Goodin (1996), institutions serve as collective constraints for individual agents 
and groups who pursue their respective projects. In addition, institutions shape the patterns 
of human interactions and the results that individuals achieve (Ostrom 1992). Ostrom 
(idem) defines an institution as the set of rules that is followed by a set of individuals. These 
rules impact on incentives, which means that institutions operate in an indirect manner to 
achieve or frustrate outcomes. In other words, institutions are simultaneously enabling and 
constraining and are never directly concerned with the output of a project or a policy 
process, but rather with the practices in which these outputs come about. They work on 
these practices by creating spaces where interactions take place and by setting the norms and 
rules of the game.  
 Designing new institutions for public participation entails the creation of new spaces 
where governmental and societal actors can meet (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) and the 
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introduction of new roles (Rowe and Frewe 2005) that imply certain norms and rules of 
conduct. Thus, designing institutions for public participation entails two major elements: 
first, creating a participatory meeting place in space and time and establishing its boundaries 
(for instance, a series of workshops in a community centre); and second, setting up formal, 
generally accepted roles, norms, and rules of conduct within these boundaries (e.g. an 
independent chair, unanimous decision-making procedures, the type of stakeholders invited, 
certain methods for conflict resolution, etc.). However, as in liberal democracies 
governmental and societal actors usually already have spaces where they interact, and do so 
according to established norms and rules, participatory institutions do not so much create 
practices where formerly there were none, but instead can be considered to be an attempt to 
change existing practices. In order to understand what these attempts imply, we now 
describe in some detail how we conceptualise practice. 
 We understand a practice to be an ensemble of doings, sayings and things, situated in, and 
performative of, a specific field of activity. Such an ensemble has a logic of practice. When 
we use the term logic, we do not mean to say that such a practice fully conforms to a set of 
rules, but rather that ‘practice has a logic which is not that of logic’ (Bourdieu 1977:109). A 
logic of practice is able to organise the doings and sayings of actors by means of a few 
generative principles (Bourdieu 1977). Such principles provide a common sense of how 
interactions take place (Blackmore 2010). As a logic of practice is defined by its practical 
relation to a situation, it is most often implicit. The situations that define a logic of practice 
do not occur at random, but are constituted in a field of practice. A field of practice, on an 
abstract level, is a system of positions and relationships among positions (Costa 2006). 
Concretely, actors and institutions occupy these positions by creating spaces, assuming roles, 
setting norms, and following rules. A logic of practice is implied in the relationships between 
these positions and cannot be reduced to one of them.  
 A field of practice and its logic unfold in time and space. In other words, actors and 
institutions are entwined in practice (Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011); they do not come into 
being separately, but emerge and become real in their mutual relationships (Giddens 1984). 
This gives practice a certain materiality or embodiment which ‘tends to guarantee the 
“correctness” of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules 
and explicit norms’ (Bourdieu 1990:54, cited in Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011:344). In other 
words, the spaces, roles, norms, and rules that make up a field of practice tend to fit the 
principles or logic of practice that govern the doing and sayings that make up a practice as 
such. What is correct in a practice is therefore not so much an issue of truth or the following 
of formal rules as it is the fit of a practical logic with the field of practice.  
 Given our understanding of practice, we view participatory institutions as a deliberate 
attempt to change the structure of positions in the field of practice with the aim of 
introducing new principles or a logic of practice. By designing a space where participation 
 What institutions do 
131 
take place, new situations are created that reorder the field of practice by creating new 
relationships between established positions (e.g. of state and civil society, or between business 
groups and NGOs). Moreover, the devising of roles, norms, and rules of conduct causes 
positions to shift or new positions to be created. When a field is reordered according to these 
new situations and positions, the result can be the emergence of new generative principles in 
the logic of practice. For example, some deliberative democrats seek to create ‘ideal speech 
situations’ through discursive designs that create the role of a facilitator who can mediate 
between actors and thereby change their relationships to one another (Dryzek 1987).  
 The field of practice in which actors are situated constitutes a meaningful, unfolding 
totality, and not a set of isolated and abstractly linked variables such as interests, rules, 
resources, incentives, or goals (Bourdieu 1990, Sandberg and Tsoukas 2011). That is to say, 
organisers and participants cannot be fully detached from the roles they play outside of 
participatory processes, nor can participatory institutions provide isolation from the wider 
fields of practice in which officials, civil servants, and participants are situated. Such fields of 
practice inevitably entail an uneven distribution of resources and a diversity of interests that 
are at odds with each other (Costa 2006). As such, a field of practice in which a logic of 
practice takes shape will necessarily be characterised by different and probably conflicting 
principles of action, as well as by power inequalities. Therefore, the idea of a universally 
applicable model of design is challenged by a practice based approach. The variability and 
dynamics of the fields of practice in which the design is introduced, and the inevitable 
shaping of this design in the field of practice make each participatory institution unique. 
Moreover, we see participatory institutions at work in different fields of practice 
simultaneously, as they cater for different goals.  
 We identify two main groups of goals of participatory institutions: democratic and 
instrumental. Democratic goals that are often ascribed to participation include public 
acceptance, empowerment, inclusion, consensus building, and deliberation (e.g. Beierle 
1999, Rowe and Frewer 2000, Webler et al. 2001, Cooke and Kothari 2001, Innes and 
Booher 2004, amongst others). These goals are often linked to a specific field and logic of 
practice. They are aimed at extending and improving the public sphere. When we consider 
goals such as public acceptance and empowerment, then these can be understood to seek to 
extend the public sphere in the direction of (and sometimes at the cost of) government. 
Democratisation of the workplace, neighbourhoods, or the educational system are goals long 
held by participatory democrats (Arnstein 1969). Goals such as consensus building and 
deliberation are more aimed at improving or transforming the public sphere, by improving 
the quality of engagement and deliberation by the public (Fung 2003) and by having 
arguments take precedence over the positions of actors (Calhoun 1993). As such, democratic 
goals can be seen to direct the design of participatory institutions towards attempts to change 
the field and logic of practice in the public sphere.  
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 The instrumental goals we identify entail the improvement of decisions and policies, 
policy efficiency and efficacy, and goal achievement (Lowndes et al. 2001, Woltjer 2002). 
These goals direct participatory institutions more towards the role that they can play in 
strengthening or creating governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing 2005), in the wake of 
the shift from government to governance (Pierre 2000, Arts and Leroy 2006). They are thus 
aimed at extending and strengthening governance networks that take on functions that the 
state is no longer willing or able to take on by itself. The aim of instrumental goals of 
participation then is to change the role of societal actors from bystanders to active 
participants in policy making, and from those that are demanding action by the state to 
partners in implementation. Instrumental goals also include the goals of the participants: to 
promote their stakes and values given a limited amount of time and energy (van der Arend 
and Behagel 2011). Participants engage in participatory processes to achieve things that 
would be difficult or impossible to achieve through their private efforts (Fischer 2006). So 
they operate in an economic sphere, in addition to a public sphere and governance networks. 
We will describe the field and logic of practice of the public sphere, the governance network, 
and the economic sphere in more detail in the following section, and let them structure our 
subsequent analysis. 
Fields and logics of practice 
The first field of practice that participatory institutions can be seen to work in is the public 
sphere – the open, visible space of deliberation and meaning-making where interests and 
perspectives are articulated, exchanged and confronted, issues are put on the agenda, and 
public opinion somehow emerges. As a field of practice, the public sphere is characterised by 
voluntary relations based on shared convictions and habits. The fully established 
organisations and less organised movements in civil society are a crucial element in the on-
going process of group formation, association, and dissociation that is the public sphere. 
They often articulate interests, values, and viewpoints before these are explicitly expressed or 
consciously felt by those they seek to represent. Between stakeholder organisations a 
continuous game of relative positioning may be observed: an on-going movement of 
associating and dissociating. Representative organisations engage in public opinion 
formation, disagreement, taking sides, forging coalitions without ever coalescing 
permanently with another organisation, seeking centre stage for the interests represented, 
expanding the group they speak for, etc. All this is led by voluntary association, goal 
achievement, and public visibility as a key logic of practice.  
 A second field of practice in which participatory institutions are at work is that of the 
governance network. Unlike the relationships in the public sphere, relationships in policy 
networks are characterised by mutual dependencies, by sustained direct interaction between 
actors, and by a certain level of professionalism (van der Arend 2007). The relationships 
include lobbying, partnerships and the pursuit of legal options. A central notion in 
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governance thinking is to conceive of governance networks as foci for a new form of public 
management: network management (Kickert et al. 1997). This managerial perspective is 
closely related to the notion of institutional design of participation. Both work from the 
assumption that it is possible and desirable to externally design and organise other people’s 
practices. To design institutions for public participation means to create new formal places 
where governmental and societal actors can meet and where new principles of action 
(including implicit rules and norms) can be introduced. 
 A third field of practice is the economic sphere in which participants are situated. Societal 
groups are organisations that need to efficiently convert resources into results (Mayer 1991: 
62). Accordingly, participants act according to economic principles of efficiency and scarcity. 
Participants have to negotiate salaries with their staff, hire affordable office space, choose 
strategically between their own multiple goals and possible courses of action, and secure their 
income. Different types of participants have diverging ways to acquire and reproduce the 
means necessary to represent and pursue their goals. Some stakeholder organisations are 
operated on the basis of voluntary or obligatory membership, others get the bulk of their 
income from government funding. In some organisations, most of the work is done by 
volunteers; others are mainly run by a professional staff. Such differences relate to diverging 
positions in the economic field, with specific advantages and flaws under specific 
circumstances.  
The practice of participation in the WFD in the Netherlands  
Below, we will show how the introduction of participatory institutions during the 
implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands worked on each of three fields and logics of 
practice described above. Our aim is not only to ascertain how successful participatory 
institutions were in changing the logic of practice according to one or more of the goals 
stated above, but also to provide insight into why participants often undervalued the 
legitimacy of these institutions. In Section 4. 4.1 we describe how public participation was 
designed and organised for the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands. We then 
move on to the practices of those who were expected to make use of the newly designed 
institutions as participants: the employees of NGOs and interest organisations with a stake in 
river basin management. We will show what the participatory institutions did in the three 
fields of practice in which these participants were situated. Section 4. 4.2 describes how the 
participants are positioned in the public sphere as representatives of social interests, values 
and groups. Section 4.4.3 shows that participants are situated in a governance network in 
which they engage into the practice of governance. Section 4.4.4 situates the participating 
organisations in an economic sphere. In each of these sections, the field of practice is 
described as an ensemble of spaces, roles, norms and rules with an operational logic of 
practice. The impact of the participatory institutions on the order of the field and the logic 
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of practice is analysed as it occurred during the implementation of the WFD up until the 
publication of the RBMPs 2010.  
The design and organisation of public participation in the WFD 
Although the WFD encourages participation, it does not offer a set of prescribed measures to 
achieve or promote public participation, but only offers a limited set of design choices (Ker 
Rault and Jeffrey 2008). That is to say, there is no blueprint for the implementation of 
public participation. In general, the lack of detailed guidelines is inherent to the nature of 
framework directives, as it is the responsibility of EU member states to implement them. To 
stimulate active involvement, a number of official participatory institutions have been 
created in the Netherlands over the years. In 2004, a new structure for intergovernmental 
cooperation between different levels of government in the Netherlands on water policies was 
introduced, that mirrored the division of the sub-river basins20. It became the primary 
institutional context for the implementation of the WFD, with the similarly newly created 
‘Coordination Office of Dutch River Basins’ (CSN) as its organisational hub. At this point, 
the department of Water Works at the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management (V&W) began to put in place the formal organisation of active involvement in 
the implementation process at the national level. The main participatory institute at the 
national level was a deliberative body of societal groups (Overlegorgaan Water en 
Noordzeeaangelegenheden (OWN)), which was linked to the junior minister of V&W. The 
status of this body was to advise on general issues, based on consensus. The same societal 
groups were also invited to contribute their knowledge in thematic clusters within the 
structure for intergovernmental cooperation. The civil servants at the ministry did not design 
public participation at the regional level, as they had no wish to interfere in what they called 
‘the bottom-up process’ of the WFD and the responsibilities and decisions of the lower tiers 
of government in the country (municipalities, provinces and regional water boards21).  
 Most local and regional governments at the sub-river basin level in the Netherlands began 
implementing the WFD in about 2005. The officials responsible in each of the seven sub-
river basins devised similar structures. The main regional societal groups in a sub-river basin 
participated in the deliberative body of a sounding board that offered advice on general 
managerial issues. One level lower, and slightly later, the water boards all set up their own 
sounding boards, which consisted of societal groups. In 2006 and 2007, the water boards 
also organised so-called ‘regional processes’, to discuss and decide upon the regional goals 
and measures to be reported to the EC in the River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs). In 
total, there were 140 of these regional processes in the Netherlands. In most sub-river basins, 
                                                 
20 In the Netherlands, there are sub-river basins of four international river basins, the Rhine, the Meuse, the 
Scheldt, and the Ems. In total, seven sub-river basins exist in the Netherlands. 
21 Water boards (waterschappen) are sector-specific regional authorities that manage water quality and quantity. 
These authorities have the right to levy tax and have an elected board. 
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the main actors to participate were the municipalities. In some cases, local and regional 
stakeholders were in the same committee as representatives of the lower tiers of government; 
other water boards organised separate sounding boards for societal groups.  
 The three levels at which formal public participation took place showed differences, as 
well as similarities. The differences between national, river basin and regional level bodies are 
mainly in the topics discussed during meetings. At national level, there was scope to discuss a 
general view on the implementation of the WFD. OWN dealt with the overall progress of 
the implementation of the WFD and the associated legislation, general measures (such as the 
appointment of water bodies and the setting of ecological standards), and economic and 
societal costs. In turn, the sounding boards at sub-river basin level dealt with managerial 
issues, decisions, and reports. At the regional level of the water boards and the regional 
processes, participants were mostly involved in the planning of measures. At this level, 
measures for attaining water quality goals were discussed in terms of their feasibility, cost, 
desirability, and efficiency. The style of the design of the participatory processes was similar 
in the three levels of participation, but differed in the issues that were discussed. At all levels, 
the participants were generally ‘the usual suspects’: those societal groups that were mostly 
already taking part in water policy issues. Furthermore, all participatory bodies had an 
‘advisory’ status, which is to say that decision-making power remained in hands of the 
respective water governors, such as the water boards, the provinces, and the junior minister 
of V&W. Advice from the national body (OWN) to the junior minister had to be 
consensual, which meant that all the parties represented in OWN had to agree. The 
sounding boards at the river basin level were mostly consultative. They were primarily 
designed to reflect and comment on management plans, and not so much to develop policy. 
At the regional level, the sounding boards and working groups at the level of the water 
boards and the ‘regional processes’ were strongly involved in the selection of water quality 
measures, although they had no formal decision-making power. The selection of measures 
was sometimes set up as a joint process, in which societal parties together with civil servants 
from the water boards and municipalities would identify a set of measures during a number 
of meetings. At other times, societal parties would work in separate sounding boards. Both 
types of meeting were usually heavily directed by civil servants from the water boards – who 
would be present in considerable numbers – or by independent consultancies, depending on 
the water board in question. Participation at all levels worked on the fields of practice in 
which the participants were situated, as we will now discuss. 
Extending and improving the public sphere? 
Organised public participation requires the establishment and design of new public spaces, 
where new roles (including implicit rules and norms) can be introduced. In the spirit of 
Article 14 of the WFD, a new public sphere would help stakeholders to do their 
representational work: to promote the goals of their constituencies in the implementation of 
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the WFD and the drawing up of RBMPs. This spirit may be interpreted in several ways, 
such as to empower stakeholders and be inclusive, to promote cooperation between 
stakeholders, or to foster public deliberation on water quality and integrated river basin 
management. In the various sounding boards and workshops that formally took place in the 
process of implementing the WFD in the Netherlands according to these interpretations, a 
number of issues came up. In terms of empowerment, decision-making power was kept 
firmly in the hands of the formal authorities in the existing institutional structure: the 
national designers of participatory processes and their organisers were reluctant to give up 
their decision-making power. The organisation of participation led to a greater inclusion of 
societal groups in water policy, but the general public remained all but absent. Accordingly, 
when we conducted our interviews in 2008 and 2009, many respondents stated that in their 
view there was no real active involvement of interested parties (let alone of the public).  
Yes, participation in the WFD is threefold, isn’t it? Informing the public takes place 
and so does consultation. But if you consider active involvement, then I still have to 
say: [Government officials] are not fulfilling that requirement. They do not give 
body to …the active involvement. (R1) 
This representative of an environmental group did not feel empowered to influence decision 
making. Interestingly, not all groups that participated considered this to be a problem: the 
agricultural and business groups in particular stated that they were content with an advisory 
role. In general, they were satisfied with how governmental authorities were handling the 
implementation of the WFD and considered themselves to be monitors of the process, rather 
than active participants. As such, they were comfortable with the position created for them. 
At regional level, greater participation was possible. The joint search for a programme of 
water quality measures that was organised by most water boards gave some power to societal 
organisations initially, albeit informally. Interviewees characterised some of these processes as 
a good way to secure their interests: they made sure that their interests were mentioned in 
management reports, and in some cases even wrote text for inclusion in reports. In addition, 
societal groups (the organisation for water recreation, HISWA, for instance) contributed 
actively and creatively to the selection of measures. However, in most cases the submitted 
texts and creative measures did not make it to the final documents:  
And then what happens? Then in the final documents that issue has been moved to 
the appendix. The whole recreational boating sector is no longer mentioned in the 
main document; it has been completely removed. (R2) 
 There were several reasons why the input of some interest groups did not make it to the 
final documents. In this specific example, it was a result of institutional boundaries between 
ministries. The ministry of V&W, which handled the WFD, was not allowed to make 
judgments about boating, as this was the domain of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
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Food Safety. Other reasons to exclude measures at a higher level were costs and the fear of 
committing to measures vis-à-vis Brussels. This shows that not only participants but also 
officials were sometimes uneasy about the reordering of the field of practice by the 
organisation of participation. Positions were held tight and leadership of decision-making 
processes was not relinquished. In such instances, the lack of formal decision-making power 
led to disappointment among societal groups and eventually reduced their involvement in 
the organised participatory processes. The principles of empowerment and decision making 
based on arguments rather than positions were not shared by all the actors involved and 
meant different things to those who did adhere to these principles. The possibility for the 
principle of empowerment of stakeholders to become part of a logic of practice in the public 
sphere was thwarted by the lack of uptake of the outcomes of participatory processes in 
formal decision making.  
 The principle of cooperation has not been given great attention in the design and 
organisation of the participation in the WFD. Nonetheless, some design choices have led to 
more cooperation. For instance, the fact that OWN could only give consensual advice 
obliged its constituent parties to come to a common understanding. Similarly, the joint 
search for a programme of measures led to a reordering of the field, in so far that societal 
groups needed to deal with each other and work together. In the Netherlands, most societal 
groups are on speaking terms and uphold a certain ethics of ‘professionalism’ (see section 
4.4.3), which means, inter alia, that they are transparent about their interests and the actions 
they take to pursue them. As such, increased cooperation can be explained by the strong 
institutional constraint that the demand of offering advice unanimously poses and the 
already existing principle of professionalism. However, the principle of cooperation that was 
part of the participatory processes did not always transfer successfully to the public sphere. 
For instance, after a programme of measures had been selected in a regional process and had 
to be made official by the water board and the province, the following happened: 
After [the selection of a programme of measures] everyone starts to shout and yell 
and everybody gets mad: nothing should happen in that nature area, LTO22 and the 
farmers who live there say. And subsequently the water board says ‘there is no 
popular support’ and the province says ‘ there is no popular support’ . Well, nothing 
happens then in the end. (R3) 
The quote shows how a logic of practice was successfully changed in the practice of 
participation, but that it disintegrated – so to speak – immediately after the participatory 
process was over, when actors reverted to established principles of representing the interests 
of their constituencies. These principles proved to be more reliable than the principles that a 
participatory process could bring. 
                                                 
22 Dutch Federation for Agriculture and Horticulture (Land en Tuinbouw Organisatie) 
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 The degree of empowerment that participants experienced, their positions in the public 
sphere, and the way in which participants are accustomed to pursue their interests largely 
determined how at ease they felt with the positions offered by the newly designed 
participatory process, and this also influenced how willing they were to be part of such a 
process. Differences between participants can be ascribed to diverging interpretations of the 
spirit of active involvement, and also to how well the spaces and roles that participation 
offers match the field of practice in which participants are situated. Sometimes, participants 
have the same expectations, and sufficient institutional restraints and incentives are put in 
place to reorder a field of practice to such an extent that its logic changes, as was the case 
with increased cooperation. But more often, the goal of extending and improving the public 
sphere through principles of empowerment and deliberation failed, as both governmental 
and societal actors felt more at ease interacting from their established positions. Participatory 
venues could change the field of practice temporarily, but could not be said to successfully 
transform the public sphere. In the entwinement of practice, the practices that constitute a 
public sphere depended not so much on design choices but rather on the pre-existing logic of 
practice. 
Changing the logic of the governance network 
As actors and institutions are constituted only in the entwinement of practice, the very 
existence of stakeholders and representatives indicates that they already ‘do and say’ 
according to a logic of practice. This section illustrates how a logic of action in a governance 
network hindered the workings of the meeting places organised in the WFD. Despite their 
already overwhelming number, the formally designed participatory events were definitely not 
the only meeting places where governments and stakeholders discussed the new EU water 
policies and plans. The governance network in which decisions about the WFD are discussed 
and influenced was not as clearly demarcated to a specific time, place and sector as the 
institutional design of participation assumes. Although it had a certain unity, it was made up 
out of nested and overlapping networks that spread through time and place, and covered 
several policy fields. At regional level, the major, broader field of practice for our interviewees 
was the regional network where civic and governmental policy professionals discuss and 
negotiate planning issues in general; i.e. the entire range of policies regarding water, 
environment, spatial planning, nature, economic development, housing, agriculture, and so 
on. At national level, the network seemed slightly more confined to the separate policy issue 
of water, as water is more closely linked to a single ministry and field of expertise.  
 In the interviews on participatory practices, representatives of societal groups mentioned 
many other places where they tried to exert their influence on the WFD implementation. 
These places differed from the newly designed participatory places in that they were either 
informal, not clearly demarcated or not newly created, or all of the above. To most NGOs, 
some of these informal, blurred, and pre-existing places for participation were more 
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important and more effective to further their goals than those formally designed for it. This 
employee of a regional nature organisation told us: 
We focus specifically on the people who hold the pens, the people who write these 
WFD plans. […] For instance at the water boards, in the end it is they who write the 
River Basin Management Plans and the Programmes of Measures. Well, we 
succeeded to contribute a lot to the Programme of Measures for the WFD. [...] Like 
Natura 2000, the WFD is an enormous circus. [At the formal meetings] half the day 
is spent explaining the directive, because at each meeting there are always new 
people, time and again. So at one point we said: this is a waste of time, were not 
going there anymore. Because we just want to communicate our preferences directly. 
(R3) 
In other words, the spaces for public participation and the roles such participation offered 
did not link up with the logic of practice in governance networks on how to influence 
policies and plans. Likewise, employees of societal groups used and expanded their contacts 
in the municipal councils, the water boards, and other groups, to influence the 
implementation of the WFD. Others worked directly with individual farmers to make 
covenants to carry out specific water quality measures on their own land. That is to say, these 
parties continued to perform the logic of practice that they were accustomed to.  
The same set of key stakeholders and decision makers in a region or in a broad national 
policy field encountered each other and interacted frequently on many occasions, both 
formal and informal. One of our respondents related how people influence the political 
agenda informally and come to define formal policies:  
They meet at a party and tell each other: I have this problem, I am annoyed by that 
issue. And they pull out their diaries, and plan an informal meeting, like: we should 
discuss that issue one day. […] A small group of three, four, five people, key figures, 
meet each other two, three times at a social gathering. And two or three times they 
hear: I’m working on this issue, or I’ve got a problem with that issue too. And then, 
at some point they have the same sense of urgency, and they find a moment. And 
then it takes place not at a party, but in a meeting room. In the corridors [at the 
social gatherings, parties, etc.] they test the water [to find out] what the problems are. 
And when several organisations have a shared problem, then they start with informal 
meetings. […] And then they give it a name, like: we’ll call it a covenant meeting. 
And sooner or later this word shows up in a newsletter, and government gets to know 
about it, and they pull up a chair as well. And that’s how it gets a life of its own. And 
then at some stage it is official. Then it is a policy. (R4) 
Certainly, this description of the policy process is not new. Policies have come into being like 
this for ages. That does not mean that the informal institutions in such networks are 
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universally agreed upon or invariable. For instance, this same respondent said how much she 
welcomed the fact that the relationships in the networks in her region were slowly becoming 
less personal and more professional. In the words of Bourdieu, they were becoming 
‘objectified’ (Bourdieu 1977: 187). With this picture of governance networks in mind, one 
comes to understand the limited efficacy of designing spaces for participation. What can be 
designed is formal meetings, where decisions are made public and official. In many ways, 
however, these decisions have only a limited impact on the logic of practice by which things 
are said and done. 
 The main thrust of instrumental goals of improving decision making, policy efficiency, 
and goal achievement is for participatory institutions to introduce new roles for participants 
to become active in policy formulation and partners in the implementation of measures, 
thereby changing the logic of practice in that field. Accordingly, preventing other 
participatory activities was not an aim of the ministry of V&W either, as it explicitly stated 
that, next to the officially organised meetings at the national level, ‘the NGOs involved were 
free to use other channels available to them to advocate their interests’ (Ovaa and Ottow 
2006: 8). Societal groups did indeed often act as active partners in governance, but according 
our respondents this was not so much the result of participatory institutions. Much more, it 
was an existing practice that was made up of roles, rules, and norms that could not easily be 
practised in participatory processes because of the alternating composition of parties that 
participated in and the largely informative set-up of the meeting. Nonetheless, the spaces for 
participation were conducive to increased and professionalised interaction between societal 
groups themselves and between them and government (national, provincial or local). They 
provided space for interaction and could formalise the input of participants. As such, the 
logic of practice of a governance network does not mainly consist of the rules and norms in 
the books of administrative law, or of the consensus-based roles in the formal participatory 
exercises. Rather, it is couched in a field of practice that has informal rules of engagement in 
the networks of people with relevant positions in administrative, political, public and civil 
organisations.  
The economics of participation 
Goal achievement is a major issue for any stakeholder. If societal groups cannot publicly 
exhibit their activities directly, they should be able to present solid results of what they do to 
their constituencies. This is not only a matter of accountability or representation, but also of 
creating resources by securing funds or time from members or obtaining subsidies. These 
resources need to be spent economically. The great number of participatory processes 
surrounding the implementation of the WFD in the Netherlands did not match well with 
the capacities and resources available to participants. A frequently heard comment was that 
there were simply too many participatory processes. Most societal groups found it took too 
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much time, effort, and knowledge to participate in all the participatory sessions organised. 
One of the respondents described this vividly: 
During the participatory processes a lot of parties dropped out […], also because it 
was all very technical – the information you receive – and it’s all during working 
hours. And there is also no remuneration: you have to pay for it yourself. […] In the 
end it was only us larger parties. […] I asked VNO-NCW23 to join, but they could 
not manage that in terms of staffing either, because there were so many regional 
processes happening simultaneously. (R4)  
 The WFD implementation process totalled over 150 distinct participatory bodies which 
met frequently and put great pressure on societal groups. Most groups were invited to 
participate at every level at which participation took place, and it was not uncommon for one 
individual to attend the national deliberative body as well as multiple sounding boards 
connected to the sub-river basins. Similarly, some of the people who participated in the 
water board meetings and the regional processes also participated in the sounding boards of 
the sub-river basins. These overlaps can mainly be attributed to the fields of practice in 
which participants were situated before participation in the WFD was introduced: many 
societal groups engage with government at national level in order to further their goals and 
simply do not have many employees. Consequently, water policy is usually not the only issue 
that these individuals need to address: 
For those business organisations [to participate in all meetings] is just very difficult, 
because it is just a part of your workload. And, regrettably, a small part at that. There 
are so many different subjects about which you need to know something because 
there is no more capacity within your organisation. (R5)  
 Public participation started relatively late, especially at the lower level of water boards. As 
most participatory meetings at this level focused on programmes of measures, many events 
had to take place in a relatively short time period. The sounding boards of the sub-river 
basins were also pressurised by the high pace of the WFD implementation process. As a 
result, large amounts of information were circulated just days before sounding boards would 
meet, which meant that those who lacked the time or knowledge to process the information 
were unable to participate meaningfully. One respondent (R6) described this pace as 
‘killing’. The complexity of the WFD exacerbated the difficulty for societal groups to 
participate in a meaningful way. According to the national coordinator: 
The inner circle, those who are directly involved in the implementation of the WFD, 
consists of about a hundred people, within the Netherlands. The next circle of people 
already has a lot of trouble following the process. (R7) 
                                                 
23 The Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW). 
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 Indeed, the WFD is so complex in terms of ecological goals, monitoring requirements, 
and administrative demands, that it became very difficult to comprehend for people who are 
not involved with it daily. According to one respondent (R8), not even the governor of the 
water board could keep up, so how could stakeholders, let alone the public? In this sense, 
complexity issues had their effect on the capacity issues of societal groups as well. Although 
most groups have local departments or affiliations, these lower-tier organisations were mostly 
unable to cope with the level of knowledge required. What was more, discussions floundered 
in complex issues that no one could really make clear sense of. The question of whether the 
WFD set ‘obligations of intent’ or ‘obligations of result’ became extremely contentious in the 
Netherlands (see Behagel and Turnhout 2011). It occupied elected officials, civil servants, 
lawyers, and interest groups for years, without ever resulting in common understanding. Fear 
of these ‘obligations of result’ resulted in many policy measures that had been proposed by 
interest groups being left out of programmes of measures. So, complexity not only led to 
unease among participants, but it also negatively reinforced the attempt to establish a new 
logic of practice in participatory processes. Ignoring the measures proposed during 
participation caused frustration, especially in environmental groups, and subsequently 
diminished their involvement.  
 This section shows that public participation in the Netherlands needed to draw on a 
highly skilled and thoroughly organised civil society in order to be meaningful. Such a civil 
society was not equally developed at all levels, and nor could it be, given the confines of the 
economics of representation. This is not surprising if we consider that the societal groups 
were shaped in the entwinement of the positions they already inhabited and the principles 
they were implicitly following. Groups accustomed to lobby at national level, such as VNO-
NCW, could successfully participate in national venues, but did not have enough staff to 
send delegates to the regional meetings with the water boards. Groups more concerned with 
representing values and having a high public profile, such as the environmental groups, were 
present at many levels and thus had to deal with an enormous amount of work and 
complexity. Capacity issues overloaded civil society in general and reduced the impact that 
participatory processes could have had on the logic of practice of participants. As the 
participants realised that it was unlikely they would achieve their goals in the participatory 
institutions of the WFD, they did not wholeheartedly inhabit the spaces and roles that these 
venues offered. 
Conclusion: grasping participatory practices 
Our analysis shows that fields of practice are not level surfaces, but are very uneven terrains 
with a diversity of positions and outlooks that cannot be smoothed out by participatory 
institutions to create a level playing field for all participants. Indeed, the impact of newly 
designed institutions in such terrains is uneven, and often reproduces or skews the existing 
positions and roles in a field of practice. Moreover, the way in which different spaces created 
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by the design of participatory institutions were suitable for participants to pursue their goals 
depended highly on the different practices that participants were entwined in. Additionally, 
some positions created by the reordering of a field of practice were more acceptable to some 
participants than to others.  
 In general, we have seen how the design of participation can fail to take into account the 
existing field of practice in which participants are situated, and that this reduces the impact 
that the organisation of participation can have on the logic of practice that participants are 
engaged in. A failure to empower participants diminished the possibilities for participatory 
institutions to make a real impact on the principles that govern how actors interact in the 
public sphere. Furthermore, the roles offered by participatory institutions did not align well 
with the existing logic of practice of the governance network. Although the spaces created by 
participatory institutions were conducive to higher modes of interaction in the governance 
network, they mostly offered formalisation of interactions in the governance network ex post, 
thereby attracting attention away from the main forms of political action that societal actors 
engaged in (Fischer 2006). Like all formal, public meetings on policy, a public participation 
event is only the final act of an emergent, yet carefully nurtured process of informal decision 
making constituted by a logic of practice that is stronger than the incidental design of official 
places, norms, and rules that are enacted during a limited number of formal participation 
meetings. Another major factor contributing to the impact of the newly introduced 
participatory institutions was the huge strain they put on the resources of participants, 
making it difficult for them to meaningfully engage in the policy process. Consequently, 
many participants shunned the participatory venues and instead continued to influence 
policy making within the logic of practice they were accustomed to. As such, the 
institutional design and organisation of participation seemed to be no more than a semi-
conscious effort to change the ordering of a field of practice and the logic of practice that 
participants follow.  
 The introduction of participatory institutions was convincingly incentivised by article 14 
of the WFD and succeeded in that many occasions for participation were available for 
participants, and societal groups attended these events. But the democratic and governance 
ambitions that are often associated with the introduction of participation were less 
convincingly present in the design of the participatory institutions, and neither did they 
amount to a considerable change in the practices of participants. The various normative and 
instrumental goals proved partly contradictory and can be seen to require trade-offs. For 
instance, being inclusive of a wide range of societal actors was experienced as hindering 
decisive action in governance networks. But the informal lobbying strategies that are 
accepted ways of interacting in a governance network were equally considered to infringe on 
the democratically selected measures in regional processes. Moreover, by placing too much 
strain on the resources of participants, neither democratic nor instrumental goals were likely 
Chapter 7 
144 
to be met. The result of all this was that participants became frustrated and disappointed in 
what participatory institutions had to offer. 
 The disappointment of many societal groups in the participatory institutions of the WFD 
has seriously harmed the legitimacy of the institutions, and possibly even the entire WFD 
implementation process in the Netherlands (Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2010). In academic 
literature, legitimacy is generally conceptualised as consisting of two dimensions: acceptance 
and justification (Bernstein 2011, Behagel and Turnhout 2011). Acceptance as legitimacy 
usually refers to the outcomes of policy making, but can equally be applied to the rules of 
policy making and the institutions that play a role in this process. In this respect, the 
participatory institutions of the WFD in the Netherlands do not score very high in terms of 
legitimacy. We can trace this low level of legitimacy to the mismatch between the spaces and 
roles that these institutions created and the field of practice that participants are situated in. 
Justification as legitimacy depends on the actors’ goals and on whether actors see these as 
worthy of aspiring to. Here, the survey of Ten Heuvelhof et al. (2010) reveals a more mixed 
picture. Actors who were comfortable with the logic of practice in the governance network 
considered participation mostly from an instrumental perspective, and although there were 
some mismatches with their field of practice, did not judge it negatively. Those who sought 
empowerment and transformation of the public sphere were less satisfied, as on the one hand 
the design of the participatory institutions left them wanting in terms of empowerment, and 
on the other hand the limited impact of participatory institutions on the public sphere could 
not realistically bring about a turn towards deliberation. Our focus on practices shows us 
that legitimacy cannot be achieved by design alone. For instance, participation that is more 
specifically tailored for a single purpose, such as strengthening democracy, is likely to erode 
the enthusiasm required for participation, policy making, and improving water quality, as it 
leaves less opportunities to engage in the accustomed and reliable interactions of the 
governance network.  
 Neither the designing of participatory institutions that specifically cater to a certain set of 
norms and goals, such as ‘empowered participatory governance’ (Fung and Wright 2001), 
nor the providing of ‘recipes’ for the public sphere (Fung 2003) is as interesting as 
discovering how an existing logic of practice is already available to build upon. Rather than 
trying to accomplish lofty democratic ideals by a standard recipe, or to pragmatically grasp 
all the potential of governance networks to further the instrumental goals of improving water 
quality, it would be more in line with our understanding of participatory practices to 
approach participation from a more open starting point. Allowing various actors to engage 
with each other in the ways they are accustomed to and building on and incrementally 
transforming established logics of practice promises to be a more productive way of actively 
involving societal groups in policy making. Like all meetings, any new event can be a 
breeding ground for new informal contacts and relations, producing new informal 
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institutions and outcomes, and leading to new ways of doing and saying. As such, the 
democratic and instrumental value of direct, informal contacts between governments and 
civil society, however opaque, conflict-ridden and asymmetrical they may be, should not be 
underestimated. They can help us trace and understand participatory practices and the ways 
in which they are impacted by newly designed participatory institutions. Thus, the notion of 
participation as practice opens up a mode of research that to us seems much more interesting 
and challenging than a generic, criteria-based evaluation of formal participatory institutions 
(as for instance proposed by Chess 1999 or Rowe and Frewer 2000). Those who ascribe all 
the outcomes, successes and failures of public policy making to institutional design and the 
formal spaces and roles of decision making, fundamentally misunderstand the nature of 
policy practices and will be groping at participation, not grasping it. 
Annex 2: List and dates of interviewees cited in this chapter (all 
interviews were in Dutch and have been translated by the authors) 
R1: A spokesperson for Natuur and Milieu (an environmental organisation), 31 June 2008. 
R2: A spokesperson for HISWA (the organisation for the Dutch water sports industry and 
water sports enthusiasts), 17July 2009. 
R3: A spokesperson for Stichting Het Zuid-Hollands Landschap (a provincial landscape 
protection foundation), 8 April 2009. 
R4: A spokesperson for LTO Glaskracht (the platform for greenhouse horticulturists), 17 
April 2009 
R5: A spokesperson for Bouwend Nederland (an association for the construction industry), 9 
April 2009. 
R6: A spokesperson for Stichting Reinwater (a foundation fighting water pollution), 15 April 
2009. 
R7: National coordinator of the WFD in the Netherlands, 2 July 2008. 
R8: A spokesperson for Milieufederatie Zuid-Holland (a provincial environmental 
organisation), 7 April 2009. 
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Abstract 
The rise of public participation in policy is an integral part of the shift from government to 
governance, and is presented as the best and most appropriate answer to requests for 
democratic policymaking. Both in official accounts and in the work of scholars, participation 
is situated in a discourse that combines a deliberative ethics with a managerialist pathos. This 
discourse has two important omissions: the neglect of the role of power in participation, and 
the poor coverage of the activities of participants. To remedy these omissions, this paper 
proposes a practice based approach to the study of participation. Two case studies of 
participants’ practices are presented: one dealing with spatial planning, the other with 
qualitative water policies. The case studies show similarities and differences in practices of 
participation. These are related to the values that participants hold, the roles they adopt, and 
the context in which they are situated. The paper concludes that power relations in 
participation are only fully understood in the light of a complex field of practice that 
stretches beyond formal venues and official accounts of participation. 
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Introduction 
Public participation in policy has been on the rise over the last decades, as an integral part of 
the more general shift from government to governance that has been identified worldwide 
(Pierre 2000, Bevir et al. 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Arts et al. 2006). The discourse 
of public participation – the language used to write and talk about it – combines a 
deliberative ethics with a managerialist pathos (van der Arend 2007). Most scholars in the 
field explicitly or implicitly start from deliberative normative underpinnings and then 
proceed to scrutinise managerial issues, such as: how to design participative institutions 
(Dryzek 1987, Fung 2003), how to manage and organise participatory sessions (Young 
2000, Innes and Booher 2000, Hajer 2005), which participatory policy method fits which 
policy setting best (Chess and Purcell 1999), how to evaluate participatory methods (Rowe 
and Frewer 2004), or how to fit participatory outcomes into formal politics (Warren 2002a). 
Non-academic writing and speaking of participation follows similar lines (Newman 2005).  
 Hence, texts on participation are legible on two levels. On a philosophical level, the 
deliberative ethics are expressed. Here, the texts refer to direct, inclusive, power-free decision 
making as the highest moral standard of democracy. Thus, these texts draw on the moral 
standing of the ideal of democracy to advocate public participation as the most appropriate 
answer to shortages of legitimacy, quality, and efficacy in policymaking. In this reading, the 
discourse on participation may address a general public as well as specific audiences, such as 
social democrats (Bevir 2010a) or environmentalists (Dryzek 1990, Owens 2000). On a 
more practical level – in terms of ‘what is to be done?’ – lies the pathos of these same texts, 
i.e. the emotional charge that incites action. Here, the discourse of participation primarily 
speaks to the passions and competences of managers, consultants, and other officials, by 
expounding how they themselves can enhance democracy by initiating, inviting, organising, 
guiding, and managing citizens and stakeholders to participate.  
 The discourse on participation invokes and reiterates a deliberative ethics by nourishing 
the idea that democracy is improved to the extent that public managers open up 
policymaking to participants, but without really testing its assumptions in practice. 
Deliberative ethics are invoked in the concepts of deliberative democracy, collaborative 
planning, and others, which project a form of power-free public decision making that occurs 
in a framework of broad public discussion, where all participants can freely debate various 
issues in a careful and reasonable fashion (Blaug 1999, Innes and Booher 2000, Vitale 2006). 
The values of deliberative democracy entail authentic dialogue rather than positional 
bargaining; inclusiveness of interests and parties; diversity in stakeholders; and 
interdependence among stakeholders (Innes and Booher 2003). Notwithstanding the notion 
that deliberation implies a distance from the state (Dryzek 1987) and that pleas for 
participation are often couched in a critique of central government trying to steer or ‘make’ 
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society, the discourse on participation holds that some form of steering is possible and 
desirable, through the ‘staging’ (Hajer 2005) or management of participatory processes 
(Forester 1999, Edelenbos 2000). 
 Over the last 20 years, a related and overlapping, but not identical body of academic 
literature has evolved around this issue of managing public participation. It differs from the 
above mentioned discourse on public participation in that the texts merely express the 
managerialist pathos and hardly ever explicitly invoke (or deny) the deliberative ethics of 
participation. Here, a variety of concepts guide the search for and research of methods to 
coordinate, design, and organise participation, such as network management, interactive 
policymaking, and process management (Kickert et al. 1997, Edelenbos and Klijn 2006, De 
Bruijn et al. 2010).  
 With this paper, we aim to address two omissions in the discourse on participation as it is 
sustained in these two related bodies of literature: its neglect of the role of power in 
participation and its poor coverage of the activities of those actually participating (Newman 
2001, van Stokkom 2003, Newman 2005, Barnes et al. 2007)24.By pointing out these 
omissions and contributing to their amendment, we seek to challenge the presumption that 
managers, mediators, and facilitators can create deliberative, equal, transparent, and inclusive 
policy processes through the organisation and management of public participation. As an 
alternative, we propose a practice based approach to the topic of participation, in which 
participation is what participants do. That is, rather than focusing on managerial questions, 
we address questions that relate to participants’ activities and agency: what is it that they do 
on a daily basis?; how do they operate effectively in terms of the goals that they set for 
themselves?; how do they fit organised participatory events in with their daily work?; and 
how do they shape and develop their own roles and procedures? Inevitably, these questions 
open up the largely neglected issue of power in participation, as they presuppose effective, 
conscious agency on the side of participants (and others). Thus, a practice based approach 
also contributes to the rare studies on power in participatory governance that give meticulous 
analyses of the power plays going on in invited sessions for policy participation (Barnes et al. 
2007, van Stokkom 2003). In comparison, practice based research extends its focus beyond 
the formal venues for participation and towards the daily practices of participants. In a recent 
issue of this journal, Jennifer Dodge has made a similar point regarding empirical studies of 
deliberative democracy: the focus on official, organised settings for deliberation ‘overlooks 
important activities of civil society actors in deliberative politics, particularly at the boundary 
between civil society and the state where much of the work of transmission happens’ (Dodge 
2010: 226). 
                                                 
24 Interestingly, also in the field of business administration, this last omission is recognised recently: ‘few 
stakeholder theorists have analysed the motives, identities, ideologies, and tactical choices of stakeholders and 
their consequences for firms’ (De Bakker and Den Hond 2008 :. 9). 
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 In the following, the paper first outlines a practice based approach to participation and 
then goes on to describe two case studies that were carried out following this approach. The 
case studies deal with two policy fields – spatial planning and qualitative water management 
– which are situated in the same regional area and have overlapping time frames. The cases 
show how rules and agency, roles and organisations, values and interests, and formal and 
informal participation interfere. Moreover, they show how these interactions are as much 
based in the daily activities of participants as in the coordination, design, and organisation of 
formal participatory settings. We conclude by discussing how a practice based approach can 
account for the role of power in participation, and provides a more integrative coverage of 
the activities of those actually participating.  
A practice based approach to participation  
To account for the role of power in participation, a number of scholars have taken up a 
critical stance towards their object of study (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Smismans 2008, 
Trenz 2009). Such critical studies usually connect the role of power to the dominance or 
hegemony of the discourses that are employed by actors in the participation process (Hajer 
1993), or to the techniques employed by government that reproduce or steer power relations 
(Rose and Miller 2010). Notwithstanding the added value of these studies to the 
understanding of policy practices in general and the role of power in participatory 
governance in particular, they insufficiently account for the agency of those actually 
participating. In other words, they still assign a central role to governors and managers with 
the task and ability to steer social processes (Colebatch 2009), even though they treat this 
role critically.  
 Partly in response to the above-mentioned deficits in these critical studies, partly as a 
logical extension to it, we propose a different approach to the study of participation. To do 
so, we connect to the so-called practice turn in the social sciences (Schatzki et al. 2001). The 
practice turn builds on the notion that phenomena such as knowledge, meaning, human 
activity, power, social institutions, and historical transformation occur within and are 
components of a field of practices. In the field of policy studies, the practice turn is gaining 
momentum as well, opening up accounts of the everyday activities of policy actors. Such 
accounts counter a managerial rationality that works to transcend the contested arena of 
politics (Wagenaar and Cook 2003) and that builds on a single actor called ‘the government’ 
(Colebatch 2006). A practice based approach takes a variety of aspects into account, 
including discourse, norms, values, roles, conflict, and local contingencies, in their mutual 
interrelationships. Moreover, it understands policies as the collective outcomes of largely 
uncontrolled interactions in networks of actors; actors who all, to various degrees, both exert 
and experience influence and power. Furthermore, while a managerial approach to 
policymaking defines policy problems authoritatively and aims at solutions through 
intervention, a practice approach is more sensitive to how policy problems are constructed 
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socially, and how policy solutions are arrived at through processes of structured interaction 
(Colebatch 2006).  
 The notion of practice itself seems rather hard to define. On a concrete level, practice may 
alternately refer to a way of doing, performance, customs and habits, or rehearsal. On an 
abstract level, the concept of practice serves as an antonym to the mental plane of theory, 
thoughts, and rules25. This illustrates the ambiguity of the concept of practice. Either 
practice is something we engage in experientially, or it is something of which we give a 
second order description, by means of models, discourse, rules, etc. However, practice is 
rarely conceptualised as both simultaneously. Bourdieu (1977) has sought to deal with this 
dilemma by introducing the concept of habitus, which denotes the objective structures that 
are produced and reproduced by historical practice. As such, the structures, rules, norms, and 
habits that second-order models and discourses on practices describe are re-situated in 
historical context. That is to say, second-order descriptions of practices influence (but do not 
determine) historical practice and are reproduced within these practices.  
 In the field of policy studies, this insight has been employed in the concept of situated 
agency (Bevir and Rhodes 2006). This concept has two functions. First, the social structure 
within which actors are situated is accounted for. They are influenced by traditions, beliefs, 
rules, and discourse. As such, actors are to a large extent what social traditions and 
institutions make them. Nevertheless, they exert agency in their decisions and actions. While 
pursuing their goals, actors need to interpret traditions, beliefs, rules, and discourses, and to 
apply them in real time. This necessarily involves improvisation. In addition, they have the 
capacity to accommodate new beliefs in an existing web of beliefs; actors may gradually alter 
and add to the traditions handed to them. These forms of agency are most visible when 
actors are faced with dilemmas or disruptive events, which force them to adopt alternative or 
new discourses and perform actions outside of the conventional boundaries of social context. 
But agency just as well occurs on a daily basis, even when all seems quiet, as people have the 
capacity to adopt beliefs and routines for reasons other than given by the social structure (De 
Certeau 1984, Bevir and Rhodes 2006).  
 These notions shape our understanding of practice as a theoretical concept. A practice, to 
us, is a set of ‘doings’ that are related as such, that is: the set exists in and through the doings 
itself. Doings build on practices, and on the patterns that actors (and analysts) can see in 
them. Thus, practices proliferate through actions, which simultaneously make for their 
interpretation and modification. Such interpretations and modifications may be restrained 
by the effects of particular activities that we call institutionalisation, that is: the translation of 
practical patterns in more durable forms, such as power relations, laws, written texts, 
artefacts, etc. (Scott 2001). A practice based approach, then, is a line of research that zooms 
                                                 
25 As in the unaccredited quote: ‘In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they are not.’ 
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in on doings and their interrelations. Accordingly, a practice of public participation is 
defined as the set of doings by those participating in public policy that extends as far as these 
activities themselves. A study of public participation from a managerial perspective would 
focus on what happens within the venues formally created for citizens (and their 
organisations) to engage with public policy. Alternatively, a practice based approach to 
participation starts from the people engaged with public policy, to study how they perform 
and organise their participatory doings on a daily basis. In the next section, we specify how 
we have set up our practice based studies of participation.  
Methodological choices  
The notion of practice as described above has led us to a number of methodological choices 
in our studies of public participation. These choices both draw on and depart from well-
established approaches to methodology within qualitative research, in particular the step-by-
step approach and the ethnographic approach. A step-by-step approach to qualitative 
research, typically found in methodology textbooks, follows a path that starts with a problem 
definition; develops research questions; sets a strategy for data collection (interviews, surveys, 
document analysis, focus groups, etc.); defines questions for interviews or surveys; collects 
and records data (by transcribing interviews, selecting relevant documents, processing 
surveys, etc.); and ends with a data analysis (usually based on a theoretical or analytical 
framework) and reporting (e.g. Baarda et al. 2005). We believe this approach to be 
unsupportive of our purposes. The one-directional movement from problem definition to 
data analysis privileges second-order problem definitions over practice, much like a 
managerial approach to policymaking privileges design over actual participatory activities 
(Maxwell 2005, p. 2). This problem is recognised by many interpretive policy researchers, 
most of whom stress that a research approach should be iterative or retroductive (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007). 
 Likewise, ethnography provides an answer to this problem, by taking the culture and 
practices of a group of people under study to define the boundaries of investigation, rather 
than a pre-fixed institutional setting or problem definition. A practice based approach to 
participation draws on these ethnographic principles to account for the situational context 
and the daily activities of participants. Ethnography pays attention to the richness and 
complexity of practices and more readily acknowledges the cultural and historical roots of 
practices. However, if ethnography is confined to its main methodological tenet of ‘being 
there’, it can be of little use to our studies of participatory practices. The notion of place in 
‘being there’ refers to the idea that direct observation would be the only truly ethnographic 
method of gathering (or creating) data. In policymaking, however, key arrangements, 
transactions, and choices are typically concocted along the way, and often in informal places. 
Key events in policymaking thus tend to occur out of the researcher’s – and almost 
anybody’s – sight. More importantly, they are not scheduled beforehand. Typically, the 
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significance of policy events – as well as the key actors, the main places and the exact 
definition of the policy problems and their solutions – only becomes evident when looking 
at the process in retrospect. Some key events are planned and public: the formal 
performances of decision making, such as voting in parliament. But mostly, and perhaps 
specifically in the Netherlands, these are merely the concluding movements to the 
uncontrolled, opaque, meandering processes of opinion forming, strategising, and 
compromising that run through multiple organisations. When we want to study public 
participation – i.e. the activities of non-governmental actors in policymaking – this is 
especially so. The organisation and management of public participation may be seen as an 
attempt to fix the locations of the action beforehand – but these attempts often fail. For a 
practice based rather than a managerial perspective, it is vital to look beyond such attempts. 
Consequently, it is just as problematic to take pre-established places (such as invited 
participatory sessions or formal decisions) as a starting point for research as it is to take a pre-
defined problem definition. Hence, the location of policymaking and participation is 
necessarily an open question throughout the policy process as well as the research process.  
 In this light, we used interviewing as our main source of data. In doing so, we bypassed 
the problem of place uncertainty. A number of interviewees were selected on basis of their 
participation in formal places that are connected to the practices we intended to study; 
others have been selected on the basis of relevant documents; and others again have been 
selected on basis of their prominence in the public sphere. In themselves, all of these 
methods of selection are flawed. Taken together, however, they proved a good tool to initiate 
interviewing. Lacking a pre-defined problem definition, we have drawn from open methods 
of interviewing in order to develop questions for interviews as they go (Weiss 1994). This is 
where we most clearly diverge from a step-by-step research design approach. In the 
interviews, we did not highlight a policy or a formal participation process, but started from 
the experiences, activities, concerns, and passions of the person before us, and worked from 
there. We have asked questions that prompted the interviewees to talk in considerable detail 
about their careers, their activities as participants, and their daily activities in the field of 
policymaking. In the conversations, we stimulated our interlocutors to talk about the 
activities and events that meant most to them, and the situations and experiences these 
activities brought them. Likewise, we probed for more detail when interviewees mentioned 
conflicts and disruptive events. Our focus on emotional involvement and personal 
engagement helped to stay close to the day to day judgments and experiences of participants. 
Generalised opinions and second-order descriptions were only invoked as rationalised 
explanations of their actions or practices, and treated as such in the analysis  
Introducing the case studies  
We have applied our methodological choices in two case studies, which we describe in 
further detail below. As practices do not have natural or given limits that make them 
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concrete entities (Bevir and Rhodes 2006), we only loosely coupled our case studies to two 
broad policy fields, rather than limiting them to one or more clearly defined policy projects, 
which would show clear boundaries in space and time. The first case study describes how 
citizens and their organisations have been actively involved in the field of regional spatial 
planning in the southern part of the ‘Randstad’, a highly urbanised area in the west of the 
Netherlands. As part of what we wanted to learn was how participants deal with new, formal 
opportunities for participation, interviewees should at least have some experience with 
formal participatory venues. Therefore, we listed the participatory regional planning projects 
that had taken place in the few years before the case study. About 10 projects qualified. 
Using this list of projects, interviewees were selected along two lines. The first set of 
interviewees was found in the ‘usual suspects’: those non-governmental and interest 
organisations that were present in almost all of the projects. We found eight such 
organisations in the case study region, from each of which we interviewed at least one 
person. Another 10 interviews, with one or two interviewees each, were planned by 
randomly choosing one non-regular participant from each of the listed projects. Thus, we 
interviewed a set of 14 people who participated individually or as a member of a voluntary 
group. Although they were selected from recent projects, the accounts of most interviewees 
from both sets appeared to go back in time much further. Consequently, the case study 
report covers a period of more than a decade of participatory activities of all sorts.  
 The second case study revolves around the activities of participants in the implementation 
of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) in the Netherlands. The WFD, which 
entered in force at the end of 2000, requires EU member states to remodel their qualitative 
water management and policies to the level of river basins. Member states had to deliver their 
first River Basin Management Plans at the end of 2009. Article 14 of the WFD is of specific 
relevance here, as it commits the member states to inform and consult the public, and to 
‘encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in the implementation of this 
Directive, in particular in the production, review and updating of the river basin 
management plans’ (European Commission 2000). This second case study also features 
participants from the southern part of the ‘Randstad’. In addition, it reports on participants 
involved in national WFD policies. The case report describes a period of roughly 10 years. 
Like in the first case study, interviewees were selected on the basis of their experience in 
organised participatory sessions. In the Netherlands, participation in the WFD was mainly 
organised in the form of ‘sounding board groups’. These are deliberative bodies , designed to 
advise the local, regional, and national authorities on the implementation of the Directive 
and the set-up of their share of river basin management plans. These sounding boards mainly 
accommodated usual suspects, and barely hosted any individually participating members. 
We have interviewed about 25 regular participants from regional and national non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), covering most usual suspects, and allowing for ample 
variety in size, orientation, backing, and location.  
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 The interviews from both cases were transcribed. These data were supplemented with 
relevant documents (from written media, policy notes, public reports, pamphlets, and 
advisory reports) on the events, issues, and organisations mentioned by the interviewees. 
Further document search was primarily based on the role and prominence that these 
documents fulfilled for participants’ activities, such as influencing public opinion, setting out 
policy lines, engendering political debate, and legitimising or criticising policy choices. Both 
cases give an overview of a decade of participation. In our descriptions, we have prioritised 
the aspects that highlight how a practice based approach challenges managerialist accounts of 
interactions between state and civil society and re-situates them in practice. The case studies 
bring out a number of characteristics of participatory practices in the policy fields studied. 
Specifically, they show that these practices are created and recreated based on values of 
professionalisation; that roles are adopted with respect to different contexts of organised and 
unorganised participation; that actor networks cut across authoritatively defined policy 
issues; and that value conflicts can lead to mobilisation and instances of agency. In addition, 
the cases bring to the fore how power relations are shaped according to values, discourses, 
and the organisation of participation or the absence thereof.  
Regional planning case  
The first case study covers more than a decade of participants’ activities in the field of 
regional planning in the southern half of the ‘Randstad’, an urbanised region in the west of 
the Netherlands. This region covers the cities of Leiden, The Hague, Delft, Rotterdam, 
Gouda and Dordrecht26.In the two or three years before data collection for the case study, 
authorities in the region had organised about 10 participatory planning projects, for which 
they invited citizens and NGOs to contribute actively in the making of plans. Although 
interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement in one or more of these projects, 
the large majority of them had been mobilised long before, and mostly through other ways 
than by an official invitation to participate. 
  A main mobilising event for many citizens and NGOs in the region had been the 
emergence of the plan to build a high speed railway line (HSR) in the mid-1990s. Therefore, 
the case narrative sets off with the tale of the alliance of citizens and NGOs that almost 
blocked the HSR plan of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management 
(Verkeer and Waterstaat – V&W). The plan projected a new rail track from Amsterdam to 
the Belgian border, crossing the relatively open, rural ‘Green Heart’ area that lies in the 
middle of the Randstad27. The alliance against the plan was united around an alternative plan 
from ‘engineer Bos’, an inhabitant of the municipality of Zoetermeer working at the 
Ministry of Education. In his spare time, he designed a HSR route passing through The 
                                                 
26 This case study is published in Dutch as a chapter of a dissertation on the rise of participatory planning in the 
Netherlands (van der Arend 2007). 
27 Also see Wolfram (2003), Priemus (2007). 
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Hague, which would save the Green Heart. Although many participants supported his plan, 
he never enrolled in one of the organisations or groups in the alliance, and mainly worked 
alone throughout the whole decision-making process.  
 In many respects, the tale of the HSR has set the stage for the remainder of the case study 
period, which covers almost 10 years of participatory activity in numerous events in regional 
planning in the southern Randstad. Most notably, the ways in which people participated in 
the HSR alliance corresponded to a limited set of participatory roles that were upheld and 
developed further in the years following HSR policymaking. Three main roles can be 
distinguished. Besides the role of ‘engineer’ – the technically oriented, solitary operating 
participant epitomised by engineer Bos – participants employed two other roles to organise 
their activities. One role is mainly played by voluntary members of local groups in the 
region. The other is the role of usual suspect, which is performed by the employees of the 
larger non-governmental pressure groups in the region.  
 The usual suspects participated in almost every planning project and attended nearly all 
formal and informal, regular and occasional meetings on related policies and topics. The case 
analysis shows that the events around the HSR plan had a large impact on the participatory 
practices of the usual suspects. On the one hand, the alliance for the alternative HSR track 
had shown them the possibility and power of cooperating with other participants who had 
very different concerns and traditions. On the other hand, the alliance had failed to stop the 
government from building the HSR through the Green Heart. As a response to these 
experiences, the usual suspects started to – what they called – ‘professionalise’ their 
participatory practices. In this professionalisation process, they simultaneously:  
• altered their organisational structures and working procedures;  
• retrained their personnel and hired a new type of employees, strong on 
communication and negotiation skills rather than on specialised knowledge;  
• formed a regional network of usual suspects; and  
• established a novel participatory planning practice that they called 
‘ontwikkelingsplanologie’ (developmental planning, as opposed to the ‘permit based 
planning’ dominant in the Netherlands).  
In Weberian terms, they switched from a value-rational approach to a functional rational 
approach of participation (Boonstra 2006).  
 In functional rational participation, participants identify as stakeholders. They promote 
the interests of their organisation, rather than the shared values of their supporting faction. 
Interests are less personal and more distanced, objective, and quantifiable than values, and 
therefore ready for exchange in a negotiation process. Furthermore, their professional take on 
participation combined this shift to functional rationality with the adoption of deliberative 
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principles. For the usual suspects, professional participation particularly indicated a shift 
from positional bargaining to authentic dialogue. Some of the interviewees even attended 
courses to learn techniques of ‘multilateral dialogue’ and the ‘mutual gains approach’ to 
negotiation. In this way, the usual suspects in the southern Randstad overcame the value 
conflicts that used to impede the interactions among them, e.g. conflicts between economic 
development and ecology. ‘Unprofessional practice’ became shorthand to blame and exclude 
participants who were not willing or able to negotiate their goals. The network of usual 
suspects became very influential in the field of spatial planning in the region. When a broad 
range of NGOs – former opponents even – backed a certain plan collectively, who was going 
to refute it? Within their smoothly running network, the usual suspects of the southern 
Randstad coordinated their activities to the extent that regional planning processes became 
highly predictable for them .  
 Meanwhile, the participating local groups on their part tried to protect and enhance the 
quality of their living environments. Their power to participate mainly hinged on the 
commitment and creativity of their voluntary members, because as locally oriented volunteer 
groups, these participants were unable to pacify and coordinate their activities like the usual 
suspects did. Consequentially, they were trapped in a zero-sum game with rivalling 
community groups in the region, all trying to keep unwanted spatial developments out of 
their own vicinities. Between the groups evolved something that could be called the ‘polder 
competition’: a battle for open, green space between the rural areas surrounding the cities of 
the Randstad. The biggest gains in the polder competition were to be found in political 
support from National Parliament, e.g. when a political majority would label an area as 
protected ‘national landscape’. Therefore, the main strategy of the participatory practices of 
local, voluntary groups was ‘polder branding’: creating a unique and positive image of their 
local environment with the public opinion (cf. Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005). Gains in the 
polder competition were few, and outcomes were highly unpredictable and uncontrollable 
for the participants. Generally, the voluntary groups seemed to lose ground to the influence 
of the network of usual suspects on spatial developments in the region. Still, participation by 
way of the polder competition gave them a bigger chance of success than trying to partake in 
the participatory practices of the usual suspects, because they could not live up to the habits 
and so-called professional standards of the usual suspects.  
 For engineer Bos and other participants operating individually, the field of spatial 
planning in the southern Randstad came to look even less appealing. Their particular 
participatory style leaned on the ideal of rational planning; these ‘engineers’ wished to be 
seen as unbiased, reasonable, logical, and cooperative citizens. Hence, the ideal of interest-
driven stakeholder participation characteristic for the new participatory modes of governance 
did not fit their practices well. With the rise of the polder competition and the network of 
usual suspects, the room left for their mode of citizenship shrunk even further. Occasionally, 
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however, an individual action of a solitary citizen or an outcome of the polder competition – 
which both may bring about a sudden change of opinion in national parliament about a 
certain planning project – would affect the participatory practices of the self-acclaimed 
professional network, breaching their predictability, and outraging the usual suspects.  
 ‘Government’ was not an outsider to these conflicts between diverging participatory 
practices. Mid-level governmental bodies, such as the provinces, bigger cities and the 
regional departments of ministries, were most involved in the network of the usual suspects, 
and they supported the idea of ‘ontwikkelingsplanologie’ at a regional level. Smaller and 
more rural municipalities were more dependent of polder branding strategies, and mostly 
cooperated on a local level with local participants. Thus, the monolithic façade of singular 
‘government’ opened up into a plurality of organisations and positions, participating in the 
field of spatial planning. These organisations had special responsibilities in spatial planning, 
but not the ability to coordinate participatory practices.  
 At the end of the case study period, the various participants who started off as allies 
fighting the HSR plans of the government had turned into rivals employing competing 
participatory practices. Rather than equalising the balance of power between different types 
of participants, the very ideals of public participation and active citizenship became 
instruments in their mutual struggles. Those participants who could claim to be the genuine 
representatives of the citizens, and those who could most effectively exploit the positive, 
democratic aura of participatory sessions, got the better positions in the public sphere.  
Water Framework Directive case  
The second case study deals with participatory practices in policies for water quality, or more 
specifically: with the activities of participants regarding the implementation of the WFD. 
The WFD is an interesting case, as it explicitly requires the member states to publish key 
documents for public consultation and to actively involve the interested parties in the 
implementation process, especially in the production, review, and updating of river basin 
management plans (RBMPs)28 (European Commission 2000). The Dutch authorities have 
followed up on this obligation over the last few years, for instance by organising many 
hundreds of deliberative sessions, mainly for stakeholder organisations. This case study 
examines how participants organised their involvement with the WFD and dealt with the 
vast amount of invitations to participate.  
 In the Netherlands, civic organisations have been involved in water policies long before 
the WFD came into force. Water management even precedes the establishment of the 
modern state. The current 26 regional water boards date back to as early as 1200 in the 
                                                 
28 There are four river basins in the Netherlands, which all cross international borders: the Rhine, the Meuse, 
the Scheldt, and the Ems. By subdividing the Rhine in four, the Dutch authorities demarcated seven sub-river 
basins in total. 
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shape of thousands of local joint initiatives by ‘stakeholders’ with a shared interest in 
protecting themselves from flooding. Also the much more recent introduction of ecology in 
water management must, for a significant part, be credited to citizen involvement. From the 
1960s onwards, several NGOs have been founded, mainly by hydro-biologists and 
environmental scientists, who took up the work they thought governments should do, e.g. 
monitoring and modelling of ecological water quality (van Heezik 2007). Although this 
short description is a gross simplification, it exemplifies that in historical perspective, it is 
almost bizarre to ask government to encourage public involvement in water quality policies. 
In many crucial episodes, public ‘participation’ has been pervasive and constitutive in and 
for Dutch water management.  
 Nevertheless, Article 14 obliges all EU member states to organise public participation. 
Dutch government followed the description in the WFD, and divided public participation 
into information, consultation, and active involvement. It estimated that the tasks of 
information and consultation were already sufficiently provided for in Dutch law and by the 
water boards, which in the Netherlands are decentralised, regional authorities with a 
democratically elected board29. In the first years after adoption, implementing the WFD was 
mainly a task for civil servants of the Ministry of V&W and was considered an 
administrative and technical duty, dictated by a clearly defined timeframe. At the time, most 
citizens and NGOs did not show great interest in the WFD, as most actors felt that the 
Netherlands was already performing well in water management. Ecologists and 
environmentalist trusted the WFD to give the final push towards ambitious ecological water 
management.  
 At the end of 2003, the peaceful bureaucratic activities were dramatically disrupted. 
During a large conference, attended by almost all of the societal and governmental actors 
involved in water policy, a scenario-study entitled ‘Aquarein’ was presented (van der Bolt et 
al. 2003). The study painted a devastating picture for the agricultural sector: a strict 
implementation of the WFD would force 70% of the agricultural land out of production. In 
response, all NGOs called for more participation in the WFD policy process. Moreover, 
agricultural and business interest groups demanded central government to define its 
ambitions for the WFD. A few days after the conference, national parliament backed this 
demand by refusing to transpose the directive into Dutch law until the assistant minister of 
V&W wrote down the Dutch WFD ambitions. Several months later, parliament accepted 
the ‘ambition paper’, which laid out a ‘pragmatic approach’ to the WFD (Verkeer and 
Waterstaat 2004). 
                                                 
29 However, only about half of the official board members are elected by the general public. The 
remaining board members represent land users and land owners, resulting in a large section of 
farmers in most boards. 
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 The ambition paper provided the first official occasion for stakeholders to participate in 
the WFD implementation process. The ministry consulted all main national NGOs in its 
making – the ‘usual suspects’ representing agriculture, nature conservation, business, and 
recreation. Although all interests were heard, in the end the ambition paper catered primarily 
to the wishes of agricultural stakeholders. The national organisation for agri- and 
horticulture (LTO), together with the national employers’ organisation (VNO-NCW), had 
set up a strong and successful lobby to curb the Dutch ambitions. At the time, these 
organisations were frustrated by EU environmental standards on nitrates, air pollution, and 
nature conservation (Behagel and Turnhout 2011). The demands from these groups for ‘low 
ambitions’ were translated in the notion of ‘pragmatic implementation’, which meant costs 
and consequences would be kept ‘as limited as possible’ (Verkeer and Waterstaat 2004). 
 Following the ambition paper, the authorities further stimulated active involvement by a 
number of official opportunities and invitations. The Department of Water Works of the 
Ministry of V&W took the initiative to design the formal organisation of active involvement 
in the implementation process on the national level. It restyled the previously existing 
deliberative body ‘Overlegorgaan Water en Noordzeeaangelegenheden’ (OWN), consisting 
of the ‘usual suspects’ in the field of water policies. The organisation of public participation 
in the sub-river basins and below was the responsibility of the municipalities, provinces, and 
water boards. Each of the seven sub-river basins established so-called sounding boards 
advising to the authorities. Typically, these sounding boards were deliberative bodies like the 
OWN, composed of representatives of the main NGOs within the relevant territories. 
Furthermore, from about 2006 onwards, the regional authorities started to organise so-called 
‘regional processes’, to discuss the regional goals and measures to be included in the RBMPs. 
These plans were drafted at the regional level, by water boards and provinces, to be 
aggregated later by a national task force to the level of the river basins. In most regions, the 
main actors involved in these processes were the municipalities. In some cases, local and 
regional stakeholders were in the same committee as the lower governments. Other water 
boards organised separate sounding boards for groups from civil society. Again, the groups 
participating in these processes were mainly usual suspects, who usually operated on a larger 
spatial scale than the confines of the regional processes. As a result, some individual 
representatives from these groups had to visit a large number of participatory sessions. 
Interest groups operating on a local level, such as groups concerned with the management of 
local fish quota, hardly joined, nor did members from the general public. 
 During the regional processes, a divide within civil society came to the surface. The 
ambition paper on pragmatic implementation seriously affected the dominant discourse on 
the WFD. When measures were discussed, it was usually in terms of whether measures were 
‘feasible and affordable’ (Behagel and Turnhout 2011). This terminology was employed both 
by officials of regional authorities and by agricultural and business groups. Together, they 
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represented a large majority in the regional processes. Consequently, the terminology of 
‘feasible and affordable’ had a rhetorical function: it foreclosed discussion on the desirability 
of specific measures and on the actual costs they would bring. Most of the measures that 
were ultimately selected did not involve considerable costs or the change of land use. The 
people at environmental and nature conservation groups were disappointed and frustrated by 
this lack of ambition, as were some recreational groups and the drinking water companies. 
Also, they believed that participation was excessively focused on interest advocacy and did 
not allow deliberation about ambitions and objectives. They believed that the ‘pragmatic 
implementation’ failed to achieve the WFD’s original purpose: improving water quality.  
 In order to turn the debate around, environmental groups formed a coalition with 
recreational groups and drinking water companies in order to influence public opinion and 
to lobby with members of the national parliament. The coalition was called ‘benefits clean 
water’ (Baten Schoon Water); it tried to create a more positive perception of ‘cleaner water’ 
by focusing on its benefits instead of its costs (SNM 2006). The coalition was short-lived: 
soon after its establishment, recreational groups and the drinking water companies lost 
involvement. Moreover, the majority of parliament remained committed to a ‘pragmatic 
implementation’. Environmental groups also tried to gain more influence by calling for 
alternative ways of participation in the WFD implementation, for instance through the 
institution of a help desk that could help civil society groups with searching for innovative 
measures and best practices, and by having special ‘focus groups’ in which only certain parts 
of civil society would be represented, such as environmental groups or recreational groups. 
The assistant minister of V&W refused to honour these requests. An NGO that had been 
active in the prevention of pollution of fresh water since the 1970s tried a more creative 
approach: it developed an interactive game in which water managers together with civil 
society groups could select measures to include in the RBMPs. The NGO felt that 
environmental groups should give up their historically shaped, antagonistic ways of protest 
and legal action, and should try to become more process-oriented. Although initially the 
game was quite successful, the NGO eventually went bankrupt after funding by the central 
government was cut off.  
 Next to the conflict over ambition, there was a common frustration with the organisation 
of participation that was shared by all groups. In short, it was simply too much. Participation 
was organised at more than three spatial scales, and most groups were invited to every level. 
As a result, it had not been uncommon for one individual to visit the national deliberative 
body as well as multiple sounding boards connected to the sub-river basins. Similarly, some 
of the people that participated in the regional processes and sounding boards also 
participated at the sounding boards of the sub-river basins. Moreover, the time-pressure to 
finish RBMPs by 2009 meant that many regional processes took place simultaneously. For 
the ‘usual suspects’, this was near to undoable. These groups operate on a national level with 
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regional departments and simply do not employ that many people. Moreover, water policy 
usually is not their only issue of concern, they also deal with all other environmental topics. 
The complexity of the discussions added to the problems: the WFD has such a high level of 
technicality with regards to ecological goals, monitoring requirements, and administrative 
demands, that it was incomprehensible for people who were not involved with it on a daily 
basis. In the end, many parties dropped out of the formal participation process and looked 
for alternative ways of participating. These alternative ways of participating were either 
informal, not clearly demarcated, not newly created, or all of the above. One strategy often 
employed was to focus specifically on the people who wrote the RBMPs, such as the civil 
servants at the water boards. Sometimes, NGO employees communicated their preferences 
directly by writing paragraphs to be included in the plans. Likewise, NGO employees used 
and expanded their contacts in the municipal councils, the water boards, and other groups, 
to influence policymaking. Another way of influencing policymaking was to bypass 
government altogether and to forge covenants, for instance between a water board and 
individual farmers who would take water quality measures on their own land. 
 These alternative participatory practices were situated in the broader network in which 
NGO employees discuss and negotiate planning issues in general; i.e. the entire field of 
policies regarding water, environment, spatial planning, nature, economic development, 
housing, agriculture, and so on. Within this network, actors have informal meetings, based 
on problems they shared and communicated with each other. These informal meetings may 
take place at parties, in meeting rooms, at corridors (of official meetings and social 
gatherings), etc. When a shared understanding of a problem is arrived at by several NGOs, 
officials may be invited as well, or it will be communicated through a newsletter. Or several 
civil society groups meet up before a formal participation event to coordinate strategy and 
input. Although these alternative ways of participating are in no way new, they are often 
overlooked in formal accounts of participation. Interestingly, they also take place in the 
‘corridors’ of organised participation: they may result from frustration with organised 
participation, work to influence it, or can even reinforce it. 
 The great divide in this case study was not between civil society and the state or between 
formal and informal ways of participating, but between conflicting values, represented by 
both societal and political parties: the freedom to agricultural and other economic activities 
vs. the conservation of natural water quality and the possibility to recreate in and by the 
water. Both sides believed that the economic and agricultural parties had gained overriding 
dominance during the short, turbulent episode following the publication of the Aquarein 
report, and that the power relations never really changed afterwards.  
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A tale of two policy fields: the dynamics of participatory practices  
Above, we have described the activities of civil participants in two adjacent policy fields, as 
they took place largely in one geographical area and in overlapping time frames. For most of 
the interviewees, even for many that did not get their salaries from it, participating in 
policymaking constituted a major share of their daily lives. In this section, we summarise 
from both cases ‘what participants do’. In doing so, we find several ways in which 
participatory practices have eluded managerial efforts to coordinate and streamline public 
participation in policymaking.  
 As said, in both cases, the participatory practices of citizens and NGOs have often 
developed independent of the formal organisation of public participation by governments. 
Firstly, the involvement of citizens and civil organisations in policymaking – their 
mobilisation – turned out not to originate in the invitations from governments to 
participate. Rather, in order to be invited to some meetings, it seems helpful to be active and 
visible already. Most participants mobilise themselves – often in reaction to government 
plans. 
 Secondly, also the ways in which participants participate on a daily basis – their methods, 
manoeuvres, habits, actions – are not so much steered by the participatory venues that are 
designed and managed officially. Instead, what participants do depends mainly on the direct 
social context of their participatory activities: their goals, resources, organisational customs, 
and shared norms of social interaction. 
 Hence, thirdly, rather than by purposely designed participatory arrangements, 
participatory practices are secured and shaped by existing and emerging institutions that are 
embedded in social interaction. Most clearly, the public sphere in the southern Randstad is 
found to harbour a limited set of roles for participants. These roles can be defined by such 
structural, dichotomous characteristics as: participating solitarily or representing an 
organisation; getting paid or participating voluntarily; and participating at the national or 
the regional level. Intermediate forms – e.g. between a voluntary community group and a 
money-based interest organisation – seem to lack the internal logic to maintain the 
conditions of their perseverance. 
 Fourthly, the cases show that organised participation may collide with participatory 
practices. Notwithstanding the relative independence of participatory roles and practices 
from official design and management, participants are government-oriented and policy 
oriented by trade. Dealing with the practicalities of organised participatory sessions is an 
important part of their daily activities. The spatial planning case, specifically, shows that 
some participatory roles fit better into most official participatory venues than others. The 
water policy case, in turn, illustrates that all participants at times experience difficulties with 
the invitations to participate in formal spaces for participation. Both cases together give a 
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picture of what participants do if official participatory arrangements collide with the 
conditions for their action: they drop out, use their habitual, informal routes to influence 
policymaking, or embark on new participatory practices. 
 Fifthly, the cases show that participatory practices have a dynamics of their own, evolving 
over periods of years. With the possibilities granted by the roles available to them, and in 
their interactions with others, participants themselves gradually shape their practices and 
roles. We saw the dynamics of participatory practice to include several processes of change: 
mobilisation, professionalisation, and the invention of new participatory strategies, such as 
polder branding or direct, informal modes of participation. In the spatial planning case, such 
dynamics have helped to overcome value conflicts between interests and between interest 
organisations, and between authorities and civil society groups. The perseverance of value 
conflicts in the WFD case shows that such processes of change may be restricted to certain 
policy fields. 
 Interestingly, and lastly, the changes in the participatory practices in the field of spatial 
planning have also triggered new a type of conflicts in the southern Randstad: conflicts 
between participants employing diverging participatory practices. Governments got involved 
in these new conflicts as well, as different practices of participation favour different levels of 
government, which fit one authority better than another. Therefore, these new conflicts 
could not easily be pacified by organising participation from the side of governments or 
managers. Furthermore, these conflicts suggest that power relations between government and 
society change in more intricate and more multifaceted ways than most theories of 
(participatory) governance suggest. 
 From these observations, we infer that the introduction of new participatory modes of 
governance is only one factor reshaping the balance of power in the public sphere, a factor 
secondary to processes of change rooted in participatory practices themselves.  
Conclusions  
What the paper exemplifies is that, indeed, practices of participation hardly coincide with 
the official and academic accounts that are mostly given of them. In the cases discussed, 
practices of participation appeared to follow their own dynamics outside formal occasions, 
and these dynamics are only partly defined by the administrative logics of government. 
Participants draw on an evolving repertoire of methods, strategies, and habits. Their practices 
are embedded within their own institutional settings, which do not necessarily coincide with 
the institutional settings that are connected to the formal organisation of participation. 
 The discourse of organised participation trusts deliberative institutions – built on values 
such as authentic dialogue, inclusiveness, and diversity – to warrant a fair distribution of 
power and to empower citizens and stakeholders in policymaking. We found that instead, 
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the agency of citizens to participate effectively in policies is primarily rooted in their roles as 
individual, organised, voluntary, or paid participants. On a deeper institutional level, these 
roles derive their strength and stability from such bourgeois relics as voting rights, the right 
to organise, free press, the right to protest, and the right to comment. So, while organised 
participatory processes are supposed to amend the power relation between government and 
society, participatory practices themselves are critically dependent on the existing institutions 
that set this relation. In other words, organised participatory processes do not and cannot 
stand alone outside the ‘old’ democratic institutional settings, without risking undermining 
participants’ power base. 
 Although it is possible to design institutional settings that reflect deliberative values, the 
actual realisation of these values depends largely on the contingencies of practice. Designers, 
managers, and facilitators of official participatory sessions lack the power to exclude the 
influence of socially embedded participatory practices, roles, institutions, and the dynamics 
therein. Moreover, although formal participation is often organised with normative 
underpinnings in mind, it is prone to follow problem definitions set out by central 
government on the basis of dominant discourses and to revolve around pre-structured policy 
solutions. Under such circumstances, the organisation and management of participation may 
even yield effects that counter or undercut the acclaimed deliberative values. 
 Our findings indicate that the balance of powers between government and society takes 
root in much larger historical and institutional contexts than is recognised when studying the 
short-lived, formal processes of organised participation alone. To account for these contexts 
and the agency that actors exert within them, we have proposed a practice based approach to 
the study of participation. By asking interviewees to give accounts of their daily activities and 
by paying special attention to emotional involvement and instances of conflict and dilemma, 
we have allowed our focus to be shaped by the data we collected in the interviews. In this 
manner, we gained knowledge of what it is that participants do and how this involves power. 
Participants do not just go to official meetings that are organised for them, but also find 
alternative places to take part in policymaking. There, they participate in diverging ways, e.g. 
through interest-oriented or value-based modes, which are based in diverging roles. 
Participants develop these roles over time, thus shaping their own agency in policymaking. 
In the two cases, we saw how the miscellaneous activities of participants may generate 
different types of conflicts and alliances in policymaking processes. Cutting across single 
meetings and policy processes, practices of public participation take on a dynamics of their 
own. 
 Taken together, these observations on what participants do illustrate how steering does 
not only take place at a distance or from a central place, but that it is part of a complex 
interplay of institutions, traditions, rules, discourses, actors, and events: it takes place within 
the field and at the level of practice. The paper shows that, as a consequence, power cannot 
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be excluded from democratic policymaking, nor can it be controlled by designing, 
organising, or coordinating public participation. 
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Abstract 
This concluding chapter reflects on how democratic norms and governance elements are 
entwined in practice. It does so by reflecting on how the case study of the implementation of 
the WFD in the Netherlands answered the research questions. These questions asked how 
democratic norms are articulated and performed in the WFD as an example of a new mode 
of governance and how this affected processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. 
Moreover, it revisits the analytical concepts applied to the case study and reflects on the 
interpretive research approach. The chapter concludes that the introduction of governance 
elements in WFD implementation in the Netherlands led to the articulation and 
performance of democratic norms in various ways. Accordingly, a nuanced image of the 
discourses and practices of democratic governance is painted that describes it as being 
produced in and through three modes of power, where power is constitutive, disciplinary, 
and resistance. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the analytical concepts of articulation, 
logic of practice, rationalities, performativity, and situated agency are useful to highlight how 
the interdependencies between norms and governance elements are part of larger discourses 
and practices. The interpretive research approach used in this thesis has proved its value in 
studying these interdependencies as it conceives of the social as open, multiple, and 
heterogenic. The final section of the chapter concludes by arguing for the study of the politics 
of democratic governance. This entails the examination of the multitude of practices in 
which democratic governance takes place and a renewed understanding of democracy that 
frees it from state-centred notions and re-situates it in the politics of day-to-day decision 
making. 
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‘The will of individuals must make a place for itself in a reality of which governments have 
attempted to reserve a monopoly for themselves, that monopoly which we need to wrest from them 
little by little and day by day.’ (Foucault 1994:475) 
Introduction 
This thesis has set out to investigate the political processes in which democratic norms are 
articulated and how these norms are performed in practice. This investigation was prompted 
by the contradictions that exist between normative and critical accounts of democratic 
governance – in particular, the way in which these two accounts consider the introduction of 
governance and one or more of its key elements (e.g. involvement of non-state actors; 
decentralisation; new mode of steering) as both an affirmation of, and a challenge to, 
democracy. To unravel the basis for these contradictions in different accounts of democratic 
governance, chapter 1 describes three steps in which (1) key governance elements are 
disentangled from the democratic norms articulated upon them; (2) these norms are 
described as not being unequivocal, but as having different meanings within different 
discourses of democracy and therefore as giving rise to debates over what constitutes 
democratic governance; and (3) these debates are understood as contestations over what 
constitutes a legitimate political actor, a legitimate political arena, and legitimate political 
action. This thesis therefore has not approached the study of democratic governance as an 
opportunity to strengthen democratic processes by involving more non-state actors (Warren 
2009), to decentralisemore authority (Ribot et al. 2010), and to move from ‘rowing to 
steering’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992); nor did it approach democratic governance as failing 
to meet norms of participation (Scholte 2002), inclusion (Turnhout et al. 2010), or 
accountability (Papadoupolos and Warin 2007). Rather, this thesis has sought to 
reconceptualise the contradictions that can be found in the paradox of democratic 
governance as contestations over what democratic norms mean in terms of what constitute 
legitimate political actors, arenas, and action. Thus, the paradox of democratic governance is 
lifted out of the realm of the ethical and into the realm of the political. 
 In chapter 1, I have defined the concept of the political as consisting of contestations and 
decision making in and through power. The focus is on contestations when decision making 
takes place in contingent and undecided terrain (Glynos and Howarth 2007). Decision 
making itself is understood to be the particular expression of a structure of power relations 
(Mouffe 2000). Having situated democratic norms in the realm of the political, this thesis 
has therefore set out to gain insight into how democratic norms are contested. Moreover, as 
the role of democratic norms is commonly understood in terms of regulating decision-
making processes, another key focus of this thesis has been to understand how these norms 
both express and structure power relations. The first two research questions serve this 
purpose. The first research question (How are democratic norms articulated in the political 
discourse of the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (WFD)?) focuses on the 
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role of democratic norms in contingent and undecided terrain. Chapter 2 uses the concepts 
of articulation and logic of practice to explain how the field is ‘decided’ by fixing meanings, 
doings, and sayings in specific logics. It furthermore describes how these articulations and 
logics constitute discourse and practice as reality and fix specific democratic norms while 
doing so. The second research question (How are the democratic norms that are articulated 
in political discourse performed in practice?) focuses on the role of democratic norms as they 
express and structure relations of power. Chapter 2 uses the concepts of performativity, 
rationalities, and situated agency to explain how power is exercised or resisted. Thus, it 
shows how reality is constitutive of, and constituted by, the democratic norms that it 
performs. These two research questions are linked to the third research question (How does 
the introduction of governance affect the politicisation and/or depoliticisation of non-state 
actors, lower-level authorities, and new modes of steering), as the question describes the 
processes in which meaning is fixed and unfixed as processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation. The contestations that shape democratic debates are consequently 
understood to emerge in, and to be decided by, the processes of articulation and 
performance.  
 The three research questions have been answered in the empirical chapters of this thesis by 
applying an interpretive research approach. Rather than trying to settle debates about what 
democratic governance should be (e.g. European Commission 2001) or demonstrating how 
actual practices of governance fail to live up to democratic ideals (e.g. Cooke and Kothari 
2001), this thesis has sought to expose contestations and show what type of democratic 
practices are expressed by the articulation and performance of democratic norms. Therefore, 
this concluding chapter uses the findings and conclusions of the empirical chapters to discuss 
how the contradictions that characterise the paradox of democratic governance can be read as 
struggles over the articulation of what is democratic and what constitutes politics. It draws 
on the empirical chapters to reflect on how democratic norms regulate decision-making 
processes, the interactions of actors, and the mechanisms of accountability, but also to reflect 
on how they fail to do so and how these norms themselves are articulated in discourse and 
performed in practice. By giving such an account of democratic governance, this thesis 
develops a normative position of its own. However, this position is not based on ethical 
imperatives of what democratic governance should be or what it is not, but in the critical 
understanding of what it can be and what it is. 
 The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the 
findings and conclusions that engage with the first two research questions. It describes how 
the introduction of governance elements in WFD implementation in the Netherlands led to 
the articulation and performance of democratic norms in various ways that often did not 
align with normative accounts of good governance and showed a greater variation of 
democratic processes than critical accounts of governance would have us believe. The third 
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section engages with the third research question. It shows how processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation took place at multiple sites in WFD implementation in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, it reflects on the implications of these findings for understanding the paradox of 
democratic governance. In particular, it argues that debates that discuss democratic 
governance in dichotomies of representative versus participatory democracy; top-down versus 
bottom-up approaches; and instrumental versus deliberative rationalities perpetuate the 
paradox of democratic governance rather than stimulate a new understanding of it. 
Accordingly, it paints a more nuanced image that describes the discourses and practices of 
democratic governance as being produced in and through power as constitutive, power as 
disciplinary, and power as resistance. Subsequently, the fourth section draws on the 
analytical concepts identified in chapter 2 – articulation, logic of practice, rationalities, 
performativity, and situated agency – to highlight how the interdependencies between norms 
and governance elements are part of larger discourses and practices and should not be studied 
in isolation. This section argues that the understanding of these interdependencies is 
embedded in the openness of the field and exhibits multiple and heterogeneous logics. 
Moreover, the study of the interdependencies between the multiple and heterogeneous 
elements in the field can offer explanations of the expressions of different modes of power 
that most normative and critical accounts so far have failed to offer. The fifth section reflects 
on how the interpretive research approach used in this thesis has shaped the normative 
position of the researcher. In particular, it argues that a critical constructivist perspective 
entails favouring power as resistance and as productive, and it identifies the three overarching 
norms of openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity as useful principles not only for 
democratic governance itself, but also for its analysis. The sixth and final section concludes 
by making an argument for the study of the politics of democratic governance. This entails 
the examination of the multitude of practices in which democratic governance takes place 
and a renewed understanding of democracy that frees it from state-centred notions and re-
situates it in the politics of day-to-day decision making. 
Articulating and performing democratic norms 
Normative accounts of governance – or good governance – hold that by instituting a number 
of governance elements in policy and decision making it is possible to create a more 
democratic type of rule. Such ideas have also been applied to water governance and the 
WFD (e.g. Barraqué 2003, Carter and Howe 2006, Zeitlin 2011). Governance scholars also 
have been critical of the tensions between the norms of democratic governance and those of 
liberal democracy (e.g. Lemos and Oliveira 2004, Lundqvist 2004). The case study on WFD 
implementation in the Netherlands has demonstrated that such perspectives are not limited 
to scholarly debates. For example, environmental groups had clear expectations of a more 
participatory way of dealing with water governance (chapters 7 and 8), whereas national 
authorities were most concerned with being held accountable to the European Commission 
Chapter 9 
174 
(EC) and to the national parliament (chapter 4). Or, in another example, lower-level 
authorities struggled with how to position themselves, whether in horizontal networks of 
peers or within a hierarchical governance structure (chapter 5). Finally, those responsible for 
assessing water quality struggled between adopting new modes of accountability and actively 
resisting them (chapter 6). Accordingly, democratic norms were articulated and performed in 
various ways. Below, I specify the different articulations and performances of the norms of 
participation, inclusion, and accountability as discussed in chapters 4–8 of this thesis. 
 In governance, the norm of participation is linked to the increased role of non-state actors 
in decision making: the first key element of governance. This norm was articulated in 
political discourse as auxiliary to decision making rather than substantive, and it envisioned 
the role of non-state actors as representatives of organised interests rather than as democratic 
actors in their own right (chapter 4). In other words, non-state actors were not supposed to 
make legitimate decisions themselves, but were only there as the representatives of issues, 
knowledge, and interests. The creation of many spaces for public participation did not 
change this discourse, and it continued to pervade participatory processes all the way down 
to processes organised by lower levels of government (chapter 7). Yet, when the norm of 
participation was performed – by creating spaces in which non-state actors could be involved 
and perform their pre-assigned roles –, this performance led to multiple practices of 
participation, not all of which converged with the political discourse articulated at the 
national level. Participants were shown to follow their own logics of practice (chapter 7), and 
practices also developed their own dynamics in accordance with the broad historical and 
institutional contexts in which non-state actors were situated (chapter 8). Moreover, non-
state actors actively sought out numerous ways to participate in decision making that went 
beyond an auxiliary role, such as making covenants and writing sections in formal policy 
documents (chapter 8).  
 The norm of inclusion is linked to the second key aspect of governance: decentralisation. 
The main idea is that decentralisation is able to enhance the responsiveness of decision-
making processes by locating them as close as possible to those who are affected by them; by 
promoting local deliberation that is more effective for finding innovative solutions to 
problems; and by increasing the opportunities for less powerful groups to gain access to 
decision making. Thus, decentralisation is expected to enhance the inclusiveness of policies 
and decisions. However, in the political discourse of the WFD in the Netherlands, inclusion 
was predominantly articulated as following from representation. This meant that water 
boards were considered legitimate authorities, but mainly as representative institutions. This 
has impaired their responsiveness to local actors because political processes of lobbying by 
national non-state actors as well as disciplinary control from the Ministry of Traffic, Public 
Works, and Water Management (V&W) often undid the outcomes of local participatory 
processes (chapter 7). Moreover, deliberative dynamics were limited to cooperation between 
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water boards and often did not apply, for instance, to the selection of measures to improve 
water quality (chapter 5). Even so, as the norm of inclusion was performed by water boards, 
they often expanded their scope of activities beyond mere representation, and for example 
allowed non-state actors to contribute to policy proposals and enhanced their access to 
decision makers (chapter 7). Furthermore, they did not always conform to the hierarchical 
set up of the WFD in the Netherlands and, on the basis of internal deliberations, actively 
resisted demands made by central government (chapter 5).  
 The norm of accountability is linked to new modes of steering: the third key aspect of 
governance. In the governance literature, accountability is associated with a move from 
command-and-control to steering at a distance. The norm of accountability in the political 
discourse of the WFD in the Netherlands was primarily articulated in the negative: the 
Netherlands as a member state actively tried to avoid creating obligations towards the EC 
(chapter 4). Moreover, central authorities have strongly coordinated the reporting of 
measures by placing pressure on water boards to report to them about the measures selected 
(chapter 5). Water quality standards were not strongly embraced as a tool to steer at a 
distance, but were contested and seen as a threat to national interests (chapters 4 and 6). 
However, as the water quality standards were related to performance measurement, they 
exercised disciplinary force nonetheless. The specific indicators and monitoring parameters 
for water quality embodied in the standards steered water managers towards convergence 
with the WFD system. Furthermore, they led to cooperation between water boards, and to 
the updating and refining of the water quality measurement system. This was not done with 
the aim of enhancing accountability per se, but rather was a disciplinary effect of the use of 
standards (chapter 6). Consequently, the performance of accountability resulted in a mixed 
picture. New modes of accountability by means of performance measurement with regard to 
the water quality objectives were resisted both by central authorities and by lower-level 
authorities, but nonetheless still had considerable effect in terms of disciplinary force 
(chapter 6). They also gave substance for debate and scrutiny by civil society and therefore 
did establish a form of participatory accountability. However, this type of accountability was 
put in practice not only to further the achievement of objectives, but also to actively hinder 
them and, consequently, further the political discourse on the WFD in the Netherlands 
(chapters 4 and 6). 
 Thus, the findings of the thesis demonstrate that the articulation of democratic norms 
during WFD implementation in the Netherlands did not align with accounts of good 
governance. Rather, democratic norms were primarily articulated within the discourse of 
liberal democracy. Consequently, participation was articulated as formal rather than 
substantive; inclusion was articulated as the representation of interests rather than 
deliberation; and accountability was articulated as hierarchical rather than horizontal. In 
light of the political discourse that accompanied WFD implementation in the Netherlands, 
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it is clear that the introduction of the governance elements of the WFD did not 
unequivocally result in a shift towards democratic governance. However, the performance of 
democratic norms showed a more diverse image. Even though the political discourse of the 
WFD was not contested as a whole, in some local instances, democratic norms were 
performed in ways that came close to the meanings associated with accounts of good 
governance. That is not say that the introduction of key elements of governance will 
inevitably lead to democratic outcomes, but it is to say that such democratic outcomes are 
possible if these elements of governance are performed in specific ways. Consequently, 
elucidating how democratic norms are articulated and performed showed how normative 
accounts of good governance do not necessarily reflect practice. It also showed how key 
elements of governance are nonetheless able to perform the democratic norms of governance. 
These performances cannot be based on these elements alone, as they are situated in 
discourse and based in local and historical contexts in which actors exert agency. Moreover, 
these performances involved more or less deliberate acts of power. Rather than referring to 
‘mere’ ideas, democratic norms – in their performance – identify political actors, delineate 
political arenas, and prescribe modes of interaction. The performance of democratic norms 
in the WFD therefore revealed contestations over who participates, where decisions are 
made, and by what accountability mechanisms. In other words, the performance of these 
norms led to processes of politicisation and depoliticisation. 
Dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation 
New modes of governance in the EU are assumed to involve close cooperation between state 
and non-state actors in the formulation and implementation of EU policy by means of the 
abolition of top-down, command-and-control approaches to decision making in favour of 
bottom-up, deliberative modes of decision making (Holzinger et al. 2006). These ideas also 
apply to the WFD, for instance when it is described as a direct deliberative polyarchy by 
scholars in experimentalist governance (Zeitlin 2011). As chapter 1 has described, these ideas 
require the politicisation of civil society (Calhoun 1993, Fung and Wright 2001), the 
bureaucracy (Christiansen 1997, Peters 2010), and the steering mechanisms of the state 
(Bevir 2010a). Thus, the new mode of governance that the WFD introduces is believed to 
affirm democracy by politicising previously depoliticised spheres. However, state politics can 
halt these processes of politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2006). This was also the case for 
the WFD: WFD implementation in the Netherlands did not lead to an affirmation of 
democracy, but involved the depoliticisation of various spheres. The state, in the person of 
the junior minister of V&W, actively halted processes of politicisation by emphasising an 
instrumental approach to WFD implementation that undercut deliberative processes 
(chapters 4, 7, and 8). Moreover, even though non-state actors were involved in WFD 
implementation on a national level (chapter 4), this also led to the depoliticisation of 
organised public participation in terms of the disempowerment of environmental groups and 
 Conclusion 
177 
a lack of opportunities for disagreement by non-state actors in these formal processes 
(chapter 7). The politicisation of the WFD on a national level furthermore resulted in a top-
down approach to policymaking by means of strong coordinative efforts on a national scale 
(chapter 5). More generally, the managerialist uptake of the WFD with a strong focus on 
meeting deadlines and fulfilling requirements did not allow for much debate or 
contestations. Even though water quality objectives could be set by water boards, which 
allowed them a degree of freedom, the disciplinary effect of the water quality standards 
resulted in the restriction of that freedom (chapter 6). The same was true for public 
participation processes, which were heavily managed and primarily designed to inform and 
consult, rather than to allow for debate (chapter 7). 
 The empirical chapters have therefore shown that the employment of the same key 
elements of governance that proponents of new modes of governance view as instruments of 
politicisation brought about processes of depoliticisation. That is to say, the participation of 
non-states actors resulted in the empowerment of undemocratic powerful elites (Cooke and 
Kothari 2001), decentralisation led to the extension of the state over lower levels of 
government (Rose and Miller 2010), and new modes of steering reinforced technocracy by 
depoliticising environmental issues (Robertson 2004). Nonetheless, processes of 
politicisation also took place, as different norms were performed in a multitude of practices. 
These performances led to processes of resistance and contestation by water boards, non-state 
actors, and ecological experts. These processes of resistance were dispersed over all the 
elements of the WFD and took place at different times and in different places. For example, 
politicisation occurred when actors followed bureaucratic or deliberative rationalities 
(chapter 5). Similar processes of resistance and contestation were observed in the 
performative aspects of water quality standards, particularly the way in which they acted as 
sites for political action (chapter 6). They were also shown in the practices of public 
participation, where non-state actors drew on existing logics of practice to resist or 
circumvent the limited roles they had been given in formal participatory processes (chapters 
7 and 8). 
 The dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation documented in this thesis make clear 
that that WFD implementation in the Netherlands did not follow the ideal images that are 
often assumed in accounts of participatory, bottom-up, or deliberative governance. For 
instance, the politicisation of the public sphere took place only at the national level and 
according to a specific political mode of interaction; this resulted in the depoliticisation of 
formal participatory processes (chapter 4). Similarly, bottom-up processes did take place, but 
did not result in the politicisation of local authorities and the ‘uploading’ of policy to higher 
levels because of the water boards’ concerns over accountability (chapter 5). Finally, 
deliberation between state and non-state actors did take place, but did not result in the 
politicisation of decision making because it did not take the form of an open public debate. 
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Instead, decision making took place backstage as the water boards cooperated to create water 
quality standards (chapter 6), or as civil society actors negotiated informally to place an issue 
on the political agenda (chapter 7). Thus, this thesis demonstrates that processes of 
depoliticisation and politicisation are not only about empowering certain spheres or modes 
of governance and politicising them by stimulating the possibility for contestations over 
issues, but also about who participates, where decisions take place, and how decisions are 
made. This reveals a conception of power that is more dispersed and heterogeneous than is 
suggested by the dichotomies of representative vs. participatory democracy; top-down vs. 
bottom-up approaches; and instrumental vs. deliberative rationalities. 
Constitutive power, disciplinary power, and resistance 
The case study on the WFD implementation in the Netherlands elucidated how different 
domains of society and modes of decision making are politicised and depoliticised in patterns 
that are not either/or, as most democratic debates present them, but diversified and subject 
to change depending on the specifics of the context in terms of the time, place, and actors 
involved, and the discourse that is articulated. In other words, governance elements are not 
introduced into a smooth terrain where the realm of politics spreads out towards civil 
society, market, and lower governments, but into a terrain that is uneven and shaped by the 
power relations that are already present in society. The introduction of governance elements 
and the democratic norms associated with them do regulate these power relations to a certain 
extent, but they are themselves subject to power as well. Consequently, in contrast to what 
scholars in network governance suggest (Sørensen and Torfing 2005), there are no ‘meta-
norms’ that can be drawn upon to regulate and structure the ways in which democratic 
norms are articulated and performed. Instead, power is at work in the constitution of reality; 
in the disciplining of social and natural subjects into certain rationalities, behaviours, and 
shapes; and in resistance to these rationalities, behaviours, and shapes by doing things 
otherwise. 
 Chapter 4 has shown how the articulation of a political discourse included the articulation 
of democratic norms. The articulation of the political discourse of the WFD in the 
Netherlands converged around two distinct social demands, a competitive agriculture and 
fewer European obstacles to economic development. These social demands were anchored in 
positions of power, specifically in two powerful interest groups – LTO and VNO-NCW – 
that could influence parliament and elected officials. As the influence of these two interest 
groups demonstrates, social demands played a pivotal role in the constitution of a new 
discourse and hence a new political reality. Reality was therefore shown to be constituted not 
only in the explicit articulation of discourse, but also in the more implicit logics and 
rationalities rooted in larger historical and institutional contexts than is often recognised in 
governance discourses (chapters 5, 7, and 8). Power is therefore constitutive of reality: 
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discourses are produced and reproduced in ‘a particular set of practices and [give meaning] to 
physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995:44). 
 As power constitutes reality, it also transforms it. This involves a second mode of power 
that can be distinguished from constitutive power because it disciplines single or 
disconnected elements in the field (Arts and Tatenhove 2006, Dean 1999, Foucault 1994). 
The case study has shown that democratic norms do not escape such disciplinary power. 
Because rationalities, logics, or systems of knowledge structure a field, they also structure the 
roles of actors, the places where decisions are made, and the modes of interaction that take 
place. This affects how democratic norms perform as they are given meaning in these 
practices. As chapters 5 and 6 show, the actors that took part in the WFD governance 
process were subject to disciplinary power. By devising a specific way of framing water policy 
– including definitions of water quality, preferred ways of measuring water quality, and goals 
to be achieved – and by creating specific ways of acting and intervening – by setting 
monitoring and reporting requirements –, the WFD contributed to processes of 
depoliticisation. It limited possibilities for contestations by non-state actors (chapter 4), 
disempowered regional participatory processes (chapter 7), and hindered horizontal modes of 
peer and participatory accountability (chapter 6). Even though strategies were devised to 
undercut some of their disciplinary effects, the standards, the knowledge system, and the 
reporting requirements set out by the WFD were rarely questioned. In this depoliticised 
setting, environmental groups and local non-state actors were marginalised, participatory 
processes remained limited to finding ways to meet the monitoring requirements, 
accountability structures continued to be hierarchical, and water quality goals were primarily 
used to inform reports and management plans. 
 Disciplinary power can also be resisted. Resistance – as a third mode of power – implies 
that reality is not always ‘rational’ in that it follows multiple rationalities and logics, not just 
one. Thus, ‘complete success in any attempt to forge a particular kind of subjectivity is 
impossible’ (Digeser 1992:985). Chapters 5 and 6 show how the disciplinary force of the 
rationality of the WFD was also resisted. Interestingly, unlike most accounts of 
governmentality that draw on a singular hegemonic rationality to explain the operation of 
power (e.g. Rose and Miller 2010), chapter 5 shows how multiple rationalities were 
employed to effectively counter the rationality of the WFD. Bureaucratic rationalities were 
effectively employed by the water boards to resist the WFD’s reporting requirements, 
instrumental rationalities were employed to resist the WFD’s environmental ambitions by 
situating WFD implementation in an economic field of costs and benefits, and deliberative 
rationalities were used to resist the predominantly technical framing of water and to 
emphasise its societal meaning. Thus, the multiple rationalities encountered in the WFD 
governance process show how power is ‘heterogonous, diverse, and shows resistance within 
and over time’ (Bevir 2010b:453). By drawing on multiple rationalities (chapter 5), 
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governance actors were able to position themselves as political actors, create political arenas 
outside of formal processes, and follow their own modes of accountability. They therefore 
performed democratic norms in a way that was different from the meaning these norms were 
given in the political discourse of the WFD. They did so not only by consciously drawing on 
alternative rationalities, but also by employing the implicit and often semi- or unconscious 
logics of practice and acting in ways to which they were accustomed (chapter 7). 
Revisiting the analytical concepts 
The different modes of power connected to the articulation and performance of democratic 
norms show how the interdependencies between norms and governance elements are part of 
a wider field in which reality is constituted. They do so by highlighting the rationalities or 
logics according to which this field is structured,30 how this structuration affects elements 
within the field, and how the field rejects total structuration. In this thesis, five analytical 
concepts have been identified to explain how these processes entail the establishment and 
breaking of relations between discursive and non-discursive elements. By doing so, these 
concepts highlight how norms, governance elements, and their interdependencies are not 
isolated from, but embedded in, larger discourses and practices. 
 By applying a specific approach of discourse as the articulation of demands, chapter 4 has 
paid specific attention to the fundamental openness of the field and the important role of 
social demands as elements of articulation. Moreover, it has shown that different logics of 
engagement lead either to political action or to a lack thereof. On the basis of this analysis, 
the following two conclusions can be drawn: (1) the place, demands, and logics that lead to 
the articulation of a discourse have clear implications for the democratic norms articulated; 
and (2) although politicisation does lead to an opening up of opportunities for contestation 
or deliberation, it does so in specific ways that are limited to specific actors, time periods, 
places, and dynamics. In political discourse, the politicisation of one domain therefore tends 
to imply the depoliticisation of another, as possibilities for the democratic norms of 
representation and interest representation are articulated at the expense of the norms of 
participation and deliberation.  
 Chapter 5 applied the concept of rationalities, which Rose and Miller (2010:273) define 
as ‘the changing discursive fields within which the exercise of power is conceptualised.’ 
Rather than describing how the field is articulated, the analytical concept of rationalities 
draws attention to the multiple fields in which power is exercised and how power is entwined 
with the rationalities and methods that are present in a field. Thus, rationalities provide the 
logic of action for decision making. By analysing the multiple rationalities at play in WFD 
                                                 
30 A rationality and a logic refer to the same type of structuration of the field. The difference between the two is 
that the first is explicit and the result of conscious articulation, whereas the second is implicit and conceived of 
as also shaped by the doings, sayings, and things in the field. 
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implementation in the Netherlands, the chapter has shown that actors were situated in 
different fields that led to the disciplining of subjects and depoliticisation, but that actors 
also resisted such discipline and took political action. In other words, by conceiving of actors 
as being situated in multiple fields simultaneously, the concept of rationalities also pays 
attention to how these actors situate themselves in different relations of power. The concept 
of multiple rationalities therefore shows how actors can resist specific articulations of 
democratic norms by drawing on the different ways in which the interdependencies between 
the elements in the field are established. Thus, the openness of the field, or put differently, 
the situatedness of actors in multiple fields and relations of power, empowered actors to do 
things otherwise. This leads to the insight that identities are not articulated in single 
discourses, but in many discourses at the same time, and that this multiplicity can be used as 
a source of resistance.  
 Chapter 6 detailed the performativity of standards as a technique of governance. On the 
one hand, it has shown how such techniques can strongly discipline a field of practice, 
through processes of convergence, but always fail to do so completely. As not all elements of 
water quality were articulated in the methods to set and monitor quality standards (nor 
could they ever be), the disciplinary force of these standards was partial. This force was 
countered by processes of resistance: waters defied being shaped in accordance with the 
standards, and standards acted as sites for political action. In other words, the concept of 
performativity showed how attempts to articulate specific relations between standards, the 
activities of ecological experts, and waters were decided by relations of power in the social 
field, but also how unexpected results allowed experts to resist such articulations. This 
implies that a neoliberal technique does not necessarily lead to neoliberal results, or, in other 
words, a logic that is introduced in practice will not by definition alter the logic of that 
practice. 
 The analytical concept of logic of practice was central in chapter 7. It described how the 
non-state actors that took part in participatory processes were situated in multiple fields of 
practice with established logics that guided their day-to-day actions. The chapter paid 
specific attention to the fact that both the organisers of these processes and the participants 
could not be fully detached from the roles or positions that they held outside such processes. 
Thus, for democratic norms to be successfully articulated upon such practices, the roles and 
places that they prescribed in such participatory processes needed to be linked to pre-existing 
logics of practice. The chapter also showed that actors have different positions in different 
fields of practice and that, in one field, they may be able to adopt a more powerful position 
than in another field. Analysing the logics of practice at play therefore showed how practices 
are to a large extent constituted by relations that are not always discursively explicit but 
nonetheless able to structure a field to the extent that they limit the possibilities for creating 
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new relations, articulating democratic norms, or the successful introduction of governance 
elements. 
 Chapter 8 discussed participatory processes in terms of situated agency and found that 
what actors do depends not so much on these participatory venues or on democratic norms, 
but rather on their goals, the resources available to them, and their shared norms of 
interaction. The concept of situated agency therefore shows how the structuration of fields 
cannot be easily changed by introducing a new mode of governance and that actors are 
firmly embedded in the positions and logics that are part of the field. Participants drew on a 
repertoire of methods, strategies, and habits to exercise power and to engage into 
contestations outside of formal governance architectures. Consequently, they defied the 
attempt to create new relations – for example the kinds of new interactions between state 
and non-state actors envisioned by the organisers – and continued to engage with 
policymakers in established ways and forms. The concept of situated agency thus explains 
how the balance of power between government and society is rooted in wider historical and 
institutional contexts than is often recognised in governance discourses.  
 The five analytical concepts applied in the various empirical chapters flesh out the 
interdependencies between discursive and non-discursive elements. They show how the 
interdependencies between democratic norms and governance elements are embedded in 
broader discourses and practices. These broader discourses and practices can be drawn upon 
by agents and even natural systems to resist being disciplined into specific behaviours or 
shapes. Consequently, the analytical concepts highlight the openness of the field. Moreover, 
the application of the analytical concepts elucidates the fact that alternative relations 
between, for instance, democratic norms, social demands, or established ways of doing and 
acting can be stronger than the interdependencies between democratic norms and 
governance elements. These processes therefore explain how democratic norms are 
articulated within relations of power and how they perform in multiple and heterogeneous 
ways in practice. Recognising the multiplicity and heterogeneity of practice is crucial to 
understanding the openness and contingency of the social (Bevir 2010b). Doing so opens up 
possibilities for the analysis of agency, and, perhaps more importantly for a critical approach, 
the study of processes of resistance. 
The politics of interpretive research 
The interpretive approach used in this thesis informed the methodological choices made, but 
also has broader implications. By choosing an interpretive research approach, processes of 
resistance were actively brought to the fore. In addition, the data were specifically collected 
to substantiate the analytical concepts, to show processes of politicisation and 
depoliticisation, and to show how these were subject to power struggles. Furthermore, 
approaching the social as constructed opens up debate on how it can be constructed 
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otherwise. Moreover, considering the social as material undercuts many normative 
arguments or established notions on how the social should be ordered and shifts attention to 
how it can be ordered.  
 By adopting a single case study approach, this study aimed to analyse the processes of 
democratic governance by favouring meanings as ways to grasp actions and by considering 
meanings to be contextual (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, Bevir 2010b).Consequently, the 
research focus was primarily directed at making sense of processes in the context of the case 
study, rather than seeking comparisons with other cases. In a single case study, meaning is 
therefore viewed as a relational activity. That is to say, processes were understood by 
reference to other processes in the case study that had preceded these or took place at another 
level. For example, as chapters 4 and 8 document, the way in which regional processes of 
participation were organised was related not only to a general tendency towards 
managerialism, but also to the political discourse articulated at the national level. Viewing 
such processes as at least partially constructed within the limits of a case study that only 
spanned a few years and was situated in the Netherlands allowed me as a researcher to 
explain these processes in terms of the different relations of power that were at play. It 
therefore informed a critical stance towards concrete instances of power. Moreover, it 
allowed me to show how processes of resistance were a response to attempts to discipline 
behaviour by means of discourses or governance techniques. While describing actors and 
institutions, the research focus converged on the relations of power, on the social interactions 
in which these actors and institutions were engaged, and on the struggles and contestations 
that these involved. Finally, this focus on processes of ‘meaning in action’ (Bevir 2004) 
created an image of democracy as being constructed in these social processes. 
 Interviewing to collect and organise the data helped me to engage with the field of practice 
and the relations of power that constitute reality. Specifically, the way in which these 
interviews were conducted by probing the interviewee to give accounts of his or her daily 
practices focused attention on the activities in which they engaged, how they made sense of 
their activities, and what norms they invoked or did not invoke to justify their activities. In 
addition, asking how actors dealt with conflicts and contested ideas about the WFD and its 
requirements prompted actors to justify their views and activities by drawing on democratic 
norms, rationalities, or logics of practice. The way I conducted my interviews and the central 
role that I awarded the accounts of interviewees in the assessment of the relevance of other 
types of data were therefore methodological choices that not only educed relations of power, 
but also provoked interviewees to actively reflect on these themselves. Considering the fabric 
of the social as material also served a critical purpose. As different meanings are ascribed to 
the word, these meanings inform action. Interviewing a wide range of actors at different 
levels and domains and taking part in meetings with these actors to discuss the processes of 
WFD implementation led to an understanding of politics as taking place in multiple sites. 
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The research design therefore followed the theoretical premise that there is no preferred site 
where politics take place, and indeed led to the uncovering of many processes of contestation 
and the exercise of power in domains where these are not usually studied. It showed how 
power is heterogeneous and dispersed, as each of these actors influenced the WFD 
governance processes in his or her own way.  
 Finally, I analysed the data thus collected in an iterative fashion with a specific focus on 
logics and related these back to the governance actors in the WFD, as well as to the 
theoretical concepts. This opened up questions about the ways in which the researcher both 
shapes and is shaped by the actors and practices that he or she encounters (Yanow 2007). 
The social is constructed by ideas that people do not simply hold individually, but that 
circulate in a social sphere that includes academia (van der Arend 2007). Policymakers 
interact with the academic world by engaging with researchers, as happened during my case 
study; they use ideas from established notions of how the social is ordered; and they solicit 
advice, evaluations, and reports from academic institutions. This leads to the construction of 
societal discourses of deliberative democracy or new governance, for example. Asking for 
feedback from governance actors on the findings of my research strengthened this process: in 
the double hermeneutic of social science research, human actors interpret their own actions 
just as the researcher interprets the interpretations of these actors (Kincheloe and Mclaren 
2011). Although an academic account such as this thesis is never completely similar to the 
accounts that interviewees give themselves, taking the materiality of the social seriously 
means that the academic account the researcher gives of a process should still be recognisable 
to the actors involved. 
 The research approach that I have chosen is therefore ultimately political, as it has led me 
to engage in contestations over what democratic governance is and can be. These 
contestations where informed by the preference that I gave to principles of openness, 
multiplicity, and heterogeneity. This led me to resist creating unified accounts of the 
governance processes that I have studied, and has exposed tensions between normative and 
critical accounts of democratic governance and its performance in practice. The research 
approach therefore involves an ethical critique (Glynos and Howarth 2007). This critique 
builds on viewing the social as fundamentally open and exhibiting multiplicity and 
heterogeneity (Lincoln and Canella 2004). As democracy is about how the social is ordered, 
this also leads me to assume a normative position on democratic governance. As the 
researcher both shapes and is shaped by the subject of his or her study, the principles of 
openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity not only inform an interpretive research approach, 
but also shape the articulation of what democratic governance means.  
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The politics of democratic governance 
The normative position that I assumed in this thesis consisted of viewing the social as open, 
multiple, and heterogeneous. These are characteristics that I ascribed to the social, but they 
also resonate with the democratic norms of participation, inclusion, and accountability 
outlined in chapter 1. A focus on the openness of the social gives meaning to why 
participation is a democratic good. As circumstances or people change, the participation of 
individuals and groups is required to define issues, set agendas, and look for solutions. 
Viewing multiplicity as an important feature of the social resonates with the democratic 
norm of inclusion. As different actors want different things, it is important to hear all voices. 
Heterogeneity can be related to accountability: it draws attention to the need to maintain 
linkages between different types of actors, such as experts, market groups, bureaucrats, and 
elected officials, amongst others. However, openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity are 
different from the democratic norms described in chapter 1: they do not favour a preferred 
actor, place, or dynamic of politics, but rather favour politics itself for its own sake. 
 Both an interpretive research approach and a theoretical framework that combines 
discourse and practice stress the openness of the social. I believe this is an important aspect 
that is lacking in most accounts of governance that describe governance as a system (e.g. 
Schout and Jordan 2005), an architecture (e.g. Sabel and Zeitlin 2008), or as a restricted set 
of governance principles (e.g. Héritier 2001). What this thesis contributes is explicit 
attention not only to how political systems and democratic norms change on large scales, but 
also to how they change continuously as they are performed over and over again. Their 
fixation in political discourse is always contingent, and they never completely succeed in 
articulating or structuring the open and uneven terrain of the social. Viewing the social as 
open leads to the realisation that democratic norms are always ‘at work’: at work to change 
logics, to reorder fields, and to be performed. The fact that the ideals that they represent can 
never be achieved in reality should not be a reason for their dismissal but a stimulus for 
critique – not a critique that dismisses some norms and ideals and replaces them with others, 
but a different kind of critique that criticises monolithic and pervasive forms of power and 
opposes them with accounts of openness, multiplicity, and heterogeneity. Although many 
scholars and political actors employ democratic norms to criticise what they believe is the 
illegitimate exercise of power, they mostly do so by opposing it with an alternative, 
universalised view of the social. However, as this thesis argues, the openness of the social 
implies that there is no definite mode of governance that is democratic: there are only more 
and less democratic performances of governance. 
 How can we move past the paradox of democratic governance? I believe it involves 
directing attention away from the actors, places, and dynamics by which decisions are made 
and towards the processes in which the social is articulated and performed. This involves 
viewing contestations and the exercise of power not as negative, as things to be resolved and 
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removed, but as expressions of the multiplicity and heterogeneity that is made possible by 
the openness of the social. Consequently, debates that take the shape of oppositions between 
two extremes, e.g. between representative and participatory forms of democracy, between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance, or between instrumental and 
deliberative rationalities of decision making, do not do justice to the varied fields and 
multiple logics where, and according to which, governance takes place in practice. Although 
such concepts are good departure points for discussing how relations of power take shape, 
they also involve the danger of giving overly simplistic accounts of what is actually 
happening. Less participation is not necessarily bad, bureaucracy is not necessarily 
undemocratic, and instrumental decision making does not necessarily hinder deliberation. 
However, a lack of openness to change will depoliticise participation, uniformity will deepen 
power inequalities, and homogeneity will reduce the possibilities for accountability. 
Democratic governance should therefore be about the multiplication of political action and 
the recognition that these actions are not necessarily restricted to types of actors, places, or 
dynamics, but rather the result of actors exhibiting – situated – agency in the field of practice 
in which they find themselves.  
 Being critical of democratic governance is ultimately not about showing how it fails to live 
up to democratic norms or about showing how certain domains of society are being 
depoliticised, although this certainly is part of it. Rather, it is about elucidating how power 
can be resisted by foregrounding the agency that results from the fields in which actors are 
situated while employing the logics they have at hand. To be clear, this does not mean that 
all domains of society should be politicised in order for governance to be democratic. Rather 
than expanding the domain of politics, as the shift from government to governance seems to 
imply, it is about transforming the image of politics from the monolithic image of the 
sovereign state to a multitude of interlinked political practices. Consequently, in order for 
democratic governance to become reality, we are in need of a renewed understanding of 
democracy that frees it from statist and elitist images and re-situates it in the politics of day-
to-day decision making. 
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Summary – The politics of democratic governance 
Governance, understood as a new form of steering, is frequently promoted as a democratic 
good. This also applies to the European Union (EU), which views the introduction of new 
modes of governance as a strategy to deal with a democratic deficit. At the same time, the 
key elements of governance – the increased involvement of non-state actors, decentralised 
decision making, and new modes of steering by the central state – have all been criticised for 
their possible negative effects on democratic legitimacy. These two perspectives on 
democratic governance present a paradox in which governance is presented as both an 
affirmation of, and a challenge to, democracy. This paradox of democratic governance can be 
disentangled in three steps. First, the democratic norms of governance – participation, 
inclusion, and accountability – are only loosely linked to the three key governance elements. 
These norms are also part of liberal democracy discourses, in which they are articulated in 
different spheres and modes of decision making. The paradox is further disentangled in a 
second step that holds that governance elements and democratic norms are part of normative 
debates about democratic governance that can be identified as involving three dichotomies: 
representative versus participatory democracy, top-down versus bottom-up approaches to 
governance, and instrumental versus deliberative rationality. These dichotomies show that 
the contradictions in the paradox of democratic governance are actually part of debates over 
what constitutes good governance. Third, normative debates about democracy involve not 
only normative ideals about what is more democratic, but also contestations over what 
constitute legitimate political actors, arenas, and modes of interaction. Consequently, the 
articulation and performance of democratic norms entail processes where different spheres of 
society are politicised or depoliticised. These three steps lift the paradox out of the realm of 
ethics and places it into the realm of politics, making the study of democratic norms and 
governance elements possible in terms of contestations and the exercise of power. 
 This thesis focuses on the implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
in the Netherlands. This directive is described in scholarly and policy debates about good 
governance in the EU as ‘a new mode of governance’ or as ‘experimentalist governance’ and 
is believed to stimulate participatory, bottom-up, and deliberative policymaking. The 
question is, however, how exactly the key governance elements of the WFD are put into 
practice and how their associated norms are articulated. This thesis seeks to gain a new 
understanding of democratic governance – one that goes beyond the contradictions and 
dichotomies that characterise current governance debates – by studying the political 
processes in which democratic norms are articulated in the policy implementation discourse 
and how these norms are performed in practice. To this purpose, three central research 
questions are answered in this thesis: (1) how are democratic norms articulated in the 
political discourse of the implementation of the WFD?; (2) how are these democratic norms 
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performed in practice?; and (3) how does the introduction of governance affect the 
politicisation and/or depoliticisation of non-state actors, lower-level authorities, and new 
modes of steering?  
 To answer the research questions, the thesis employs a critical constructivist perspective to 
guide the theoretical framework, which builds on the concepts of discourse and practice. 
Thus, the thesis conceives of the social as contingent and open and considers social relations 
to be constituted in and through relations of power. This perspective is apposite for the 
purpose of this thesis as it is able to critique monolithic and pervasive forms of power. The 
thesis uses five analytical concepts to address the research questions: (1) the articulation of 
social demands; (2) logic of practice; (3) political rationalities; (4) performativity; and (5) 
situated agency. Taken together, these concepts enable a comprehensive overview of WFD 
implementation in the Netherlands, paying particular attention to the multiple practices in 
which the WFD’s key governance elements are put into practice, the discourses in which 
they are embedded and which they reproduce, the different ways in which democratic norms 
are articulated and performed, and the dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation that 
could be observed. 
 The thesis employs an interpretive research approach in order to study the paradox of 
democratic governance in terms of the interdependencies between democratic norms and key 
governance elements. The interpretive research approach aligns well with the theoretical 
framework as it privileges meanings as ways to grasp actions and considers these meanings to 
be contextual. Moreover, an interpretive perspective stresses openness, multiplicity, and 
heterogeneity, much like the theoretical concepts of discourse and practice. It is therefore 
specifically suited to answer the research questions as it actively pays attention to how the 
meanings of democratic norms are articulated in context and how democratic norms are 
performed in the entwinement of meaning and action. Moreover, as an interpretive 
approach operates on the assumption that meanings and actions are never fully fixed, it 
educes processes of contestation and power by situating actors in different fields of meaning 
and by showing how these actors always have the agency to contest political norms. WFD 
implementation in the Netherlands serves as a single case study for this thesis. Data were 
collected by interviewing and supplemented with documents and a number of meetings with 
WFD governance actors. The qualitative analysis of the data took place in iterative phases 
and applied the five analytical concepts. This resulted in five empirical chapters (chapters 4 
to 8 of the thesis).  
 Chapter 4 describes how democratic legitimacy was constructed in the political discourse 
of WFD implementation in the Netherlands through an articulation of representative norms 
that led to a depoliticisation of civil society. It uses the analytical concept of articulation to 
show how political struggles over the meaning of democratic norms were ultimately decided 
by firmly established power structures and led to the marginalisation of environmental 
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demands in water governance. It also shows how the politicisation of WFD implementation 
was actively limited to the level of the state and parliament and how this involved the 
depoliticisation of key elements of governance. It concludes with the observation that initial 
hopes about the WFD instituting participatory and deliberative norms were ultimately 
dashed, because representative politics affirmed themselves over attempts of EU law-making 
to institute a new form of governance. Using the analytical concept of rationalities, chapter 5 
describes how processes of disciplining and resistance were shaped in every WFD governance 
element. It creates a nuanced image of how processes of politicisation and depoliticisation 
took place at multiple scales and sites. The chapter describes how these processes are not 
linked to a single actor, such as the state, or to a single rationality, for instance deliberation, 
but that multiple rationalities operate in each of the key elements of governance. It concludes 
that democratic norms are differently performed in practice every time, depending on the 
positions and relations in which governance actors find themselves. Chapter 6 shows that EU 
law-making can have both depoliticising and politicising effects. It focuses on the role of 
standards as a neoliberal tools for accountability. It describes how the WFD water quality 
standards can operate both as a disciplinary force, for example by imposing a set of ecological 
values that are not necessarily shared by the Dutch actors, and as sites of resistance. The 
chapter applies the analytical concept of performativity to address these two dimensions of 
standards. The chapter concludes that the WFD water quality standards have performed in 
ways that do not follow the norms of accountability as described in the governance literature, 
but rather build on mechanisms of accountability associated with the liberal democratic 
state. Chapter 7 shows how non-state actors’ existing logics of practice were not convincingly 
changed by the introduction of participatory institutions in the WFD. It shows how the 
performance of democratic norms, such as empowerment and deliberation, can be both 
strengthened and resisted by the logics of practice that are characteristic of the field in which 
non-state actors are situated. As the participatory design failed to take into account the 
existing fields of practice, its impact on participants’ logic of practice was low. The chapter 
concludes that, although the spaces created by participatory institutions were conducive to 
higher modes of interaction in the WFD governance network, it to a large extent also 
depoliticised the public sphere. Chapter 8 describes how the organisation of public 
participation builds on a deliberative ethos and a managerial pathos that omits the role of 
power in participatory processes and the goals that non-state actors pursue. By applying the 
concept of situated agency, the chapter counters ideas that hold that the top-down 
organisation of participation is either desirable or possible. It shows how the neglect of the 
role of power in participation and of participants’ goals favoured instrumental and 
managerial approaches to democratic governance. However, it also shows how participants 
have drawn on a repertoire of methods, strategies, and habits to exercise power and engage in 
contestations outside formal governance architectures. The chapter concludes that the 
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balance of power between government and society is rooted in wider historical and 
institutional contexts than is often recognised in governance discourses.  
 The findings of this thesis demonstrate that the articulation of democratic norms during 
WFD implementation in the Netherlands did not align with accounts of good governance. 
Rather, democratic norms were primarily articulated within the discourse of liberal 
democracy. Consequently, participation was articulated as formal rather than substantive; 
inclusion was articulated as the representation of interests rather than deliberation; and 
accountability was articulated as hierarchical rather than horizontal. However, the 
performance of democratic norms showed a more diverse image. Even though the political 
discourse of the WFD was not contested as a whole, in some local instances, democratic 
norms were performed in ways that came close to the meanings associated with accounts of 
good governance. Consequently, elucidating how democratic norms are articulated and 
performed showed how normative accounts of good governance do not necessarily reflect 
practice. It also showed how key elements of governance are nonetheless able to perform the 
democratic norms of governance. Moreover, these performances involved more or less 
deliberate acts of power: the performance of democratic norms in the WFD showed 
contestations over who participates, where decisions are made, and by what accountability 
mechanisms. In other words, the performance of these norms corresponded to processes of 
politicisation and depoliticisation. Thus, the dynamics of politicisation and depoliticisation 
documented in this thesis make clear that WFD implementation in the Netherlands did not 
follow the ideal images that are often assumed in accounts of participatory, bottom-up, or 
deliberative governance.  
 The five analytical concepts applied in the various empirical chapters show how the 
interdependencies between democratic norms and governance elements are embedded in 
broader discourses and practices. These broader discourses and practices can be drawn upon 
by agents and even natural systems to resist being disciplined into specific behaviours or 
shapes. Thus, the analytical concepts highlight the openness of the field and demonstrate 
how democratic norms are performed in multiple and heterogeneous ways. This conclusion 
resonates with the critical constructivist perspective and interpretive approach used in this 
thesis. Recognising the multiplicity and heterogeneity of practice is crucial to understanding 
the openness and contingency of the social and opens up possibilities for the analysis of 
agency, and, perhaps more importantly, the study of processes of resistance. An interpretive 
research approach to democratic governance is therefore ultimately political because it leads 
the researcher to engage in contestations over what democratic governance is and can be. 
These contestations are informed by prioritising an understanding of the social as open, 
multiple, and heterogeneous.  
 Finally, as democracy is about how the social is ordered, the principles of openness, 
multiplicity, and heterogeneity shape the way this thesis defines democratic governance. 
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Being critical of democratic governance is ultimately not about showing how it fails to live 
up to democratic norms or about showing how certain domains of society are being 
depoliticised, although this certainly is part of it. Rather, it is about elucidating how power 
can be resisted by foregrounding the agency that results from the fields in which actors are 
situated while employing the logics they have at hand. To be clear, this does not mean that 
all domains of society should be politicised in order for governance to be democratic. Rather 
than expanding the domain of politics, as the shift from government to governance seems to 
imply, it is about transforming the image of politics from the monolithic image of the 
sovereign state to a multitude of interlinked political practices. Consequently, for democratic 
governance to become reality, we are in need of a renewed understanding of democracy that 
frees it from statist and elitist images and re-situates it in the politics of day-to-day decision 
making. 
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Samenvatting – De politieke processen van governance 
De term ‘governance’ wordt met regelmaat aangehaald als een vorm van democratische 
sturing. Zo ook door de Europese Unie, welke de introductie van nieuwe vormen van 
governance beschouwt als een manier waarmee met het democratisch tekort van de EU kan 
worden omgegaan. Niettemin worden centrale elementen van governance – te weten een 
hogere betrokkenheid van maatschappelijke actoren, decentralisatie van besluitvorming en 
nieuwe sturingsfilosofieën voor centrale overheden – ook bekritiseerd voor de negatieve 
invloed die zij kunnen hebben op democratische legitimiteit. Deze verschillende 
perspectieven op democratische governance leiden tot een paradox: tegelijkertijd bevordert 
én ondergraaft governance democratie. Deze paradox van democratische governance wordt 
in deze these ontward in drie stappen. Ten eerste zijn de democratische normen van 
governance – te weten participatie, integratie en verantwoording – niet onlosmakelijk 
verbonden aan de drie centrale elementen van governance. Deze normen zijn namelijk ook 
onderdeel van discoursen over representatieve democratie waarbinnen ze aan andere dan 
governance elementen van besluitvorming verbonden zijn. De paradox wordt ontward in een 
tweede stap door democratische governance te situeren binnen normatieve debatten die 
uitgaan van drie tegenstellingen: representatief versus participatief, ‘top-down’ versus 
‘bottom-up’ en instrumentele versus deliberatieve rationaliteit. Deze drie tegenstellingen zijn 
te vinden binnen normatieve debatten over governance en laten zien dat de paradox van 
democratische governance zijn oorsprong vind in een breder debat over wat nu eigenlijk 
‘good governance’ is. Als derde stap wordt opgemerkt dat dit debat niet alleen betrekking 
heeft op idealen over wat nu democratisch bestuur is, maar ook conflicten in zich bergt met 
betrekking tot de politieke legitimiteit van verschillende actoren, plaatsen, en 
sturingsfilosofieën. 
 Deze these richt zich op de implementatie van de Europese Kaderrichtlijn Water (KRW) 
in Nederland. De KRW wordt in academische en in beleidsdebatten over good governance 
binnen de EU regelmatig beschreven als een ‘new mode of governance’ of als ‘experimentalist 
governance’. Binnen die debatten bestaat het geloof dat de KRW participatieve, bottom-up 
en deliberatieve beleidsvorming stimuleert. Deze debatten beantwoorden evenwel niet de 
vraag hoe de KRW en de governance-elementen waaruit zij bestaat uitwerking heeft in de 
praktijk en hoe in die praktijk de democratische normen die aan deze elementen worden 
verbonden gearticuleerd worden binnen een specifiek discours. Deze these richt zich daarom 
op een nieuw begrip van democratische governance; een begrip dat de strijdigheden en 
tegenstellingen binnen huidige debatten over governance overstijgt. Dat begrip wordt tot 
stand gebracht door bestudering van de politieke processen waarin democratische normen 
worden gearticuleerd en van de performativiteit van deze normen. Als zodanig beantwoordt 
deze these drie centrale onderzoeksvragen: (1) hoe worden democratische normen 
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gearticuleerd in het discours van de implementatie van de KRW?; (2) hoe zijn deze 
democratische normen performatief?; en (3) hoe leidt de introductie van governance tot de 
politisering en/of depolitisering van maatschappelijke actoren, lagere overheden, en nieuwe 
sturingsfilosofieën?  
 De bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoordt met behulp van een kritisch-
constructivistisch perspectief dat wordt geoperationaliseerd in een theoretisch raamwerk dat 
bouwt op de concepten van discours en praktijk. Dit betekent onder meer dat de these de 
sociale werkelijkheid als open en contingent beschouwt en sociale relaties primair begrijpt als 
machtsrelaties. De keuze voor dit perspectief is toegespitst op de centrale vraagstelling van 
deze these in zover het een kritiek op monolithische en alomtegenwoordige vormen van 
macht mogelijk maakt. De these past vijf analytische concepten toe om de onderzoeksvragen 
te beantwoorden: (1) articulatie van sociale vragen/eisen; (2) handelingslogica; (3) politieke 
rationaliteiten; (4) performativiteit; en (5) gesitueerde keuzevrijheid. Doordat deze 
concepten complementair aan elkaar zijn maken ze een uitvoerig overzicht van de 
implementatie van de KRW in Nederland mogelijk. Ze besteden aandacht aan hoe de 
governance-elementen van de KRW leiden tot verschillende praktijken; hoe die elementen 
zijn ingebed in discoursen en hoe ze die discoursen reproduceren; hoe democratische normen 
op verschillende wijzen gearticuleerd kunnen worden en performatief zijn; en de dynamische 
processen waarin politisering en depolitisering plaatsvinden. 
 De these past een interpretatieve onderzoeksbenadering toe in haar doelstelling de paradox 
van democratische governance te bestuderen. Deze paradox wordt vervolgens begrepen als 
voortvloeiend uit de afhankelijkheden tussen democratische normen en centrale governance 
elementen. De onderzoeksbenadering sluit daarmee aan bij het theoretische raamwerk voor 
zover het betekenissen een centrale rol geeft in het begrijpen van handelingen en het deze 
betekenissen plaatst in een bredere context. Bovendien benadrukt een interpretatieve 
onderzoeksbenadering openheid, veelheid, en verscheidenheid, evenals de concepten van 
discours en praktijk dat doen. Omdat het actief aandacht besteedt aan hoe de betekenis die 
gegeven wordt aan democratische normen het gevolg is van articulaties binnen een 
discursieve context en aan de performativiteit van democratische normen zoals die tot 
uitdrukking komen in de eenheid van betekenis en handeling, is het een zeer geschikte 
benadering om de onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. Doordat een interpretatieve 
benadering er bovendien van uitgaat dat betekenissen en handelingen nooit volledig 
vaststaan, brengt het ook processen van strijd en macht onder de aandacht in de zin dat 
verschillende actoren zich in verschillende betekenisvelden begeven en deze actoren altijd de 
keuzevrijheid hebben om politieke normen aan te vechten. De implementatie van de KRW 
in Nederland is gekozen als case-study. De data waren verzameld door middel van interviews 
en aangevuld met relevante documenten en bijeenkomsten met actoren die onderdeel waren 
(en zijn) van het KRW implementatieproces. De kwalitatieve analyse van de data heeft 
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plaatsgevonden in een iteratief proces waarin de vijf hierboven beschreven analytische 
concepten zijn toegepast. Deze analyse heeft uiteindelijk geleid tot vijf empirische 
hoofdstukken (hoofdstuk 4 t/m 8 van deze these).  
 Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft hoe in het politiek discours van de implementatie van de KRW in 
Nederland democratische legitimiteit werd geconstrueerd door middel van normen die 
geassocieerd worden met representatieve democratie en hoe dat de depolitisering van het 
maatschappelijk middenveld tot gevolg had. Het past het analytische concept van articulatie 
toe om te laten zien hoe een politieke strijd met betrekking tot de betekenisgeving van 
democratische normen uiteindelijke beslist werd binnen gevestigde machtsstructuren en hoe 
dit leidde tot de marginalisatie van milieubelangen in waterbeleid. Het laat bovendien zien 
hoe de politisering van de implementatie van de KRW actief beperkt werd tot de domeinen 
van de staat en het parlement en hoe dit de depolitisering van centrale governance-elementen 
tot gevolg had. Het hoofdstuk besluit met de observatie dat de initiële hoop dat de KRW een 
meer participatieve en deliberatieve vorm van bestuur met zich mee zou brengen uiteindelijk 
terneer werd geslagen doordat representatieve vormen van politiek bedrijven sterker waren 
dan pogingen om via EU-regelgeving een nieuwe vorm van governance te institutionaliseren. 
Hoofdstuk 5 past het concept van rationaliteiten toe om te beschrijven hoe processen van 
disciplinering en verzet gestalte kregen in ieder governance-element van de KRW. Het 
schetst een genuanceerd beeld door te laten zien hoe processen van politisering en 
depolitisering zich afspelen op verschillende schalen en domeinen. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft 
hoe dit soort processen niet beperkt blijven tot een enkele actor – bijvoorbeeld de centrale 
overheid – of tot een enkele rationaliteit – bijvoorbeeld deliberatie –, maar meerdere 
rationaliteiten tot uiting worden gebracht binnen ieder governance-element. Het hoofdstuk 
besluit met de observatie dat democratische normen op steeds nieuwe manieren performatief 
zijn, wat afhangt van de posities en relaties waarin actoren zich bevinden en welke ze 
aangaan. Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat EU-regelgeving zowel politiserende als depolitiserende 
effecten kan hebben. Het richt zich op de rol van standaarden als neoliberale 
verantwoordingstechnieken. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe waterkwaliteitsstandaarden zowel 
disciplinerend kunnen werken als verzet kunnen oproepen. Om deze twee dimensies van 
standaarden te kunnen benadrukken wordt het analytische concept van performativiteit 
toegepast. Het hoofdstuk concludeert dat de waterkwaliteitsstandaarden van de KRW 
performatief waren op manieren die niet de normen van verantwoording volgenden zoals de 
governance literatuur beschrijft, maar veelmeer de hiërarchische mechanismen van politieke 
verantwoordelijkheid die geassocieerd worden met de representatieve democratie. Hoofdstuk 
7 laat zien hoe de introductie van instituties voor participatie in de KRW bestaande 
handelingslogica van maatschappelijke actoren niet overtuigend veranderde. Het beschrijft 
ook hoe de performativiteit van de democratische normen zoals empowerment en deliberatie 
zowel versterkt kan worden als worden tegengegaan door de logica die kenmerkend zijn voor 
de prakijken in welke maatschappelijke actoren zich bevinden. Omdat de organisatie van 
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participatie deze bestaande praktijken niet voldoende in ogenschouw nam was de impact van 
participatie op de handelingslogica van participanten laag. Het hoofdstuk besluit dat, 
ondanks het feit dat de vele overlegmogelijkheden die gecreëerd waren door middel van 
participatieve instituties hebben geleid tot meer interactie binnen het KRW governance 
netwerk, participatieve instituties hebben bijgedragen aan een depolitisering vande publieke 
sfeer. Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft tot slot hoe de organisatie van publieke participatie zich baseert 
op een deliberatief ethos en een managerial pathos dat voorbijgaat aan de rol van macht 
binnen participatieve processen en de doelen die maatschappelijke actoren nastreven. Het 
hoofdstuk ontkracht het beeld dat het top-down organiseren van participatie gewenst of 
mogelijk zou zijn met behulp van het concept van gesitueerde keuzevrijheid. Het laat zien 
hoe de veronachtzaming van de rol van macht in participatie en de doelen die participanten 
nastreven leidt tot een voorkeur tot instrumentele en managerial benaderingen van 
democratische governance. Evenwel brengt het hoofdstuk ook onder de aandacht dat 
participanten zich beroepen op een breder repertoire van methoden, strategieën en gebruiken 
door middel waarvan zij macht uitoefenen en besluiten aanvechten buiten de formele kaders 
die voor hen binnen governance-architecturen geschetst worden. Het hoofdstuk besluit dan 
ook dat de machtsbalans tussen overheid en maatschappij geworteld is in bredere historische 
en institutionele contexten dan vaak wordt aangenomen in discoursen over governance. 
 De resultaten van deze these tonen aan dat de articulaties van democratische normen 
tijdens de implementatie van de KRW in Nederland niet overeenstemden met 
beschrijvingen van good governance. Integendeel, democratische normen werden 
voornamelijk gearticuleerd binnen een discours van representatieve democratie. Als gevolg 
hiervan werd de norm van participatie gearticuleerd als een formele verplichting in plaats van 
als een substantiële bijdrage aan beleid; de norm van integratie werd gearticuleerd als 
vertegenwoordiging van belangen in plaats van deliberatie; en de norm van verantwoording 
werd gearticuleerd as hiërarchisch in plaats van horizontaal. De performativiteit van 
democratische normen laat echter een gevarieerder beeld zien. Hoewel het politieke discours 
van de KRW gedurende de onderzoekperiode stabiel bleef, werden in lokale gevallen 
democratische normen toch uitgevoerd op wijzen die dicht in de buurt komen van 
beschrijvingen van good governance. Hoewel de studie naar de articulatie en performativiteit 
van democratische normen dus laat zien dat normatieve beschrijvingen van good governance 
niet noodzakelijk de werkelijkheid beschrijven, laat diezelfde studie ook zien hoe centrale 
elementen van governance niettemin de democratische normen die geassocieerd zijn met 
governance ten uitvoering kunnen brengen in specifieke gevallen. Deze uitvoering, of de 
performativiteit, van democratische normen vindt bovendien plaats als een meer of minder 
bewuste uiting van macht: het gaat over wie deelneemt, waar besluiten genomen worden, en 
hoe verantwoording wordt afgelegd. Met ander woorden, de performativiteit van deze 
normen komt overeen met processen van politisering en depolitisering. Als zodanig brengen 
de dynamieken van politisering en depolitisering zoals gedocumenteerd in deze these ten 
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ogenschouw dat de implementatie van de KRW in Nederland niet de ideaaltypen volgde die 
beschrijvingen van participatieve, bottom-up en deliberatieve governance zo vaak vergezellen. 
 De vijf analytische concepten zoals toegepast in de verschillende empirische hoofdstukken 
laten zien hoe de wederzijdse afhankelijkheden tussen democratische normen en elementen 
van governance zijn ingebed in bredere discoursen en praktijken. Actoren – en zelfs 
ecosystemen - kunnen putten uit deze discoursen en praktijken om verzet te bieden tegen 
disciplinering. De analytische concepten benadrukken daarmee de openheid van de 
werkelijkheid en de performativiteit van democratische normen als veelvoudig en heterogeen. 
Deze conclusie sluit aan bij het kritisch-constructivistische perspectief en de interpretatieve 
onderzoeksbenadering die deze these hebben vormgegeven. De erkenning van de veelheid en 
de verscheidenheid die eigen is aan praktijken is van wezenlijk belang voor een begrip van de 
sociale werkelijkheid als contingent en open en geeft ruimte om de keuzevrijheid van actoren 
en vormen van verzet te bestuderen. Een interpretatieve benadering van democratische 
governance is daarom uiteindelijke een politieke benadering, aangezien het de onderzoeker 
ertoe brengt zich kritisch op te stellen met betrekking tot wat democratische governance is en 
vermag te zijn. Een dergelijke kritische houding is gebaseerd op een begrip van de sociale 
werkelijkheid als open, veelvoudig en heterogeen. 
 De principes van openheid, veelheid en verscheidenheid hebben ten slotte de definitie van 
democratische governance in deze these bepaald. Kritisch zijn ten opzichte van 
democratische governance betekent in laatste instantie niet dat men laat zien hoe de praktijk 
van governance tekortschiet ten opzichte van normatieve idealen, of hoe bepaalde domeinen 
van de maatschappij gedepolitiseerd worden. Hoewel deze laatste twee aspecten zonder 
twijfel onderdeel zijn van een kritische positie, is het doel van deze positie uiteindelijk te 
laten zien hoe aan macht verzet kan worden geboden door de keuzevrijheid te benadrukken 
die het gevolg is van actoren die gebruik maken van de handelingslogica die zij ter 
beschikking hebben binnen de praktijken waarin zij zijn gesitueerd. Voor alle duidelijkheid: 
dit betekent niet dat alle domeinen van de maatschappij gepolitiseerd moeten worden om 
governance democratisch te laten zijn. In plaats van het politieke domein uit te breiden, zoals 
governance discoursen lijken te impliceren, gaat democratische governance volgens deze 
these over het omvormen van een beeld van politiek als uniform en behorende bij de 
soevereine staat naar een beeld van politiek dat bestaat uit een veelheid van wederzijds 
afhankelijke praktijken. Om gestalte te geven aan de wens om democratische governance 
werkelijkheid te laten worden is dientengevolge een hernieuwd begrip van democratie nodig 
dat het bevrijd van haar associaties met de staat en politieke elites en dat het in plaats daarvan 
situeert in de politieke processen van dagelijkse besluitvorming. 
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